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ABSTRACT
Although laughter has been studied for centuries, the work has occurred in several
different fields, and the lack of an interdisciplinary approach has hindered the integration
of results. Work in philosophy has focused on why we laugh but has lacked a basis in
empirical data, resulting in ungrounded theories. Studies in neuroscience and linguistics
rest on empirical data, but stop short of a full description of the phenomenon of laughter,
focusing on when and how we laugh, but not why. This study seeks to describe the
phenomenon of laughter more fully, to describe both the nature of the laughable and
laughter’s integration into conversations.
To determine how laughter is related to other conversational utterances in
organization and meaning, I recorded conversations among adult native speakers of
English, interviewed the participants for their perceptions, and analyzed both the
conversations and the interview comments. I adopted a conversation analysis approach
for analyzing the conversational data, and an ethnographic approach for the interview
data. By first identifying laugh tokens in conversations and then relating them to other
conversational elements, I identified what triggered laughter. I then analyzed the
propositional content of laughable utterances in order to determine the nature of the
laughable. I also drew on folk knowledge of laughter as revealed in casual speech and
cliched phrases as well as the interview comments of the participants to triangulate my
analysis for validity.
xi

Structurally, laughter is integrated into the broader structure of conversation. It
follows regular turn-taking structure as a second pair part in two types of adjacency pairs:
1) laughable-laugh, and 2) laugh-laugh. Laughter is also integrated into conversation as
backchannel and as a speaker discourse marker. The nature of the laughable is
incongruous. Incongruous utterances consist of various techniques that present the
propositional content in an unreal way or consist of propositional content itself that
highlights contrast, difference, improbability, or accuracy of knowledge. Finally,
understanding incongruity as an expression of the unreal encompasses a
phenomenological view of laughter and allows a broader interdisciplinary approach that
can interrelate many of the various studies and theories of laughter.

xn

CHAPTER 1
HE WHO LAUGHS LAST LAUGHS LOUDEST: INTRODUCTION
In what is sure to become tiresome for the reader, each chapter of this work is
entitled with a cliched phrase, but it is done for two good reasons. First, because doing so
allows me to flout the rules of good writing, which demand that one avoid cliches, and
I’ve always wanted to be a floutist. Second, because the folk sayings and clichdd phrases
that exist in any community’s language give insight into what the community or social
group believes and values, and this study seeks to discover what we know and believe
about laughter.
Apparently, we don’t know anything about he who laughs first; no phrase or
saying fits the initial chapter of a study on the subject of laughter in conversation. In its
absence, the only American saying that deals with the ordering of laughter, one that deals
with laughing last, has been chosen to take its place. In fact, the limitations of folk
knowledge on any subject become quite obvious when we look closely at the proverb in
the title of this chapter. First, the proverb deals only with one position in the order of
laughing, yet if there is someone who laughs last, then there must also be someone who
laughs first, and perhaps others who laugh in the middle. This reveals the incomplete
nature of folk knowledge. Second, there are two versions of the proverb. One is as
written, “He who laughs last laughs loudest.” The second runs, “He who laughs last
laughs best.” This demonstrates the inconclusive character of folk knowledge.
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Nevertheless, without relying entirely upon folk knowledge to discover what we know
and believe about laughter, we can find some usefulness in it for various points in this
study. As befits an academic study, however, the conclusions will be grounded in natural
conversational data and theoretical constructs. Unfortunately, this doesn’t provide much
opportunity to inject jokes, witticisms, or other verbal play into the discussion.
The very fact that it is possible to study humor and laughter without being
humorous and without laughing was first made evident to me, and to some students of
mine, a number of years ago when I constructed a course I called Humor in English. At
the time I was teaching in an intensive ESL program for international students. The
program was scheduled in such a way that, in the afternoons, students were given several
choices of electives from which to choose one. For my part, I offered the course on
humor. We took a brief look at the history of comedy in the cinema with a unit on Mack
Sennett, the Keystone Cops, Harold Lloyd, the Little Rascals, and other early comedians,
watching some film and learning the different terms for the different sorts of comedy:
slapstick, situation comedy, and the like. We also did a section on linguistic humor, puns
in particular, with some reference to bumper stickers (like “He who laughs last thinks
slowest”) and greeting cards. In addition, we looked at cartoons, such as The Far Side.
Finally, we considered what it is that is funny. When students evaluated the class at the
end, several commented that they disliked the course, with one stating particularly clearly
why: “I wanted to enjoy humor, but instead we study it.” Alas, I am a better scholar than
comedian, and I teach rather than entertain. Nevertheless, my interest in humor and
laughter has not waned even as my abilities to entertain have not waxed. Thus, it was
that a couple of years ago, in a discourse analysis study, the amount and distribution of
2

laughter in a conversation I was studying caught my interest. That work provided the
initial impetus for this study.
The central goal in this study is to discover how laughter is related to the other
vocalizations of conversation and what the laughter in a conversation means to the
interactants. My findings suggest that laughter is related to the fundamental differences
between individuals. The study of the structure of laughter led to the identification of the
elements that cause or stimulate laughter. Analysis of the stimulus led to the conclusion
that the nature of the laughable is incongruity. The source of incongruity lies in the
differences in experiences, perceptions, and expectations that individuals have. Since the
central goal of pairticipation in a conversation is to get closer to or otherwise connect with
others, the inherent differences between any two conversational interactants are of great
relevance. To connect, the two individuals must identify the areas where the differences
lie and bridge those gaps in one of two ways. First, one individual may share an
experience unique to him- or herself, and the other, who has not experienced the same,
then attempts to empathize as the way to bridge the gap. Second, one individual may
express an experience unique to him- or herself, and the other indicates having
experienced a similar experience. An inability to empathize or identify a similar
experience results in an inability for the two to connect. Laughter relates to the
incongruity, however, not just in the presence of connection or just in the lack thereof:
some laughter, which may be called regular laughter or humorous laughter, indicates a
connection, while nervous laughter indicates a lack of connection. Therefore, laughter
can serve to create or maintain connections, or it can serve to indicate a breach in
connection.
3

The writings that deal with laughter stretch back to some of the earliest texts of
humankind. However, five writers in particular frame the issue in a modem way that also
encompasses some of the oldest works. These five writers frame the issue for my study,
as well. John Morreall reviews the seminal works on laughter throughout the ages in two
different books. Gail Jefferson and Phillip Glenn deal with its placement in
conversational interactions. Robert Provine looks at it in a series of experiments that
range in focus from the biological to the social. Finally, Terrence Deacon uses laughter
as an example to show how human brains and human communications differ from those
of animals. A closer look at the works of each of these five is in order.
Philosophical Roots of Laughter Study
Philosophers and psychologists have typically focused on humor and the nature of
jokes, that is, on what makes us laugh. Philosopher John Morreall and, following his
lead, Simon Critchley, provide surveys of the historical discussions and theories of
laughter. According to these two, three theories dominate the philosophical and
psychological literature on laughter and humor: 1) laughter arises out of an individual’s
sense of superiority over another, 2) laughter arises when one becomes cognizant of an
incongruity, and 3) laughter results as one releases pent up tension, providing relief.
The Superiority Theory
Thomas Hobbes remains the most cited proponent of the Superiority Theory,
although both Plaito and Aristotle adhere to this philosophy, as well as Cicero. Morreall
(Taking Laughter 4-10) cites several other adherents in more recent times, including
R6ne Descartes, Konrad Lorenz, Anthony Ludovici, and Albert Rapp, and traces
instances of the laughter of ridicule and superiority in our own modem society and other
4

contemporary cultures. The theory has its adherents even in recent years with Barry
Sanders and F. H. Buckley describing their takes on this much older concept. In short,
the Superiority Theory states that we laugh when we realize our own personal gain or
superiority over another individual, and we laugh in our “sudden glory” (Hobbes 43).
The image conjured in the mind is that of a caveman standing with one foot on the chest
of a fallen foe, arms raised in victory as he hoots with laughter over the defeat of his
enemy.
Yet, this image of man in “sudden glory” dissatifies, for the caveman shouldn’t be
hooting with laughter, but rather shouting with one loud “Yah!” In Taking Laughter
Seriously, Morreall, too, describes the inadequacy of the Superiority Theory, noting its
inability to describe tickle-based laughter. Morreall notes that babies laugh when played
with and children laugh when tickled. In tickling, the person being tickled is most
decidedly not superior to the person doing the tickling. In fact, it may well be that the
person being tickled is subject to the control of the tickler rather than being superior to
the tickler.
Folk knowledge fails to see superiority as the key to laughter, either. Folk
anecdotes exist of tickling’s use as a torture mechanism, and it is easy, if one has ever
been held down and tickled overly long by siblings, to understand how the laughter
produced does not coincide with feelings of superiority. Additionally, we talk casually of
“nervous laughter” as well as of what might be termed regular laughter. If laughter is
always produced by the achievement of gain over another, why would we ever talk about
nervousness in conjunction with laughter?

5

Sanders twists the Superiority Theory slightly, showing how humor can be
employed by the underclass to subvert the power of the overclass, ultimately making the
inferior superior even while remaining inferior in certain respects. This new twist helps
clarify the role of “nervous laughter” by suggesting that the inferior who laughs and
thereby subverts the overclass should feel nervous while laughing because the superiority
is not actually shifted from the superior to the inferior. Still, Sanders’ approach includes
one flaw: he says that humor, not laughter, is what is used as the tool of subversion. The
question must then be raised whether humor and laughter are one and the same thing. To
determine the answer to this, we may look at the structure of conversations to discover if
laughter and humor both exist and if they are interchangeable.
The Superiority Theory may not be completely erroneous, though, for it is
certainly a feature in some instances of laughter. As Morreall states, “It would be foolish,
then, to respond to the Hobbesean theory of laughter by denying the reality of derisive
laughter. A more reasonable line of criticism, I think, is to show that not all cases of
laughter can be explained as involving feelings of superiority, and hence that ‘sudden
glory’ cannot be the essence of laughter” (Taking Laughter 10). It is only by looking at
cases of naturally occurring humor and laughter that we will be able to identify the role
that a feeling of superiority plays in laughter in conversations.
The Incongruity Theory
The second traditional theory of laughter claims people laugh when they note an
incongruity of some sort. An incongruity arises when a person holds some sort of
expectation that is unrealized, or more accurately, that is substituted for by some other
event than the expected one. According to Morreall and Critchley, the main proponents
6

of this theory are Kant, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, and Francis Hutcheson, with Kant
taken as the lead theorist. Kant’s leadership seems to be based simply on his greater
stature among philosophers, for Hutcheson’s work came earlier.
Hutcheson seeks to critique Hobbes and demonstrate that laughter does not
represent a sense of superiority, and he produces several of the same types of arguments
that Morreall later presents. Hutcheson goes on to delineate his own competing theory to
replace the Superiority Theory, and he comes up with a version of the Incongruity
Theory: “That then which seems generally the cause of laughter is the bringing together
of images which have contrary additional ideas .. . .” (32). Hutcheson’s words seem to
refer to the unusual coexistence of two items (ideas or images) that are not usually seen
together, or are even usually exclusive of each other, and that would indicate incongruity.
Incongruity provides more satisfactory scenarios to conjure laughter in the mind
than superiority. I can think of instances when I was expecting to say one word and
another came out of my mouth. I and the others around me laughed at the mistake. Kant
aptly describes this scenario, too. Kant’s apparent thesis statement on laughter runs thus
in translation: “Laughter is an affect that arises if a tense expectation is transformed into
nothing” (203). The transformation of an expectation “into nothing” points to situations
where we operate on a set of notions that this or that particular event will transpire.
When our expectations are not met, when something else in fact transpires, all our
expectations evaporate into uselessness, and we see that our expectations were
incongruous with reality, and we laugh. When a joke is made, Kant points out that “the
joke must contain something that can deceive us for a moment” (204), meaning that the
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joke must create expectations that will be made incongruous with the actual outcome of
the joke.
As with the Superiority Theory, however, Morreall (Taking Laughter') notes
inadequacies with the Incongruity Theory. He believes there must be more to laughter
than its status as a vocalization that occurs when we find an unexpected similarity or
when we find coexistence between two items that we previously considered unrelated or
when one train of thought is unexpectedly rerouted onto another track where it continues
to run quite well. Again, an infant’s laughter at being tickled provides Morreall with an
example where no incongruity seems to exist. Rarely does an individual sneak up on a
baby and surprise it with tickling. Typically, a parent or sibling is engaging in play
already and is already touching the baby during that play when the play turns into tickling
play. Parents and siblings often preface the tickle with cootchie-cootchie-coo sounds or
“I’m gonna getcha.” The infant can expect to be touched by the playmate and still laugh
in response to the actual tickle. Yet, what Moreall’s discussion misses is that while the
tickling can be anticipated, the exact moment of the tickling is out of the control of the
ticklee and can never be truly expected.
A stronger criticism of the Incongruity Theory is the fact that we do not laugh at
all incongruous situations (Morreall Taking Laughter 19; Santayana 91). In Morreall’s
explanatory example, finding a cobra in the refrigerator would be incongruous, but one is
not likely to respond by laughing at this unexpected event. Rather one is likely to
scream, slam the door, and call animal control. Therefore, Morreall says, the Incongruity
Theory, like the Superiority Theory, only covers some instances of laughter. Morreall’s
observation that we do not laugh at all incongruities leads to a new issue that a theory of
8

laughter must deal with: not only must a theory on laughter deal with when and why we
laugh, but also when and why we don’t laugh.
The Relief Theory
Although Kant is taken as a proponent of the Incongruity Theory, this assumption
betrays a lack of close reading of Kant’s works, for Kant discusses laughter as arising not
only out of a perceived incongruity but also out of a release of some sort. Kant spends
much time discussing the physiology of laughter, describing laughter as “a quickening”
that is “merely bodily, even though it is aroused by ideas of the mind” (202). Such
descriptions, along with overt statements on laughter as a release, including “in the
exhibition involved in jest, the understanding, failing to find what is expected, suddenly
relaxes, so that we feel the effect of this slackening in the body by the vibration of our
organs” (203), prompt me and Morreall (Taking Laughter 16) to view Kant’s theory as
encompassing bo>th the Incongruity Theory and the Relief Theory.
While Kant intimates that laughter provides a relief of some kind of tension, the
star of the relief theory is Freud. Herbert Spencer, too, adheres to this theory, and George
Santayana combines incongruity with release, much as Kant does. Kant represents the
oldest of this group, with Spencer next, followed by Freud and then Santayana.
The Relief Theory, or Release Theory, of laughter posits that people laugh when
an excess of energy has built up and the physical act of laughing serves to release this
energy. Kant saw the energy as arising from the build up of tension as our expectations
for a certain outcome grow. When those expectations “transform into nothing” (203) by
going unrealized, then the tension of expectation must be released in some way, and the
method of release is laughter.
9

Spencer saw laughter as having two causes: 1) strong feeling, whether “mental or
physical,” which will result in “the muscular actions constituting” laughter (104), and 2)
incongruity (105). For Spencer, however, laughter roused by incongruity is not merely
the release of previously pent-up serious feelings, rather it provides one more route for an
excess of nervous energy to flow out, and it is a route in addition to others which may
also be utilized at the same time. Other routes the energy may take include further
physical activity, such as clapping hands and jumping up and down, or transformation
into another emotion, such as anger.
Freud’s work, Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, as the title of his book
suggests, seeks to locate connections between humor or joke-making and the unconscious
mind. For Freud, “laughter is an indication of pleasure” (181), and the pleasure is
produced at the release of “psychical energy which has become free through the lifting of
the inhibitory cathexis” (Jokes 182). In other words, people use psychical energy to
repress or inhibit certain socially unacceptable emotions or thoughts. Most notable
among these unacceptable thoughts or emotions are hostility and sexuality. When a joke
is made, some unacceptable thought or emotion is expressed, and the need for its
inhibition is removed momentarily. In that moment, the psychical energy usually used to
inhibit the thought is unnecessary and can be released. It is released through laughter. In
Freud’s view, this explains why those who tell jokes don’t laugh, while those who hear
the jokes do. Since the joke-teller uses the psychical energy formerly employed in an
inhibitory function to make the joke, the joke-teller no longer has any energy to release; it
has been used in the joke-telling process. A person who hears a joke, however, does have
energy being used for inhibition; when that energy is freed, the hearer laughs.
10

Morreall (Taking Laughter) again provides arguments against the relief theory,
criticizing both Spencer and Freud. He gives examples of laughter that do not follow the
prescribed pattern of a build-up of emotion or the inhibition of emotion followed by a
release of the emotion or energy through laughter. Morreall’s criticisms seem weak,
however, and a stronger criticism is that some proponents of the Relief Theory see
laughter as psychologically based, while others present it as a physical phenomenon.
Both of these types of descriptions are combined under the one umbrella of Relief
Theory. This leads to the question of how laughter is related to the mind and to the
physical self.
Morreall's Theory
After Morreall criticizes the three traditional theories, he presents his own theory
of laughter. Because Morreall sees value in all three, but also sees the same deficit, which
is the inability to explain all cases of laughter, Morreall proposes a theory to subsume all
three of these major theories.
Morreall’s thesis states that “laughter results from a pleasant psychological shift”
(Taking Laughter 39). This statement subsumes the theory that laughter arises when
there is a change of psychological state, whether the change be one from an expected
situation to an unexpected outcome (Incongruity Theory) or from a state of pent-up
emotion to released emotion (Relief Theory) or from a state of inferiority to superiority
(Superiority Theory). It also encompasses the Hobbesean idea that the change must be
sudden; Morreall chooses the word “shift” deliberately, assigning it a definition of
rapidity (Taking Laughter 39). Finally, it encompasses Freud’s notion of laughter as an
indication of pleasure because the change must be pleasant to the person experiencing the
11

change. Morreall then goes on to describe the variety of humor and other aspects of the
laughter phenomenon we experience in life.
In the end, however, Morreall’s theory shakes out as a version of the incongruity
theory when he states, “Most adult humor, then, is based on incongruity, and not on
simple surprise” (Taking Laughter 60). Indeed, his later work (“Funny Ha-ha”) is an
essay on incongruity and our various responses to it. Morreall suggests that humans react
in three ways to incongruous situations: 1) We produce a “negative emotion” of anger,
fear, sadness, or disgust (190), 2) We attempt to assimilate the incongruity into reality by
altering “our own cognitive state of puzzlement” (194), or 3) We react with “humorous
amusement,” a response when we feel no discomfort (195). The implication is that
laughter co-occurs with the feeling of amusement, but not with any of the other emotions.
What Morreall fails to provide, however, is proof that laughter always co-occurs
with a feeling of amusement and never with a negative feeling or a feeling of puzzlement.
He fails to prove his thesis, then, because he fails to use empirical data. Next we need to
look at the work of researchers trained to employ empirical data and a more scientific
approach to see whether they can shed more light on the problematic areas of laughter
that the philosophers were unable to resolve.
The Empirical Roots of Laughter Study
Of the three major theories posited by traditional philosophy, the Incongruity
Theory seems to cover the most instances of laughter, although as Morreall sufficiently
points out, like the Superiority Theory, it doesn’t cover all. Since laughter’s role as a
release bears more scrutiny, as well, the question arises of whether reading outside the
field of philosophy might provide greater insight. Empirically-based fields such as
12

modem psychology, sociology, and linguistics draw on different methodologies than
philosophy and may lead to new insights.
The Sociality Theory
Linguists have focused on laughter in conversation and how it is structured with
other vocalizations. They have also come to conclusions on its role in conversation. The
two foremost linguists who have focused on the study of laughter are Gail Jefferson and
Phillip Glenn. The bulk of Jefferson’s work on laughter took place in the 1970s and
1980s, while Glenn began in the 1980s and has relied heavily on Jefferson.
In a series of articles, Jefferson describes a number of points on laughter and
conversation. In one (“An Exercise”) she outlines a system for transcribing the laughter
that occurs in conversation. In another (“Inviting Laughter”), she begins her work
describing how laughter is structured in conversation, especially noticing how it
correlates with turn-taking by participants, and how it can be produced by either a
speaker or a listener. Later articles deal with laughter’s role in “talk about troubles” and
on its role “in the pursuit of intimacy.” In these last two works, Jefferson describes
laughter as a mechanism used for the discovery, maintenance, affirmation, and
reestablishment of affiliation among conversational interactants. Jefferson’s work is
seminal, credited as the first to deal with the description of laughter’s structure in
conversation. What is significant is that Jefferson turned to natural, real conversational
data for her analyses, rather than depending upon personal observations and experiences.
Equally significant is Jefferson’s adoption of the term “affiliation” to describe laughter’s
major role in conversation. This term and the identification of laughter’s social role have
become the major breakthroughs in recent studies of laughter. Nevertheless, Jefferson
13

does not dwell on the affiliative nature of laughter, preferring instead to focus on its
structure in conversation. What she leaves almost entirely unaddressed is what causes
laughter to occur, although she provides the term “laughable” as a way to refer to it.
Extending Jefferson’s work, Phillip Glenn has sought to draw together much of
the work on laughter in conversation. While Glenn, too, uses natural, real conversational
data, he uses data collected and transcribed by others as well as by himself. Also like
Jefferson, Glenn spends much time focusing on laughter’s structure within a
conversation, but he strengthens and defends the definition of laughter’s role as affiliative
and introduces a new aspect of laughter in conversation: its power to disaffiliate. Glenn
states, “Through laughing, and laughing together, we contribute to the ongoing creation,
maintenance, and termination of interpersonal relationships. We also display, read, and
negotiate identity'” (2). Yet, Glenn does not limit his study of laughter to merely what we
can know through the study of transcripts. He demonstrates great familiarity with the
work of the philosophers, describing Morreall’s tripartite division of the historical views
on laughter in Taking Laughter Seriously. Glenn’s work, then, represents the “state of
the art” knowledge of laughter by the linguists. Yet, he, too, overlooks any description of
what causes individuals to laugh in a conversation.
The present study draws heavily on the work of these two linguists. It borrows
their focus on laughter in conversation and employs their technique of recording,
transcribing, and analyzing real, unmanipulated conversation. Not surprisingly, it reaches
many of the same conclusions regarding laughter’s affiliative role in conversation, but it
extends their work by taking on the question of the nature of the laughable.
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Standing between the philosophers and the linguists, or rather (as he would
probably prefer) standing apart from the philosophers and linguists, is Robert Provine, a
behavioral neuroscientist, who rejects all work done previous to his own by both camps.
Provine is particularly harsh on the philosophers, stating,
. . . , laughter has always hovered at the threshold of scientific
scrutiny, more the province of the poet than the scientist. The challenge
was to nudge it over that threshold and examine it as a problem in natural
science. After 2,000 years of pontificating by philosophers, it was high
time that we actually observed laughing people and described what they
were doing, when they did it, and what it meant. This is the kind of work
that should have been done 300 years ago. (3)
As proof that the work of linguists should also be ignored, Provine offers these
words,
Transcript analyses, most notably by Jefferson (1985) and Jefferson,
Sacks, and Schegloff (1987), provide a microanalysis of laughter’s
placement in conversation. Although rigorous at the level of the
transcript, these studies often make assumptions about the intentionality of
laughter (e.g., laughter is “offered,” “invited,” or “accepted”) that are
unwarranted given laughter’s minimal conscious control. (218)
And he concludes that “Laughter, it was clear, was an orphan behavior with a promising
future, but currently without a theoretical home or means of support” (8). Yet, Provine
also resolutely refuses to create a theory of laughter himself, telling his readers, “You will
not find a tidy series of experiments that drive inexorably (and with an intellectual
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flourish) to a Grand Unified Theory of Laughter” (9). So although he recognizes
laughter’s need for a “home,” he isn’t going to provide it. He is the social worker, not the
foster parent to this “orphan behavior,”
Yet, as perhaps befits a social worker, Provine repeatedly comes back to
laughter’s “sociality” (45). He frequently makes comments like “laughter is a social
behavior” (25), “laughter is the quintessential human social signal” (44), and “the social
bonding of laughter” (135). Apparently, he does have a home that can support laughter at
a theoretical standard of living: laughter serves as a signal that assists in the bonding and
other social relationships of humans. Provine, thus, in spite of his disclaimers, agrees
with Glenn and Jefferson that laughter plays a social role, both affiliative (bonding) and
disaffiliative. I will refer to this theory of laughter as the Sociality Theory, using
Provine’s term, and declare its adherents to include Provine, Jefferson, and Glenn.
Provine shares more than an empirically-based approach to the study of laughter
and an interpretation of laughter as performing a social function with Jefferson and
Glenn, however. Like them, he, too, does not attempt to describe the laughable in detail.
He goes slightly further than either Jefferson or Glenn in this respect, but he does not
attempt to go much further.
The Semiotic Theory
Another neuroscientist, Terrence W. Deacon, has also looked at laughter. In his
book, The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of Language and the Brain, Deacon seeks
to differentiate human language from other modes of communication, both nonhuman
communication and human nonlanguage (vocal and gestural) communication. He also
attempts to describe the origin and development of the human linguistic system as a
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process involving first the evolution of symbolic reference and language and secondarily
the development of enlarged and more intelligent human brains. Although he is a
neuroscientist (like Provine) and an evolutionary anthropologist, he brings the linguistic
work of Ferdinand de Saussure and the philosophical work of Charles Peirce on semiotics
and semantics to bear on the issue. Thus, he combines linguistics with philosophy and
neuroscience to describe the nature and evolution of language and the brain.
Deacon’s concept of the interrelationship of language and brain development
employs Saussure’s and Peirce’s system of signs. A simplified view of the sign system
states that there are three kinds of signs: 1) iconic signs, 2) indexical signs, and 3)
symbolic signs (Peirce 8). All signs require an “object” that is signified by the sign, and
all signs have an “interpretant,” a concept created by the sign “in the mind” (Peirce 5).
An iconic sign is one that bears a similarity to the object it signifies; pictures, diagrams,
and metaphors are all iconic signs (Peirce 10). Indexical signs occur in “dynamical” and
“spatial connection” with the objects they signify (Peirce 13). They also connect to
objects through memory. Symbolic signs exist only because “habit or acquired law”
allows them to (Peirce 16). Nevertheless, a sign can be at once both indexical and
symbolic or both iconic and symbolic, or perhaps even iconic, indexical, and symbolic all
at once.
Deacon ties his theory of brain and language development to this semiotic theory
of signs, claiming that human language developed in a hierarchical pattern of sign
interpretation. Human language, he says, is characterized by symbolic reference, not by
indexical or iconic reference. Animal communication can be explained in terms of iconic
and indexical reference only. Yet, he claims, human communication maintains its system
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of innate calls and gestures, which are iconic and indexical, alongside its language
system, which is only symbolic in nature. For Deacon, laughter provides a case in point
of an innate call that is both iconic and indexical and is interwoven with the language
system. When it is joined with language, it becomes symbolic in nature and becomes
humor. Deacon’s approach may be termed the Semiotic Theory of laughter.
Like Provine, Jefferson, and Glenn, however, Deacon, too, sees laughter as a
social signal. He characterizes it as playing “an important role in the maintenance of
group cohesion and identity” (419), and, pairing it with sobbing, he says the two signals
“are vehicles for coordinating the emotions of a social group” (429) whose “production ..
. serves to initiate some of the more intense social-affiliation responses humans engage
in” (419). All of these ways of talking about laughter indicate Deacon sees laughter as a
behavior that is connected first of all to emotion, and second of all to the sharing of
emotions or the spreading of emotions throughout a group. Such sharing serves to bond
individuals, coordinate activity and behavior, and create affiliations among the members
of the group.
Yet Deacon also harkens back to MorrealPs work, acknowledging some aspects
of the Relief Theory may be involved in laughter’s production and manipulation, for he
says “Perhaps the ‘release’ of laughter, like the sudden disinhibition of a suppressed
automatic response, reflects the disengaging of prefrontal control” (421). The use of the
term “release,” especially with its quotation marks, serves as a signal to the reader that
this is not Deacon’s own idea about laughter, but that a concept of laughter as a release
comes from elsewhere. The inclusion of the word “disinhibition” should serve as a
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trigger setting off the Freud alarm for those who have read up on laughter or on Freud, as
any neuroscientist would have done.
Aspects of the Incongruity Theory also arise as Deacon discusses laughter: “A
call that may primarily have been selected for its role as a symptom of ‘recoding’
potentially aggressive actions as friendly social play seems to have been ‘captured’ by the
similar recoding process implicit in humor and discovery. In both conditions, insight,
surprise, and removal of uncertainty are critical components” (421). Here the key words
“insight” and “surprise” signal the reader that Deacon is referring to the Incongruity
Theory.
Finally, Deacon doesn’t leave out the Superiority Theory in his discussion, but he
doesn’t endorse it greatly. He writes, “It is often the case that jokes have an aggressive
social undercurrent to them, yet they trivialize these tendencies, as w ell.. .. Laughter is
probably most common not in humorous contexts, but in uncomfortable social contexts,
where it displays both a nonaggressive stance and a kind of group assent” (421). With
these words, Deacon acknowledges the “aggressive” aspect of jokes while at the same
time disallowing the characterization of actual laughter as aggressive. He would seem,
then, to disagree with Hobbes, not in the absence of superiority, but by placing
superiority in the joke-making, not in the laughing.
In the end, then, without focusing his work on laughter, Deacon draws together
the work from all fields on laughter. Deacon’s discussions on laughter seem to have gone
unnoticed by other researchers, probably because the focus of the book is not laughter but
the development of human language and the human brain. This lack of focus on laughter
is one detriment to Deacon’s work, for it does not give a complete description or
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explanation of laughter even while it hints at a description of laughter that combines
superiority, incongruity, relief, and sociality with semiotics. A second detriment that
Deacon’s work contains is the lack of empirical data to support any of his points.
Five major theories of laughter have been offered through the ages, but each
exhibits some gaps. The three traditional theories do not explain all cases of laughter,
and Morreall’s attempt to reconcile all three suffers in its return to mere incongruity, a
position he himself pointed out as untenable. Nevertheless, his work suggests one
solution to the problem with the Incongruity Theory: he suggests that laughter is not
elicited by all incongruities because it coexists with amusement, so only those
incongruities that elicit amusement will also elicit laughter. This suggestion needs to be
tested against empirical data, a step that Morreall does not take and that causes his work
to suffer from the same problem that the work by all philosophers suffers from: its lack of
grounding in empirical data, a defect pointed out by Provine.
The Sociality Theory as outlined by Jefferson, Glenn, and Provine brings
empirical evidence to bear on the discussion, but it does not adequately address the
central issue the philosophers had: what makes us laugh? If merely being among others
explains our laughter, then why do we not laugh constantly while we pass the time in the
company of friends? Or in the company of strangers for that matter? Provine goes so far
as to show that what is laughable is not joke-telling, but he neglects to define or describe
that which is laughable. Jefferson and Glenn, too, stop short of full description. Provine
also neglects to discuss laughter by a speaker, avoiding that subject altogether. Jefferson
and Glenn take up the issue of speaker laughter, but neglect to find out if their
interpretations match the internal states of the participants. Thus, speaker laughter is
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defined as an “invitation” to laugh, but we don’t find out if that interpretation explains all
cases, a situation that is especially troubling given the duality that the sociality theory
posits in laughter’s role to affiliate or disaffiliate. If the speaker invites others to laugh,
does he or she thus invite them to affiliate or to disaffiliate? The internal state of the
speaker becomes important.
Finally, Deacon’s Semiotic Theory of laughter represents a return to the
theoretical without grounding in empirical research. Laughter as an innate response cry
of humans is a given in this theory, and Deacon does not use empirical data of laughing
people. Deacon, however, represents another example, along with Morreall, of attempts
to create a full description of laughter, a description that can encompass many theories.
Similar to Morreall and Deacon, then, but in contrast to Provine, I don’t declare
laughter an orphan as a result of my killing off the parents. Rather, I see a need for
research on laughter to reconcile the divorced parents, if possible. Such reconciliation
may not be possible, and we may indeed find one of the parents to be a deadbeat, if not
actually dead. A proper understanding of laughter may subsume all done previously,
rather than reject all done previously.
However, I also agree with Provine that we mustn’t beat a dead horse by
“rehashing this well-worn literature” (12). Neither Morreall nor Deacon, unfortunately,
refer to any empirical studies. Morreall cites real life experiences, but these are generally
experiences drawn from his own life, and Deacon’s empirical research is on a wider
range of human communication than laughter alone: laughter is simply an example of the
greater whole. What is needed is “new data” (Provine 12) and new minds, or Provine’s
“fresh eye and ear” (4), working to mediate the perspectives on laughter of the
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philosophers, the linguists, and the natural scientists. The intent of this study is to
provide one session in that mediating work.
Methods
The original goal of this study was to identify the structure and meaning of
laughter in conversation. This goal then represents an attempt to fill some of the gaps
from the earlier work. To ensure that the conclusions are based on empirical data, I
observed and recorded real, unmanipulated conversations. To ensure that the internal
states of participants are taken into account, I interviewed the conversation participants
after the conversation. To ensure that all cases of laughter are identified, I transcribed
each conversation and interview with the assistance of professional transcriptionists and
amateur research assistants. In the analysis of the verbal data, I did not preclude any of
the earlier theories from consideration as a category or code, nor did I foreclose any new
explanations. This study, then, represents a blending of two methodological approaches:
the conversation analysis approach to discourse analysis within sociolinguistics and the
qualitative interview technique from the social sciences, and the combination of
approaches will help me obtain an ethnography of laughing.
Participant Selection
In order to write an ethnography, I must observe an ethnos, or a particular group,
as they interact with each other. This study is limited to adult native speakers of English
from North America, a group with ample numbers of participants in my present location.
To locate participants, I approached acquaintances and friends of mine, fellow graduate
students, and students who attended institutions of higher education in the urban area
where I live. I limited the participants by age for two reasons. First, and most
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importantly, adults typically are more developed verbally and can better articulate their
feelings, attitudes, and perceptions when asked than can a minor, an important concern
since I am seeking to describe the meanings people place on laughter. Second, the ethics
of informed consent by adults is easy to handle. Each adult is responsible for him or
herself, so the decision to participate involves only one person for each adult, whereas a
minor’s participation would involve the consent of both the minor and his or her
guardian.
Procedures
Also important for this ethnography of laughing was the location of real
conversations. I learned early on that my setting up a conversation created an artificial
conversation, not a real one. Therefore, I had to find participants who would get together
on their own and allow me to observe, record, and question them about the experience.
At no point in the conversation recording or participant interviewing stages did the
participants know the topic under study. This was intended to assure that during the
conversation itself, participants would not become overly aware of their laughter or
attempt to ensure that they did indeed laugh. In short, in order to ensure nonmanipulation
of the topic of study, laughter, the participants needed to be kept ignorant of its
importance while they were conversing. Likewise in the interviews, the participants were
asked questions about the conversation they had participated in, questions that focused
specifically on the sections when someone laughed. But to avoid arriving at dredged up
concepts about laughter in general rather than arriving at perceptions about laughter in
the conversation particularly, I kept the participants ignorant through the interviewing
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stage as well. Participants who desired received a debriefing at the conclusion of the
interview.
All names in this document are pseudonyms to protect the identities of
participants. In addition, participants were informed both in written and oral modes what
risks they might take in acting as participants, and they signed consent forms (Appendix
A) to the effect that they understood the risks to them in participating. Furthermore,
every participant was free to withdraw from the study at any time. Participation was
voluntary, but volunteers were frequently treated to refreshments as part of their
participation: when the conversations or interviews took place over lunch or coffee, I
paid.
Scope
It must be pointed out that this report on the structure and meaning of laughter in
conversation is limited in its scope. First and foremost, the contexts in which laughter is
being studied and described are limited to conversations among native speakers of
English in North America. The results presented here should not be assumed to explain
how laughter occurs in other cultures or other times than contemporary English-speaking
America. Moreover, this report does not seek to describe the literary occurrences of
humor or laughter: comedy in literature and theater, including stand-up comedy, is not
under scrutiny here, and may well function in ways other than reported here. Finally,
only laughter in conversations is studied here. Solo laughter is not studied, nor is
laughter in more structured but socially interactive contexts, such as classes or business
meetings, studied here.
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Validity
Despite my best attempts to analyze without bias, as any researcher, I bring
certain views with me to this study. New to the formal study of humor and laughter, I sit
most closely with the linguists in my training and perspective, holding a Master of Arts in
Teaching with a concentration in English as a second language and having been a teacher
of ESL for many years, a pursuit that falls into the domain of applied linguistics. A
student of languages for many years, majoring in Classics and Medieval Studies in my
undergraduate schooling, my current pursuit of a doctoral degree has been marked by
numerous courses in linguistics, but I have also begun to inquire into and study the
perspectives of the philosophers, as well, with prominence given to Existentialism.
The following steps have been taken to ensure valid results are obtained. First, an
adequate number of participants and instances of laughter were sought. A total of eight
conversations involving 23 participants plus me acting in a participant observer role were
recorded and studied. Each conversation lasted approximately 20 minutes for a total of
approximately 160 minutes of conversational data. This data yielded a total of 570
instances of conversational laughter arising from 504 laughables. Some laughables
elicted more than one instance of laughter, and some laughter gave rise to more laughter,
causing the discrepancy in numbers between laughter and laughables. Of the 504
laughables, however, only 481 were identifiable at the time of transcription due to the
inherent difficulties of working with real conversations and features such as overlapping
talk, inaudible talk, and so on.
Further validity comes from the fact that I was not the sole research tool: the
participants themselves were asked in interviews to consider the conversations they had
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participated in and provide insider information on feelings, perceptions, and
interpretations. In addition, the interpretations and perspectives of the participants,
including me, were compared to existing literature on the subject of laughter from the
fields of philosophy, linguistics, and neuroscience. Finally, the interpretations were
compared to existing cultural beliefs of laughter as described in clichdd phrases and folk
sayings on laughter. The comparisons across individuals, across time, and across the
wider culture provide a means of triangulation for confirming and disconfirming
interpretations. The results presented in this report consist of groupings of the confirmed
interpretations and of mentioning outliers to the groupings. These outliers indicate areas
in need of further study. Disconfirming evidence may create some of these outliers or
result in the withholding of any conclusion on a particular point, and such cases will be
noted at the time the issue is discussed.
While some difficulties arose from the use of real conversational data, other
difficulties have arisen from inexperience with recording equipment, inexperience with
interviewing of human subjects, and inexperience with transcribing verbal data. On two
occasions interviews were not successfully recorded, and comfort and effectiveness with
the interview context was achieved approximately halfway through the data collection
period. Transcription of the more than 500 pages of data proved most difficult, driving
the investigator turning to outside assistance, a situation which greatly delayed the
timeliness of transcription. Nevertheless, such glitches may occur in qualitative studies
without rendering all work useless, and further studies will certainly enhance and clarify
gaps that remain.
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Organization o f the Report
The results of this linguistic study validate many thoughts on laughter by
philosophers, linguists, and neuroscientists. First, this study looks carefully at what is
said around the moments of laughter in conversation to determine in greater detail the
nature of the laughable and concludes there is a cluster of characteristics that describe the
nature of the laughable rather than merely one feature. The cluster includes incongruity,
a lack of realism, tension, and occasionally superiority. Second, I have located one way
that laughter is structured in conversation that the linguists haven’t described: it forms a
part of backchannel behavior by listeners. Additionally, I suggest that speaker laughter
be labeled a discourse marker, and I have discovered some insights into nervous laughter:
it is produced by a speaker at the conclusion of an utterance. This is the one area where
my findings refine the work of Jefferson almost to the point of disconfirming. Finally,
similar to the Relief Theory’s statement that laughter is a release of tension, I submit that
the tension is primarily the differentiation of reality from unreality as it relates to the
difference between self and other.
The next chapter, Chapter 2, describes the structure of laughter in conversation. It
includes descriptions of the structure of conversations in general and then describes the
integration of laughter into this general structure. It reviews the work of Provine,
especially his comments on the structure of laughter in conversation, and finds his
disregard for the work of the linguists on laughter’s structure in conversation
unwarranted. I confirm the work of Provine, Jefferson, and Glenn on the structure of
laughter, and I extend the findings in two ways. First, I suggest that we can best describe
speaker laughter as a discourse marker. Second, I suggest that Jefferson doesn’t go far
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enough when she calls speaker laughter an “invitation to laugh.” It may at times serve as
an invitation, but other times it serves as a request. The speaker may mark an utterance
with laughter as funny, or a speaker may mark an utterance with laughter as merely
potentially funny.
Chapter 3 focuses on a description of the funny, or the nature of the laughable. In
it I present the results of my analysis of every identifiable laughable in all eight
conversations. By using the structure of the laughter in the conversations and the
comments of my participants, I identified the conversational or contextual element that
stimulated the laughter and analyzed its propositional content. I conclude that the nature
of the laughable is incongruity.
Chapter 4 then ranges over the problematic issues of the Incongruity Theory and
finds an explanation for the limitations of the Incongruity Theory as it is traditionally
conceptualized. In locating an explanation, I turn to humanist psychology and redefine
incongruity as unreality. By understanding the source of our expectations, which is our
own individual perception of experience, we can understand why some incongruities are
not laughed at: they are not perceived, they are not relevant to the individual self, or they
are not relevant to the current goal of the individual self.
Chapter 5 concludes the study and presents suggestions for further research.
Certain problems remain and should be addressed in new studies.
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CHAPTER 2
WHAT ARE YOU LAUGHING AT? THE STRUCTURE OF LAUGHTER IN
CONVERSATION
In the area of discourse analysis known as conversation analysis, certain features
have been identified as common to all conversations. These features serve to structure
and organize conversations even as they unfold without prior consideration and as they
modify over time, taking into account new members, loss of previous members, and other
events. Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson codified these features into a systematic
framework to describe conversations. Other researchers, including Taylor and Cameron,
Heritage, Goffinan, and Allen and Guy, have expanded on their work, identifying more
details of the structure of conversations. Most notable for this study is the work of
Deborah Schifffin on discourse markers. This chapter begins with a discussion of the
nature of conversations in general as given by Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson and
subsequent researchers, and then moves on to describe how laughter fits into this larger
pattern of organization.
The Structure of Conversations
Turn-Taking
Basic to all conversations is the alternation of speakers in a pattern that is best
defined as taking turns. Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson identify 14 observations about
the structure of conversational turns:1

11 have opted to omit the internal notes in the list, which refer to footnotes in the original text.
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(1) Speaker-change recurs, or at least occurs.
(2) Overwhelmingly, one party talks at a time.
(3) Occurrences of more than one speaker at a time are common, but brief.
(4) Transitions (from one turn to a next) with no gap and no overlap are
common. Together with transitions characterized by slight gap or slight overlap,
they make up the vast majority of transitions.
(5) Turn order is not fixed, but varies.
(6) Turn size is not fixed, but varies.
(7) Length of conversation is not specified in advance.
(8) What parties say is not specified in advance.
(9) Relative distribution of turns is not specified in advance.
(10) Number of parties can vary.
(11) Talk can be continuous or discontinuous.
(12) Turn-allocation techniques are obviously used. A current speaker
may select a next speaker (as when he addresses a question to another party); or
parties may self-select in starting to talk.
(13) Various “turn-construction units” are employed; e.g., turns can be
projectedly “one word long,” or they can be sentential in length.
(14) Repair mechanisms exist for dealing with turn-taking errors and
violations; e.g., if two parties find themselves talking at the same time, one of
them will stop prematurely, thus repairing the trouble. (700-01)
The list speaks for itself, and since we have all engaged in conversations, we can draw on
our own experiences to come up with examples of each rule in practice. First, one
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individual initiates the conversation, while the others present act as an audience to the
speaker. At some point, the individual who began speaking comes to a point where a
transition is made, and another person begins to speak. This is when a speaker change is
made, and the ori ginal speaker now becomes part of the audience to the second speaker.
In conversation analysis terms, speaker designates any individual who makes an
utterance, and hearer designates any and all individuals who act as audience to any
speaker.
It should be noted that the list of the organizing features of conversations
circumscribed the contexts which were sought for data collection in this study.
Unmanipulated real conversations were the goal. Not all “speech exchanges” (Sacks,
Schegloff, and Jefferson 696) are conversational in nature. For example, meetings of any
sort, whether of a business committee, of an informal book club, or of a class, all violate
the condition of “what parties say is not specified in advance” in that a teacher prepares
lesson plans and group leaders draw up agendas. They also violate the “turn order is not
fixed” rule because certain individuals, such as the teacher or group facilitator, may
indeed have fixed turns, certainly for opening and closing the meetings, if not within the
meeting discussion itself. Likewise, contexts with even greater constraints exist: church
services, ceremonies, and legal proceedings. Although all such speech contexts provide
occasions where laughter may occur, they lie outside the scope of this study by lying
outside of the linguistic description of conversations.
While turn-taking represents the broadest level of structure, smaller levels have
been identified. In particular, certain relationships between two utterances have been
observed. The most important of these, adjacency pairs, is taken up next.
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Adjacency Pair Structure
Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson were the first to identify a pairing relationship
between certain utterances, noting that, although “what parties say is not specified in
advance,” what has been said in the conversation itself may constrain subsequent turns
(710). In particular, “there is a set of utterance types, adjacency pair first parts” that
constrain the content of the next speaker’s turn such that it must be paired with the “first
pair part” (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 710). That is, certain types of utterances
regularly occur in pairs, and if the first pair part of one of these pairs is uttered by a
speaker during conversation, the next speaker is constrained to respond with an
appropriate second pair part. Heritage notes that there are five features that must be
present for a pair of utterances to be characterized as an adjacency pair:
1) the sequence contains two utterances,
2) the two utterances are adjacent,
3) the two utterances are produced by two different speakers,
4) the two utterances are in order so that one part comes first and the other
second,
5) the two utterances are typed so that a first part requires a particular
second part or perhaps a range of second parts. (246)
Some common adjacency pairs are question-answer, invitation-acceptance (or
declination), offer-acceptance (or declination), and requesting-granting (or denying). In
all of these pairs, there is a preferred second pair part, but there may also be a
dispreferred second pair part. For example, if someone makes a request of another
person, the preferred response is for the request to be granted, but it is possible for that
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request to be denied, and denial is certainly dispreferred by the one making the request.
A dispreferred response will create consequences that must be dealt with. Usually they
are dealt with by the speaker who gives the dispreferred response with markers that
indicate the speaker’s understanding of the dispreferred nature of the response. Taylor
and Cameron identify these markers as:
1) pausing before delivery,
2) prefacing with particles, token agreements, appreciations or apologies,
and qualifiers,
3) accounting for the absence of the expected response,
4) using components indicative of declination, such as an indirect or
mitigated form of the expected second pair part. (111-12)
Again the work of conversation analysts seems to reflect the common experiences of
conversations. When invited to a party, we may immediately accept, which is the
preferred response. However, we may decline and provide an account for why we won’t
attend, such as being out of town on the day in question. Alternatively, we may provide
an indirect answer, saying that it’s necessary to check with other family members before
we can accept. It certainly seems logical to say that some utterances occur in pairs and
that if the first part is given, either the preferred response or a dispreferred alternative
response is produced by the second speaker.
Moves
Another microlevel variation of the conversational turn is the move. It is possible
that one individual may make an utterance in a turn that does two very different things.
As we have already seen, an invitation to a party might be responded to with a
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declination of the invitation along with an account for producing a dispreferred response.
In this case, the response is composed of two different moves. The first move is the
declination, simply saying “We won’t be able to come,” or some such statement. The
second move is the account: “We will be out of town at a family wedding that weekend.”
In this way, one turn may be comprised of two or more smaller level responses, and I will
use the term “mo ve” to describe such sublevels of turns. The term is inspired by Sacks,
Schegloff, and Jefferson who borrowed the term “turn-taking” from games and claimed it
was a method “for ordering of moves in games” (696). Since they claim that turns
organize or order moves, moves must be subordinate to turns, and I have chosen to define
a move as the immediate sublevel of a turn.
Tum-taking, along with its microvariations of adjacency pairs and moves, forms
the main portion of the conversational flow, but there are certain other types of utterances
that also seem to occur regularly in conversations. Hearers throw in little remarks, and
even speakers throw in small asides or remarks as they take their turns. This
undercurrent of communication consists of backchannel and discourse markers.
Backchannel
Backchannel (also spelled variously as back-channel or back channel) refers to
utterances by “conversational participants who do not ‘have the floor’” but “voice their
involvement” (Renkema 111) with particles such as Mm-hta Okay, or Really? Other
terms in use for this type of utterance include “interjections” and “support” (Allen and
Guy 166-67) and “minimal response” (Fellegy). Fellegy additionally identifies four more
terms for similar behavior as “assent terms,” “listener responses,” “accompaniment
signals,” and “hearer signals” (186).
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The term backchannel may also apply to “ancillary remarks” by a speaker,
remarks which ar e “irrelevant to the flow of the conversation” (Renkema 111) yet which
may constitute fully grammatical utterances such as Oh. that’s where that went or
particle-type utterances such as you know. Certainly Allen and Guy’s concept of
feedback considers both hearer and speaker as sources of feedback. Schiffrin’s work,
however, suggests that such remarks by a speaker are different and may be termed
“discourse markers.”
The presence of numerous terms and conflicting definitions highlights the lack of
consensus on backchannel behavior among conversation analysts. One issue that analysts
have yet to deal with is whether backchannel behavior is truly a different type of
environment from standard turn-taking structure. These issues are beyond the scope of
the present study, but the outcome of the discussion in the field could hold implications
for the present conclusions on laughter.
Following Renkema, then, in this study backchannel is defined as vocalizations
by a conversational participant who does not hold the floor. The purpose of such
vocalization is as debatable as its definition. Using the term and broader concept of
“minimal response,” Fellegy notes that various researchers have described such behavior
as having a variety of purposes, including signaling “active listening,” signaling
“support,” signaling “agreement,” or signaling boredom or “inattentiveness” (186). In
this listing, affirmation of some sort gamers the greater number of descriptions, and the
literature overwhelmingly suggests that backchannel primarily serves to direct a current
speaker to go on, since the listener is attentive and possibly in agreement with the
proposition the speaker is making. Yet there seem to be occasions when backchannel
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serves to communicate the opposite: I’m not listening or I don’t really agree with what
you’re saying. This is hardly surprising, for backchannel comprises a variety of
utterances, any of which may be modified for rhetorical effect or for courtesy. The
stereotypical husband response, Yes, dear, comes to mind as an utterance that appears to
indicate attentiveness, understanding, and agreement but, in fact, reveals the lack thereof.
Nevertheless, backchannel clearly communicates something about the level of
attentiveness, understanding, and agreement of the hearer for the proposition of the
speaker.
Discourse Markers
In discussing backchannel behavior, the question was raised whether remarks by
speakers that work at a feedback level should also be called backchannel behavior.
Although some conversation analysts do so, I have opted to limit the term backchannel to
signals produced by a hearer. A different categorization, then, is needed to refer to
signals produced by speakers that are inserted into the speech stream as they take their
turns at talk. Many such signals have been identified, including oh, well, you know, like.
I mean, and so on. These signals have been combined together with other linguistic
elements of cohesion (and, but, so and other conjunctions) and all are referred to as
discourse markers. This is the term I will employ here.
The seminal work on discourse markers was produced by Schiffrin, who defines
discourse markers as “sequentially dependent elements that bracket units of talk,” noting
that “brackets look simultaneously forward and backward” (37) and may include
paralinguistic and extralinguistic elements creating a “functional class” (41) of “devices
which provide contextual coordinates for ongoing talk” (41). Schiffrin clarifies further,
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stating, “Markers index the location of an utterance within its emerging local contexts. ..
. [M]arkers propose the contextual coordinates within which an utterance is produced and
designed to be interpreted” (315). She also stipulates that such “markers are used on
different planes of talk,” although each fits into one “primary” plane and into one or
more “secondary planes” and that “all the markers have uses in more than one” of the
five different planes (315). Finally, Schiffrin identifies a list of features that an
expression must exhibit in order to function as a discourse marker:
1) the ability to be detached syntactically from a sentence,
2) a common placement in the initial position of an utterance,
3) “a range of prosodic features,”
4) the ability “to operate at both local and global levels,”
5) the ability to function “on different planes of discourse,” and
6) “a lack of meaning or a vagueness of meaning or a reflexiveness of
meaning to either the language or the speaker.” (328)
The language used to describe the movement of water in a river is often employed
as a metaphor for conversations; we talk about the flow of a conversation. As wear-worn
as the metaphor is, it provides a useful function here to conceptualize the four aspects of
conversational structure just outlined. We can refer to the turn-taking features of
conversation, including the micro-level of adjacency pairs, as the main current of
communication, and we can refer to the ancillary remarks of speakers and hearers alike as
the undercurrent. Just as the Rhone with its own current flows beneath Lake Geneva and
its current, so too may a conversation flow with two levels of utterances pulling the
communication along.
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The Structure of Laughter in Conversations
What must first occur, then, in a study of laughter in conversations is to determine
which current laughter flows with, if any, or whether it creates a third current. My work
and that of other researchers on laughter in conversation (Jefferson, Glenn, Provine)
suggest that laughter is integrated into both of the regular conversational currents and
does not create a third current. Integration means that laughter follows regular turntaking structure in the main current and that it functions in the undercurrent of
backchannel and discourse markers, too.
Within the main current, laughter occurs in an adjacency pair structure. It usually
forms the second pair part, a response of sorts, to the first pair part of a laughable. This
creates a laughable-laugh adjacency pair. On rare occasions, laughter may act as the first
pair part, as the laughable, which is responded to with more laughter. This scenario gives
us a laugh-laugh adjacency pair and is frequently referred to as contagious laughter.
Other terms in use include echoic laughter and antiphonal laughter. I use the term echoic
laughter here. Laughter as a second pair part, whether to a laughable or laugh first pair
part, can be combined with other linguistic material and occur as one move in a turn that
is comprised of multiple moves.
In the undercurrent, laughter occurs as both a speaker discourse marker and as
hearer backchannel. When laughter occurs as a speaker discourse marker, it can take a
variety of positions in relation to the linguistic elements of the utterance. Laughter as a
pre-utterance discourse marker occurs when a speaker laughs before beginning the
linguistic portion of the utterance. Laughter as a mid-utterance discourse marker occurs
when a speaker laughs after the speaker has begun the linguistic portion but before he or
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she has completed the linguistic portion. Laughter as a post-utterance discourse marker
occurs when a speaker laughs after completing the linguistic portion of the utterance. A
laugh utterance that co-occurs immediately alongside another discourse marker, as
defined in the literature on conversation, is labeled as a discourse marker with another
discourse marker, no matter whether the laughter occurred before, during, or after the
other discourse marker.
When laughter occurs as backchannel, it may occur as the only element of
backchannel, or it may occur along with some linguistic elements. Figure 1 shows my
breakdown of laughter’s structure in conversation, including who laughs and what other
conversational elements the laughter co-occurs with.
Conversational Laughter

Main Current

Adjacency Pair
P a rti

Undercurrent

Adjacency Pair
Part 2

Speaker Discc irse Marker

Hearer
Backchannel

i
Laughter as
Laughable

Response
To
Laughable

Echoic
Laughter
Pre

Mid

Post

w/other

Solo

w/other

Fig. 1. The Relationship of Laughter in Conversation to Other Conversational Elements
and Conversation Participants
The remainder of this chapter details laughter’s integration into the larger
conversational structure. For each level of its integration I provide the work of other
researchers and the data of my own study, including both the interview comments of my
participants and the conversational evidence itself. Folk sayings are included at relevant
points, and some of the knottier issues are raised and discussed as well.
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Laughter as a Conversational Turn

Once we become aware of the turn-taking nature of conversations, we begin to
understand how to proceed with the analysis of the laughter that occurs within
conversations. Since “what parties say is not specified in advance,” a speaker is free to
provide any sort of utterance he pleases when he takes a turn. Sacks, Schegloff, and
Jefferson specify that unit types for turns in English can be “sentential, clausal, phrasal,
and lexical” (702). I have found, however, that laughter may be allowed to stand in for a
turn, a finding that Glenn notes, as well: “a stream of laughter . . . can also stand by itself
as a turn at talk” (44). Other researchers likewise designate laughter as a kind of
utterance. Allen and Guy identify laughter as a “component” of the “natural sequencing
of vocal outputs” and include laughter alongside assertions, questions, and agreements
(42). Goodwin refers to laughter as a “particular kind of talk” along with other “kinds of
talk” like “stories and opposition sequences” (374). And Jefferson finds laughter to be
worthy of study in its own right, devoting several articles to it.
Researchers outside the linguistic and conversation analysis tradition have also
located laughter as a turn of sorts. Provine, too, acknowledges laughter’s turn-based
structure when he claims, “No audience interruptions of speaker phrases were observed,”
although unlike the linguists, Provine finds this to be a “surprising result” (38). Provine’s
surprise likely stems from his neuroscientific training, for he also remarks that “the
audience could laugh at any time without speech-related competition for their
vocalization channel” (38). Quite simply, Provine expects laughter to be based in
neurobiology alone. He expects that an individual will laugh whenever certain
neurological conditions are met. Since audience members aren’t burdening their
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neurological mechanisms with speech, the neurological conditions should be met for the
free production of laughter. What Provine didn’t anticipate was that the social interaction
rules of conversation would govern audience laughter rather than or along with a
“neurologically based process” (37). But he needn’t have been surprised, for if
neurology is not at work in hearers because they are not speaking, then some other
mechanism is free to work; the absence of neurological constraints doesn’t remove all
constraints, and in the absence of neurological constraints, the social constraints of
conversational turn-taking hold sway. Provine’s declaration that “The brains of speaker
and audience are locked into a dual-processing mode” (38) succinctly describes H. P.
Grice’s contention that
our talk exchanges do not normally consist of disconnected remarks, and would
not be rational if they did. They are characteristically . . . cooperative efforts; and
each participant recognizes in them . . . a common purpose or set of purposes, or
at least a mutually accepted direction. This purpose or direction may be fixed
from the start. . . or it may evolve during the exchange. (45)
When Provine says that the brains of co-conversants are “dual-processing,” he means that
the individuals involved are working together in organizing their talk and laughing in
such a way as to avoid interrupting each other or overlapping each other, a process which
he notes must be happening in the brain, for the participants certainly do not look to some
outside conductor for timing their speech and laughter. The “working together” aspect is
reflected in Grice’s term “cooperative efforts,” and the meaning of Provine’s term
“process” is reflected in Grice’s term “evolve.” Significantly, Grice’s statements on
cooperation among conversants form the philosophical basis of the conversation analysis
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approach. His cooperative principle gave direct rise to the approach that first delineated
the conversation process as one of turn-taking. The linguists and the neuroscientist are
saying the same thing here. Nevertheless, Provine’s surprise raises the question of which
constraints are paramount for a speaker: neurological constraints, turn-taking constraints,
both, or neither. The answer to this question lies outside the present study, for to pursue
it in depth would require laboratory work on the brain. What we are able to accomplish,
however, is a demonstration of strong evidence that suggests that the conversational and
linguistic modes are primary and the neurological constraints function secondarily. Both
function side-by-side, however. Echoic laughter may be completely neurologically
constrained but occurs rarely in conversations. Other laughter follows the constraints of
the conversational rules of organization. Let us turn now to a consideration of how
laughter fits into those broader patterns of conversation.
Prototypical Laughter as the Second Pair Part o f an Adjacency Pair
Common sense tells us that laughter is a response of sorts. We think and talk of
laughing at something, and the participants in my study were no exception. Ten of the 23
made comments in their interviews that pointed to the view that laughter is a response to
something. Ann made the claim outright: “During the conversation, I’m sure I laughed,
too. Usually I laugh in response to somebody- something somebody else did, something
somebody else said.” She even followed this up with the definition, “Laughing is like a
response to like a joke or a situation.” Allie qualified what causes her laughter, but still
identified it as a response to something someone else says: “If I hear a good joke, you
know, I’ll really get, you know, a good belly laugh.” Frequently when I asked how a
participant responded to a certain story or statement, the interviewee cited that laughter

was the response. When I asked Gigi about one particular comment that her co
participant made and followed it with “Do you remember how you responded?” Gigi
replied, “I laughed.” Similarly when I asked Meg about a story she told during her
conversation with the question “How did the others that you were telling react to this?”
Meg answered, “I think they simply laughed.” Nor were the females the only ones who
viewed laughter as a response. Duane recounted how he interacts with customers at his
work place, revealing that customers will smile or laugh in response to a joke that he
makes: “You say a joke that they would get, or ya say somethin that they find funny, you
get a smile out of them. They leave the store laughing, you know.”
Because laughter as a hearer’s response to something someone else says, or
perhaps to something one sees, is such an immediate and automatic definition of laughter,
I am choosing to call it prototypical laughter. Eleanor Rosch’s work on the meanings of
words has given rise to prototype theory. Prototype theory claims that we hold an ideal
image of a word’s meaning, the prototype, in our heads, and we label things in the real
world as to whether and how well they conform to the prototype. Thus, Rosch found that
robins and sparrows are better representatives of birds than penguins and flamingoes
because they conform better to the prototypical image of the word bird that we hold in
our heads. Likewise, the image we seem to hold in our heads of laughter is that it is a
response to something funny: in conversation it is a hearer’s response to something
someone else has said. As my observations show, hearer response is not the only sort of
laughter that exists; it is merely the sort of laughter that best conforms to our idea of
laughter.

The work of empirical researchers confirms that common-sense intuition. I found
234 occasions of the prototypical hearer response laughter in my study out of a total of
570 instances of laughter. That number represents 41% of all laughter in my data and is
the largest individual category of laughter. Provine identifies what he calls the “laugh
episode,” which he defines as “consisting of the comment immediately preceding
laughter, and all laughter occurring within one second after the onset of the first laughter”
(26). The view of laughter as a response to a comment inheres in Provine’s definition of
the laugh episode.
Perhaps, though, if Provine hadn’t dismissed the work of previous investigators
from linguistics, he would have discovered that terminology already existed to describe
what he saw, and there was no need to coin the phrase “laugh episode.” Provine’s
observation of a laugh episode and the common sense view of laughter recognizes that
laughter occurs in what linguists call adjacency pairs, with the further stipulation that
laughter comprises the second pair part.
My stipulation of laughter as the second pair part is echoed in the work of others.
Allen and Guy state that “laughter is a consequence or outcome of verbal exchange and
therefore should tend to arise later in the sequence of verbal acts” (197). Goodwin talks
about “laughing as soon as a punchline in a story can be recognized” (395-96), indicating
that laughter must come after a punchline or at least after enough of a story has been told
to infer the punchline. Glenn describes laughter as “indexical” (48), or pointing to
something else. Jefferson looks at laughter as a kind of invitation-acceptance/declination
pair (“Inviting Laughter”). She finds that when a current speaker makes a joke, the
speaker then laughs, thus inviting others to laugh. Acceptance of the invitation is

revealed when another laughs. In cases where the current speaker tells a joke and does
not laugh, but another does, Jefferson indicates that the laughter is volunteered based on
the recognition of the joke. In other words, the laugher doesn’t wait for an invitation
which is known to be coming but instead offers acceptance immediately. So for
Jefferson, laughter comes after a joke and before more laughter if it is produced by the
joke-teller, and after a joke if it is produced by a joke-hearer. In either of Jefferson’s
cases, we can see that laughter comes after something else, but the prototypical case of
laughter as a second pair part in Jefferson’s analysis is the case of hearer producing a
laugh when taking a turn in conversation after some utterance by a speaker.
My work confirms the findings of these researchers. I, too, have found laughter
occurs in adjacency pairs as the second pair part. It may occur alone, uttered by only one
individual, or it may be offered by several hearers. A laugh response may also occur in
conjunction with a repetition of material from the first pair part or in conjunction with a
comment that specifies the proposition in the first pair part. Sequence (1) shows an
instance of laughter as a response to a comment by a previous speaker. In this sequence,
Duane reveals to his conversation partners when and how he learned his first swear
words. One participant, Nina, responds with laughter, but another, Rick responds with a
question asking for further information on the topic.
(1)

a

Duane:

b Nina:
c Rick:
d Duane:

Yes. ‘kay I learned my sentence enhancers when I was five and
learnt ‘em as I was at the lake and walked around the campfire
saying, ((raises vocal pitch to imitate child’s voice)) “Shit, shit, shit,
shit, shit, shit, shit.”
Ha-ha-ha.
Who taughtcha that?
Oh, my guess is probably my dad.

Segment lb clearly shows Nina’s laughter as a response to the story. She doesn’t offer
any further comment, so the laughter cannot be tied to her own utterance. Nor can Nina’s
laughter be called backchannel because Duane seems to have finished his turn. Indeed,
Rick is the next speaker.
The example in sequence (2) below shows how laughter may occur as an
overlapping turn by more than one hearer in response to a comment by another speaker.
In this particular situation, two young men have been discussing qualifications for jobs
and what to put on a resume. As they broach the issue of a person being overqualified
and whether that information should be put on a resume, the father of one of the young
men, who is eavesdropping from an adjacent room, throws in a comment that produces a
laugh response from both young men.
(2) a
b
c
d
e

Roger:

Cause they— they’re-- are looking for people that—sometimes
people don’t get hired because they’re too qualified.

Charlie:
Roger:
Dad from
other room:
Charlie:

Yeah.
They don’t want somebody who’s too qualified.
I know that’s always been my problem.
Ha-ha-ha-ha-ha-ha-ha.
[

f
g

Roger:
Roger:

Ha-ha-ha
No, it’s true, though.

Sequence (2) opens with Roger speaking about overqualified individuals and their
unemployability, Charlie provides a backchannel response in 2b, indicating he is listening
and understands Roger’s assertion, and Roger takes a turn to reformulate his point with
greater clarity in 2c. The father enters the conversation with a comment in 2d, and first
Charlie and then Roger respond with laughter. After the laughter, Roger takes a turn to
return the discussion to the general issue of listing overqualifications on resumes.

At times the laugh response is coupled with a repetition of some material from the
first pair part. Sequence (3) provides an example from a conversation where some
students of poetry are discussing performance poetry in a venue called a poetry slam.
One of the students, Joey, has participated in as well as organized poetry slams.
(3)

a
b
c
d
e
f

Wade:
Joey:
Wade:
Joey:
Wade:
Joey:

So are you the poetry slam laureate in this area?
I--1 used to.
You used to be? You retired?
Yeah, I used to be the slam master for the area.
Slam heh-heh.
Yeah, that’s what they call it—“slam master.” But then I got out.

Sequence (3) opens with Wade asking about Joey’s role as organizer. When Joey reveals
in 3b that it is a role that he no longer plays, Wade asks for more clarification, suggesting
that he wants to know why Joey no longer plays that role. Joey doesn’t answer with any
reasons; he merely reiterates his former participation, using the term “slam master.”
Wade picks up the first part of the term, and then laughs. Because Wade does not
provide any further utterance of his own at this point, the laughter must serve as a
response to Joey’s statement and in particular as a response to his choice of the term
“slam master.” Indeed, this is how Joey interprets that laughter because he responds to
Wade’s laughter with the information that “slam master” really is the word in use and is
not a term Joey made up just at this moment. In a second move in utterance 3f, Joey
returns the conversation to its main concern, how he no longer plays the role of organizer.
In yet another variation, a laugh response may not accompany repetition of
material from the first pair part, but rather include a specification of some material,
establishing that a hearer has a thorough understanding of the first pair part. In sequence
(4) below, Charlie and Roger are discussing the possibility of traveling to Las Vegas by
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bus, and Roger describes his previous experience on a charter bus such as they are
considering, paying particular attention to describing the bus itself and its features.
(4)

a
b
c
d

Roger:
And it’s a nice bus. It’s like your Greyhound.
Charlie: Yeah.
Roger:
It’s not a school bus.
Charlie: Not a school bus? Ha-ha-ha. Not a spirit bus? Ha-ha-ha.

e

Roger:

[
No. Not a Mac and
Cheese bus.

In 4a Roger clarifies that the bus is a fairly nice vehicle, like any long-distance bus such
as a Greyhound. Although Charlie provides backchannel indicating he is following
Roger’s comments, Roger presses further in his clarification, stating that the bus is not
like a school bus in 4c. At this point, Charlie responds first with a repetition of Roger’s
comment and a laugh. He then complements the repetition-laugh move with a
specification-laugh move. By specifying “spirit bus,” Charlie shows that he knows and
understands when a school bus is used for long-distance travel: when a sports team and
school supporters travel to an away game. And he thereby shows that he understands that
Roger’s description eliminates a bare-bones bus from his description of the charter bus.
In this way, Charlie shows that his earlier backchannel indicated not just listening but
also understanding since he is able both to repeat the words, indicating listening, and to
specify the meaning, indicating understanding.
In another sequence, four women are discussing a man who presented at a
meeting one of them had attended that evening. The others had seen the same man the
night before. The discussion focuses on what the man was wearing during his
presentation and contrasts that outfit with the one he had worn the night before.
(5)

a

Helen:

He had a three-piece suit on last night.
48

b
c
d
e

Rhoda:
??:
Gabriela:
Helen:

This was not a three-piece suit,
Ha-ha.
Maybe he screwed someone last night,
Ha-ha-ha, and didn’t get a chance to go home.

In 5a Helen states that the man in question wore a three-piece suit the previous evening,
and Rhoda, who saw the man present the evening of the discussion, states that he was not
wearing such a suit for his presentation. One of the women inserts a solo laugh response
at 5c, and Gabriela provides a humorous hypothesis as to why the man may not have
worn clothing appropriate for a presentation the next evening. Helen provides a laugh
response to the humorous assertion that the man’s love life is involved in setting his
wardrobe choices, and then provides additional information to specify that she has
grasped the implication of Gabriela’s comment. Thus Helen’s utterance in 5e takes the
form of a laugh-specification response.
Laughter’s Adjacency Pair First Part
But if laughing is last, what is first? Terminology for laughter’s first pair part is
ill-defined. Provine came up with simply “prelaugh comment” (27). The term joke may
be employed, but for many people joke refers to a formulaic story on the order of “a
priest, a rabbi and a redneck go into a bar” or some other such pattern, a pattern that is
exceedingly rare in conversations. I observed no instances of formulaic jokes in eight
different twenty-minute long conversations among 23 different participants that included
570 different laugh instances, nor did Provine observe many instances in his 1200 laugh
episodes, although he did not specify any particular number or percentage of jokes that
did occur (40). A need arises, then, to differentiate between telling a joke and making a
joke. Telling a joke involves the formulaic pattern constructions, while making a joke
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refers to the spontaneous and localized occasions when a speaker creates something
laughable on the spot. Yet the shorthand joke to stand for making a joke remains
unnatural, and too many will continue to think of telling a joke for us to employ it in a
technical, linguistic definition of laughter in conversation. Luckily, Jefferson has solved
the problem by devising the term “laughable” (“Inviting Laughter” 83). In this way,
making a joke, telling a joke, or any other statement that elicits laughter in the hearers can
be the first pair part in a laughable-laugh adjacency pair. In conversation, however,
making a joke predominates over telling a joke, with scores of 1200 to few in Provine’s
data and 570 to 0 in mine.
Indeed, the understanding of adjacency pair structure and the difference between
telling jokes and making jokes goes far in explaining why there seems to be such a gulf
between the results of research on laughter with traditional philosophical approaches and
those of research with empirical approaches. The focus in philosophical approaches has
been on the first pair part, especially on joke-telling. Those employing an empirical
approach focus on the second pair part, the laughing. But a full understanding of laughter
in an adjacency pair structure cannot be developed until focus is cast upon both parts
together. This leads to a series of queries to be answered, if possible:
1) What is the nature of a laughable in general that can encompass both the
making of jokes and the telling of jokes?
2) What is the same about them that both are greeted with laughter?
3) How do speakers create laughables?
These questions, their answers, and the import of both will be taken up in later
chapters of this work. Chapter 3 will deal with the nature of the laughable, and Chapter 4

will deal with the importance of the conclusions for our understanding of who we are as
human creatures. What I deal with next is laughter that seems to be a response to a
slightly different sort of laughable, a response to laughter by another person.
Echoic laughter
Part of the conventional wisdom on laughter is that it is contagious. When one
person starts to laugh, it is likely that another will join in. The phenomenon has been
variously termed contagious laughter, echoic laughter, and antiphonal laughter; the term I
will use here is echoic laughter. In my conversational data, both hearers and speakers
engaged in echoic laughter, but it nevertheless remained a rare phenomenon. Five out of
the 570 instances of laughter were echoic by hearers, and 15 of the 570 were speaker
echoic laughter. Hearer echoic laughter occurred when a listener laughed in response to
laughter by a speaker and did not seem to laugh at the linguistic content. I define speaker
echoic laughter as occurring in a three turn sequence. When a speaker produced a
linguistic utterance that a hearer responded to with a laugh and the first speaker
subsequently laughed, this became an occasion of speaker echoic laughter. Glenn notes
something similar to this when he says: “Conversationalists begin shared laughter not
simultaneously but through one speaker beginning to laugh and another joining in rapid
succession. A first laugh provides opportunity, perhaps even encouragement, for another
to join” (54).
My participants were cognizant of responding to laughter with laughter. Betsy
commented on her partner’s laughter, saying, “I don’t know if Bonnie was laughing
‘cause she thought it was funny or if she was laughing because I was laughing.” That
Bonnie might have been laughing because Betsy was laughing indicates that laughter can
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be echoic in nature and can occur in a conversation for that reason. In this case, Bonnie’s
laughter would have been a case of hearer echoic laughter: a listener laughing because the
speaker was laughing. Meg provided evidence of speaker echoic laughter when she
responded to my question on her feelings when her hearers laughed at a story that she
told during the conversation. I said, “So you told this story . . . and they laughed. And at
the time that they laughed, how did you feel?” and Meg answered, “I kind of laughed
along.” Participant comments were appropriately rare for this phenomenon, as it was rare
in the conversational data. Nevertheless, it occurred and was recognized and deserves a
place in the results.
In sequence (6) Gigi gives us an example of speaker echoic laughter. The group
of three women has been talking about how people respond to being recorded or
photographed, a topic raised when I turned on the recorder at their conversation. In 6a
Gigi points out that there seem to be two different types of individuals, those who back
away from cameras and those who feel compelled to stick their faces up close to them.
Blanca and Linda provide some backchannel in response in 6b, c, and d, but Lily takes a
turn at talk in 6e, identifying herself as a person who backs away. In 6g Gigi confesses
that she sticks her face into a camera, and Linda laughs in 6h. Gigi again enters the
conversation at 6j with laughter of her own. Because her laughter does not come latched
onto her comment in 6h, it can not be taken as a discourse marker of her own utterance.
Furthermore, since Linda has not provided any linguistic content along with her laughter,
Gigi’s laughter can not be taken as a hearer response to the proposition in anything Linda
has said. Gigi’s laughter must be interpreted simply as that of a person who has laughed
because another has laughed, a case of echoic speaker laughter.
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(6 )

a

b
c

Gigi:

=some people either back away from it or they feel compelled to

Blanca:
Lily:

stick their face in it. /ae a? ae/ ((Gigi imitates moving her face
close to a camera, mouth agape, and emits three short vocalic
syllables.))
Right.
Yeah.
[

d
e
f
g
h
i
j
k
1

Blanca:
Lily:
??:
??:
Gigi:
Linda:
Gigi:
Linda:
Multiple:

Right.
I think I’m a back-away-ffom-it type.
Mm-hm.
Mm-hm.
I’m a stick-my-mug-in-it type.
Ha-ha.
Ha-ha.
I’ve done both.
Ha-ha-ha-ha.

Sequence (7) gives an example of hearer echoic laughter. Roger and Charlie have
been talking about their chances of receiving a scholarship for college, and they’ve
brought up a scholarship they heard only requires one to be a descendent of one of the
signers of the Declaration of Independence. They raise the question of what their
chances are that they qualify for this scholarship, and sequence (7) opens with Roger
pointing out that it is unlikely that they fit the criteria due to the large number of people
in the US.
a

Roger:

b
c
d
e

Charlie:
Roger:
Charlie:
Roger:

Yeah, but do you know how many people are in the United
States?
That’s true. Actually 260 million.
Exactly. Ha-ha-ha-ha-ha
Ha-ha-ha-ha-ha. Whatcha tryin to say? Ha-ha-ha.
If it’s 100,000 people—I have a better chance of winning the
lottery.

As Charlie reveals that he knows the exact number of people in 7b, Roger’s response
indicates that Charlie has the number exactly correct, and then Roger laughs, indicating

he has perceived something laughable about Charlie knowing the exact number. Charlie
takes his turn in '7d by beginning with laughter, but his next question, asking what Roger
is trying to say, indicates that his laughter doesn’t show agreement with Roger. In fact,
Charlie must be somewhat confused because he asks for clarification on Roger’s
meaning. Charlie’s laughter in 7d may be interpreted as hearer echoic laughter. Charlie
laughs even though he does not perceive the laughable and has to ask for clarification.
Charlie, in fact, laughs immediately following Roger’s laughter, with no perceptible
laughable to attach it to. Roger’s laughter itself must be the laughable.
For the moment, what we have established is that laughter is structured into
conversations according to the same rules as linguistic elements of conversation.
Laughter may constitute a turn at talk and serve as the second pair part of a laughablelaugh adjacency pair. Although the laughable-laugh adjacency pair is the base
environment for laughter, providing the prototypical form of laughter, laughter may serve
as the fust pair part of the adjacency pair creating a laugh-laugh adjacency pair. Laughter
plays a large role in backchannel behavior, as well, a description of which follows next.
Laughter as Backchannel
Earlier I discussed backchannel and determined that it was different from speaker
discourse markers and that it was different from a hearer speaking up to take a turn at
talk. Now comes the determination of whether laughter occurs within the structure of
backchannel behavior. If laughter follows the structure of other backchannel behavior,
then the claim that hearer laughter occurs in two different conversational environments is
upheld. If, however, laughter does not follow the structure of other backchannel
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behavior, then hearer laughter must be described solely in terms of adjacency pair
second pair parts.
Three of my participants described backchannel behavior and placed laughter as
one of its manifestations. Gigi all but used the term backchannel in her comments,
clearly describing backchannel behavior and placing laughter within its parameters:
I remember going like “Oh, I know.” You know, um, like “Isn’t that
awful?” So there’s those agreement kinds of things that come up that is
kind of a “uh” something, um, verbal, but not sentence form? That says
I’m either going to tell you I’m listening by nonverbal nodding or um
attentiveness, or looking at you, um, or I’m going to tell you I’m listening
by verbally agreeing whether it’s by an “Mm-hm” or an “uh, yes” or
laughter or whatever.
Betsy, another participant, used the term “feedback,” saying, “I don’t know if
Bonnie was laughing ‘cause she thought it was funny or . . . it was just part of the
conversation feedback, knowing that each of us are listening.” Betsy’s conversation
partner, Bonnie, likewise acknowledged the existence of backchannel when I asked how
she responded to Betsy’s tale of a family trip, saying, “I think if I didn’t say anything that
I at least nodded like I knew what she meant.” In fact, Bonnie did more than nod, she
laughed, and she laughed at the point where she viewed herself as providing
conversational support for her partner in talk.
We can look at the particular sequence where Betsy is relating her trip and Bonnie
laughs in a backchannel response. Sequence ( 8 ) provides the details.
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(8 )

a

Betsy:

Yeah, so, we’re driving down this narrow alley way, and the
festival is goin’ around and they’re tryin’ to find parking. So, we
get- to the garage, and Dad’s starting to back in, and it’s really
ta - tough because the van’s extra long and he’s not used to it=

b
c
d
e

Bonnie:
Betsy:
Bonnie:
Betsy:

Yep.
S o - there’s persons waiting to go through the alley.
Oh no.
a::nd- so he couldn’t get in there, so he had to like go around the
block=

f
g

Bonnie:
Betsy:

Yep.
=to get a better angle. Well these people come rushing up andthis celebration they drive?

h
i

Bonnie:
Betsy:

Un-hunh.
=a lot, hang flags out the windows, and honk horns so it’s very
loud=

j

Betsy:

k

Bonnie:

=So it just, ya know, it goes up and down. So anyways, so
they—they—the people that were waiting come rushin’ up to the
van and Rachel is like “Hey what are you doing?” And they’re
like—well, they sw - swore a bunch “Shut up you- bleepin’bleepin’”— whatever.
Ha-ha.

1
m
n

Betsy:
Bonnie:
Betsy:

o
P

Bonnie:
Betsy:

q
r

Bonnie:
Betsy:

s

Bonnie:

t

Betsy:

u

Bonnie:

[

And Rachel’s like “You better not come over hereOh, no!!
And Rachel is very blonde, very light, and this is a Puerto Rican
festival.
Onh-ho-ho!
I’m like, Come on now they know that you’re out of—out of the
area cause this is a predominantly African-American and Puerto
Rican, you know neighborhood.
Neighborhood. It’s like. It is not a very good neighborhood? I
mean, My grampa likes the slums cause taxes are lower, blah,
blah. That whole grampa personality, so-ahaa, they get into this
arguing match=
No::!
t
=And I’m like, “Rachel, pick your battles.” And I’m like
“You’re gonna get your butt kicked,” so I’m goin’ upstairs I’m
like if she gets her butt kicked=
Oohh-ha-ha-ha!
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V

Betsy:

w

Bonnie:
Betsy:
Bonnie:
Betsy:
Bonnie:

X

y
z
aa

I’m not gonna stay around tryin’ to defend her cause she’s the
one who opened her big mouth, and it’s just— Ya know, it was
towards the end and we were very tired and sick of traveling =
Yep.
and like “Okay, whatever” a-an yeah —so that was the main—
????? That was the big thing,
and I kept sayin’ to Dad “This is an adventure.”
Ah-ha-ha-ha-ha.

Throughout Betsy’s story, Bonnie provides a number of instances of linguistic
backchannel. Segments 8 b, d, f, and h all exemplify classic backchannel. The
backchannel statement comes at a point when the speaker is not completely finished with
the proposition, although it is at a turn relevance point. The intonation of the speaker
indicates there is more to come, a feature noted by the latching symbol, = , to indicate a
lack of decrescendo or by the question mark to indicate a rising intonation. Furthermore,
Bonnie’s remarks contain no linguistic propositions of their own, and so do not obviously
constitute a turn at talk.

6k

shows a shift from a linguistic particle to a laugh particle, but

we can see that it is structured in the same manner as the classic backchannel particles.
There is no linguistic proposition to the laughter, nor is there any included in the
utterance in a different move.
At times backchannel laughter can accompany a linguistic particle, but the two
together function as one backchannel signal, not as a turn at talk. Examples of this
include
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and 8 u when Bonnie couples laughter with “oh no.”

Sequence (9) shows yet another example of how laughter follows the structure of
other backchannel behavior. In the conversation, Duane has mentioned a friend of his
that none of the others know. When they query or indicate they are trying to remember
the individual, Duane clarifies that they don’t know Phoebe.
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(9)

a
b
c
d

Duane:
Nina:
Laura:
Duane:

Nobody knows Phoebe,
Okay,
Ha-ha.
I try to make sure of that.

When Duane clarifies that the others don’t know Phoebe, Nina offers “okay” and Laura
offers a laugh. Then Duane resumes with an utterance related to his clarification: he is
sure that they don’t know Phoebe because he makes sure that his current friends don’t
meet her. Because Duane, the same speaker, resumes as speaker on the same topic and
because neither Nina nor Laura offer any linguistic proposition to the conversation, Nina
and Laura are interpreted as providing backchannel rather than taking a turn at talking.
Laura’s laughter is not a prototypical response because it follows Nina’s comment of
“okay,” which can not be interpreted as a humorous utterance in and of itself. Laura’s
laughter must be taken to refer to Duane’s utterance, not Nina’s, and therefore, it fails to
follow the structure of laughable-laugh adjacency pairs: it is not adjacent to the
laughable. If it were produced at the same time as Nina’s “okay,” as an overlap, then
perhaps it could be seen as a prototypical response, but this is not the case.
While the examples of laughter as backchannel in sequences (8) and (9) seem
clear, some of my data underscore the difficulty in discerning whether backchannel is
different from turn-taking. Sequence (10) comes from a conversation among three
women and covers a section of the conversation where Meg talks about her dog,
Cleveland. Utterances lOd, i, k, m, and o all contain laughter that is produced by one or
more listener. lOg also contains laughter, but it is not an example of hearer laughter; it is
an example of speaker laughter, an issue taken up later in this chapter. The difficulty of
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coding whether hearer laughter is a prototypical response or a backchannel offering
becomes obvious in this sequence.
a
b
c

Meg:
Britney:
Meg:

d
e
f

All:
Meg:
Britney:
Ann:
Meg:

g
h

i
j
k
1
m
n

Britney:
Meg:
Britney:
Meg:
Britney:
Meg:

Cleveland is waiting patiently at home for me to get home.
He wants to go for a walk?
Yes. Ryan called me at work today and he was like,
“Cleveland’s looking at me with a very sad face! I think it’s
meant for you!”
Ha-ha-ha-ha.
I’m like, “Well, you’re gonna tell-- have to tell him to wait.”
Ohhh.
I can’t have cats and dogs, ha-ha-ha-ha.
Yeah, I know, well, it’s like a ritual, you know, 4 o’clock comes
and he knows it’s coming and so 3:59 and he’s staring at you in
the face, you know,=
Ha-ha-ha-ha.
=drooling down the side=
Ha-ha-ha.
=walking over to the door, walking back=
Ha-ha-ha.
=you know, I’m like, I’m coming. Fine, you know. Ha-ha.
[

0

Britney:

P

Ann:

]
Ha-ha.

[
Ha-ha-ha.
[
Did I tell

you that big dog that I saw him with ?????.

The first laughter in the sequence occurs in 1Od after Meg relates a phone conversation
with her male live-in partner about the dog and its facial signal for a walk. All the
listeners respond with laughter in such a simultaneous manner that it is impossible to
determine which, indeed if any, began laughing first. The fact that all provided exactly
the same response at exactly the same time indicates that this utterance should be coded
as a prototypical laugh response to something humorous.
In lOe, however, Meg provides a little more to the story by telling how she replied
over the phone to the dog’s seemingly immediate need for a walk, saying that the dog
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would have to wait. In 1Of Britney provides an utterance of “oh.” This is a common
backchannel utterance, and Britney seems not to take a turn, but Ann steps in with a turn
of her own in lOg, saying that she lives in a situation where she can’t have dogs or cats.
In lOh Meg resumes as speaker, making one move which is a response to Ann’s
comment, “Yeah, I know,” and then making a second move which shifts from Ann’s
situation back to her own. The word “well” is a speaker discourse marker indicating that
shift. Meg next focuses on the dog’s entire range of signals that indicate his need for a
walk, a move that extends over several utterances, including lOh, j and 1. She ends the
extended move with her typical response to the dog’s signals and gives a summative
statement of that response, “Fine.” In between these utterances, Britney provides several
laugh utterances. The question is whether Britney’s laughter is a prototypical response to
something humorous or whether she is merely providing feedback encouraging Meg to
continue.
On the one hand, interpreting the laughter as backchannel seems logical because
no other speaker takes a turn, and Meg’s talk connects across Britney’s laughter.
Additionally, Meg inserts discourse markers asking for hearer feedback; utterance 6h
ends with “you know,” while utterance lOn begins with “you know,” ends with both “you
know” and a laugh. However, neither lOj nor 101 includes markers of any sort, yet
Britney provides laughter in relation to each.
On the other hand, Britney’s laughter can also be interpreted as a prototypical
response to something humorous because each of Meg’s utterances contains a potential
laughable. She creates a graphic image of her dog that is added to with each additional

utterance describing his signals, including staring, drooling, walking to the door and
walking back from the door.
How then, have I coded this particular sequence? I have used the laughing
participant’s interview comments as my guide. Britney provided clues for how I should
interpret her laughter when she said:
It was really fun to hear Meg like, cause generally in the office she doesn’t
like, she doesn’t like laugh a lot, she’s not funny a lot, she’s n o t- she
wouldn’t like scream and tell a story about screaming in the bathtub, you
know what I mean? But just recently in the last couple of weeks, I mean,
I’ve spent time with her, and I’m like, “You’re hilarious.” Seeing her
facial expressions and she uses, you know, different vocal, and it’s like
little kiddish and she’s very often not like that. She’s very professional and
like intellectual, you know what I mean, she’s just really like that
intimidating part comes out, you know. She’s very professional, but then I
really enjoy getting glimpses of the moments where she is like a little kid,
like telling a story and using voices.
Although Britney specifically mentions a different story that Meg shared in the
conversation, a story about screaming at centipedes in the bathtub, Britney also provides
the general assessment that she has recently discovered Meg’s funny side and finds her
humorous when she tells stories, a category that sequence (10) falls into. Therefore,
these instances have been coded as prototypical laughter rather than as backchannel.
The difficulty of separating whether a particular laugh utterance acts as a response
or as backchannel suggests that there is something similar about both types of laughter,
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and I would suggest that the similarity lies in the meaning of the laughter and what it
accomplishes in the conversation. The similar meanings will be taken up in Chapter 4.
To truly determine whether a particular laugh utterance should be interpreted structurally
as a response or as backchannel, then, one must look at what is occurring within the
conversation participants as well as at what happens within the conversation.
Since I believe the similarity of prototypical laughter and backchannel laughter
lies in the realm of meaning, not structure, at this time backchannel will be accepted as a
separate environment from a regular turn at talk, and laughter by hearers can be described
as occurring in two different environments, as a response and as backchannel.
Backchannel will also be defined differently from ancillary remarks by speakers, and
Schiffrin’s terminology of discourse marker will refer to that environment. Therefore,
the discussion of laughter as backchannel behavior will be limited to instances of its
production by those who do not have the floor, and laughter by speakers in all its
environments, including as a discourse marker, will be taken up in the next section of this
chapter.
Speaker Laughter as Discourse Marker
Far more frequent than speaker echoic laughter is speaker laughter as a discourse
marker. My claim that laughter by speakers functions as a discourse marker rests on the
demonstration that it adheres to the six features identified by Schiffrin as well as to her
other definitions of a discourse marker. This discussion first addresses the itemized list
of features and then moves on to the other aspects of discourse markers that Schiffrin
identifies (see page 37).
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Syntactic Detachability
Laughter obviously possesses the ability to detach syntactically from a sentence,
Schiffrin’s first feature of a discourse marker. A paralinguistic rather than linguistic
utterance, it may always be removed from the linguistic elements with which it co-occurs
with no detriment to the linguistic structure of the sentence at all.
Initial Position
Less obvious is its placement in the initial position of an utterance. However, if
we recall that I have defined prototypical laughter as belonging to a hearer rather than to
a speaker, we can see that not only does it appear commonly in the initial position, but it
also appears most commonly in the initial position. Remember that the turn-taking
process of conversation forces the alternation of roles from speaker to hearer and back
again. When person A says something and person B takes the next turn at talk, person B
is actually a speaker in the second turn of the conversation. If person A produces a
laughable utterance, person B can respond in one of four ways: 1) by making only a
linguistic utterance, 2) by making only an utterance of laughter, 3) by making first a
linguistic utterance and then an utterance of laughter, or 4) by making first an utterance of
laughter and then a linguistic utterance. Of these four possible patterns, one lacks any
laughter and becomes an unmarked or unbracketed utterance (although it may be marked
by something other than laughter). The second possibility, a response consisting of
laughter alone contains no linguistic elements that the laughter might mark, and in this
case, laughter fails as a discourse marker. The third possibility suggests that laughter
might serve as an end bracket, but Schiffrin requires that to quality as a discourse marker,
a candidate marker must occur initially. The last possibility is the only one that will
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allow prototypical laughter to serve as a discourse marker. Indeed, my data show that
even prototypical responses may co-occur with some sort of linguistic response, and the
laughter may precede the linguistic elements. As we have seen, prototypical laughter
may co-occur with a repetition of material from the first pair part and it may co-occur
with a linguistic proposition that specifies a part of the first pair part. Segment 5e shows
laughter preceding a specification and confirms that laughter may occur initially in an
utterance.
Returning to our basic conversational role, if person A produces a laughable
utterance, person A may be the laugher as well. This creates three different possible
placements for the laughter: it can precede the linguistic elements, occur within the
middle of the linguistic utterance, or occur at the end of the utterance. In fact, all three
placements occur in what I have termed speaker laughter. On six occasions laughter
preceded the linguistic elements. On 68 occasions, laughter arose in the middle of a
linguistic element, and on 104 occasions, laughter occurred at the completion of a
linguistic element. The low number of occasions when laughter precedes a speaker’s
comments would seem to eliminate laughter as a discourse marker, as it fails the second
criterion of occurring commonly in an initial position. However, two reasons why this
interpretation is false must be pointed out. First, these numbers correspond to my coding
decisions, and I chose to separate some of the occasions when laughter occurred initially
in a turn because I saw it as responding to the prior speaker’s turn and not as initiating the
subsequent comment. Schifffin makes no such distinction. In short, I looked at moves
and not just turns. Second, Schifffin sets “commonly placed initially” as a criterion
without clearly explaining what she means by “common.” Common can be taken to
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mean very frequent or most frequent placement, or it can be taken to mean used by a
variety of speakers rather than function as an idiolect element of one individual. Without
adequate explanation, the focus must be on initial placement rather than on the
commonality, for Schiffrin’s own definition states the function of discourse markers is to
bracket units of talk, and there are both opening brackets and closing brackets. Initial
placement is required for the function of opening bracket.
Range o f Prosodic Features
The third feature a discourse marker must display is a range of prosodic features.
This item on the list conflicts with Schiffrin’s definition of discourse markers as
encompassing both “verbal (and nonverbal) devices” (41) since nonverbal devices clearly
have no prosodic features. Nevertheless, laughter satisfies this criterion because it does
exhibit a range of prosodic features; we can laugh in giggles, gales, and guffaws. Glenn
further delineates the prosody of laughter as denoted by Sacks, et al.: “When laughter
ends a turn at talk . . . certain features routinely mark its nearing completion . . . . These
include an inbreath laugh particle . . . and decreased volume” (44).
Local and Global Levels
Schiffrin’s next item, the ability “to operate at both local and global levels” (328),
captures the idea that a discourse marker has import at the moment when it is included as
well as import across a larger section of the discourse. I do not take this to mean that
each and every occasion of a marker’s use actually operates both locally and globally,
merely that it carries the potential to do so. Although Schiffrin’s explanation again
remains sketchy, laughter does seem to function across a stretch of conversation as well
as at a local point.
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The long sequence in (11) shows exactly how laughter acts both locally and
globally in a conversation. It occurs immediately after a laughable, but as several
laughables and laughs occur over a stretch, the laughter serves to mark a particular stretch
of talk as laughable. Nevertheless, when one of the participants moves to make the
conversation more serious, the laughter subsides and talk continues without any laughter
for a stretch. In sequence (11), Roger and Charlie have been talking about credit card
debt and its effects on credit rating. Roger makes the comment that for his future career,
he can’t afford to have bad credit, prompting Charlie to ask what his intended career will
be. Roger’s response in 1lc takes the form of a laughable, and the conversation
continues in a slightly different vein, focusing on politics. Roger’s statements on his
political affiliation prompt some facial expressions from eavesdroppers in another room,
and Charlie responds with prototypical laughter in 1lj. Roger joins in what has become a
game now to get a rise out of the eavesdroppers, producing several laughables in a row in
1lk, m, o, q, s, and u, and Charlie provides prototypical laugh responses in 111, n, r, and
v. In 1lv, however, Charlie decides the game has gone on long enough and makes a
move to create a more serious tone. In 1lv he produces an initial laugh but then follows
it with “That’s pretty cool actually.” By stating the word “actually,” Charlie moves out
of the game frame and into a frame for serious discussion. Laughter does not occur even
once between 11 v and 11 rr.

(ID

a

Roger:

b
c
d
e
f

Charlie:
Roger:
Charlie:
Roger:
Charlie:

Exactly. If you pay interest on your credit card, you’re done.
Your credit score goes down so much. You know, for what I
want to be, I have to have really, really good credit. You know.
What was it, finance banker? What’d - What did you say?
Capitalize. I’m going to be a capitalist.
Ca-h-apita-ha-ha-ha-ha-ha-ha
Yeah.
Yeah.
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j

Roger:
Charlie:
Roger:
Charlie:

k
1
m
n
0
P

Roger:
Charlie:
Roger:
Charlie:
Roger:
Charlie:

q

Roger:

r
s
t
u

Charlie:
Roger:
Charlie:
Roger:
Charlie:

g
h
i

V

X

Roger:
Charlie:

y
z

Roger:
Charlie:

aa
bb
cc

Roger:
Charlie:
Roger:

dd

Charlie:

ee
ff

Roger:
Charlie:
Roger:
Charlie:
Roger:
Charlie:

w

gg
hh
ii
jj

I’m a Republican. I changed.
Die hard Republican.
Hey, dude, yeah.
Ha-ha-ha-ha-ha-ha Look at this guy. He’s getting the looks
over here. Ha-ha. Yeah. Die hard Republican over here ha-ha.
I’m never changing.
Ah-ha-ha-ha-ha-ha
Bush is awesome.
Ah-HA-HA-ha-ha. Don’t say that too loud in this house.
Hey, don’t say that too loud in this house, man. I don’t care haha.
‘Cause I am writing a letter to Bush. I am getting it autographed
and all that stuff.
Ha-ha You gonna get an autograph?
Oh. Yeah.
You gonna put it up in a frame?
Yeah. I’m going to put it up in my house.
Heh. That’s pretty cool actually. I don’t know, I like— I don’t
know, I like Bu—, well, I think he’s a good old boy, I think he’s
cool like that, but I think they are full of—something.
They all are full of something, but, dude.
It’s—pretty much in picking a president which one you think is
the less fulla crap, you know what I mean? Cause they’re all, I
don’t know.
W ellI don’t know. I don’t know enough to— anybody- I don’t
know. I don’t know enough to—
It depends on what you think. Should we wait? For=
Yeah.
=you know, Saddam Hussein to attack us and then go okay
we’ll go after him, or do you want to go after him now?
Yeah. Oh, and also, though, I mean, you see like the conditions
in that country, you know, they could be so much better over
there, but in the long-run we’re really trying to help them out.
Their GNP’s gonna be better than France’s in the long run, you
know, they have so much potential.
They do.
They have a lot.
It’s good they have you know—
Natural resources
So many natural resources.
Yeah.
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kk
11
mm
nn
00

Roger:
Charlie:
Roger:
Charlie:
Roger:

PP
qq
rr

Charlie:
Roger:
Charlie:

ss
tt
uu

Roger:
Charlie:
Roger:

That’s how United States became so~
And it is squandered.
We had so many natural resources=
Yeah.
=to start off, and that’s what—that’s one of the reasons, you
know
We did.
That’s why w e- we came out on top.
We did a little bit of imperialism, too. Ah-ha-ha. Joined in to
that.
Well, industrialized everything.
Yeah.
So.

From studying this stretch of talk, we can see that laughter works at the local level when
it immediately follows a laughable, and that it works globally across a stretch of talk to
mark a section of a conversation as playful.
Planes o f Discourse
Schiffrin requires a marker to function “on different planes of discourse,”
comprising the five planes of:
1) the information state of participants,
2) the participation framework,
3) the ideational structure,
4) the action structure, and
5) the exchange structure. (24-29)
The information state comprises the “cognitive capacities” (Schiffrin 28) of the
conversation participants: what each knows and what each assumes the others know. The
participation framework refers to the social relationships between the conversation
participants, while the ideational structure refers to the “semantic” content or
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“propositions” of the utterances (Schifffin 25). The action structure refers to the acts that
utterances perform according to speech act theory. Finally, the exchange structure refers
to the organization of the talk itself. Although Schiffrin identifies five different planes
and requires markers to function on multiple planes, no marker needs to function on all
five, only on more than one. For example, Schiffrin identifies well as functioning on all
five planes, but oh functions on three, and or functions on only two (316). Like well.
laughter seems to have the ability to function on all five planes.
First, we have seen that laughter functions within the exchange structure because
it acts as the second pair part to a laughable in a laughable-laugh adjacency pair.
Sequence (12) demonstrates that laughter is a factor in the information state of
participants, too. Four women are discussing a group that they are members of and the
meetings that the group holds. At the meetings, there are typically two presenters, a main
speaker and an attendant speaker. The members of the group itself play the roles of
speakers at their meetings. Sequence (12) picks up after one of the women, Helen, has
revealed that she will be speaking at the next meeting, a role she hasn’t performed yet for
the particular chapter of the group in this locale. In 12a Rhoda says she thought Helen
had been a main speaker, and it becomes clear that she had not in 12b and 12c. After the
group’s working out the timeline of Helen’s move to the current location, Rhoda reveals
in 12h that she was, in fact, the one who suggested that Helen be asked to speak at the
next meeting. Gabriela takes the next turn and laughs, marking her interpretation of
Rhoda’s confession as a laughable. In 12j Helen responds to the new information with
Schiffrin’s classic marker of a change in an information state, “oh.” Rhoda admits her
guilt again with “yeah” and laughs, and the other listeners provide echoic laughter. Then
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in 12m, Gabriela reveals why she had deemed Rhoda’s first confession a laughable: she
had suspected all along that Rhoda had been the one to suggest that Helen speak. Thus
Gabriela’s laugh in 12i acts a marker of Gabriela’s information state moving from
suspicion to certainty and helps reveal what she found laughable about Rhoda’s
confession: she had held that information all along.
(12)

a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
j
k
1
m

Rhoda:
Gabriela:
Helen:
Gabriela:
Kathy:
Gabriela:
Helen:
Rhoda:
Gabriela:
Helen:
Rhoda:
Others:
Gabriela:

I thought you were “main” one night at the old church?
She never was at the old church.
I never was at the old church.
She, ah, she just came when we were at the new church.
Yeah, last September.
Yeah, a year after.
I know, I’ve been here forever.
Then I’m glad I did say you
Ha-ha-ha-ha.
You told it—ooh.
Yeah, I ha-ha-ha-ha-ha
Ha-ha-ha-ha.
I knew it! Rhoda does that! Rhoda always does that!

Sequence (12) may be seen as a demonstration of laughter’s role in the participant
framework, too. Although Gabriela’s laughter coincides with a change in her information
state, it also coincides with confirmation of her knowledge of and relationship with
Rhoda. In 12m Gabriela reveals that she knows Rhoda well and that she knows that
Rhoda is the sort of person who will volunteer others for activities. Therefore, her
laughter in 12i reveals not just the confirmation of suspected information, but also
confirmation of her knowledge of and relationship with her friend, Rhoda.
As an example of laughter’s ability to mark something on the ideational plane,
sequence (13) below along with interview comments by one of the laughers allows us to
define laughter as a marker on this plane. Gigi has been telling stories about her mother-
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in-law, and in (13) she continues, adding a new story for the listeners. She describes a
day of having her mother-in-law over to baby-sit and returning home to see many of her
toddlers’ drinking cups sitting on the living room coffee table. She inserts a laugh
particle into the word “table” and concludes her description with a marker asking for
hearer feedback, “you know.” Blanca and Linda both provide a response in the form of
laughter in 13b.
(13)

a

Gigi:

b
c

Blanca, Linda:
Gigi:

d
e
f

Linda:
Blanca:
Gigi:

=For example, they came up to here, to Big River, and,
ah, they stayed with the boys one afternoon while I was
in orientation or something, you know? And ah, I came
home and there were like six sippy cups - all over the tah-h-able, you know.
Ha-ha
And I’m like, “Wow, what’s all - what’s with all the
sippy cups?” And, um, I probably should have said - um
- “Hi, how’s everybody doing?”
Yeah-ha-ha.
Um-hm.
I came out with “Wow, what’s with all the sippy cups?”
Cause I was wondering “what?”

Later during an interview, Blanca revealed what was going through her mind as she
listened to Gigi tell about the sippy cups on the table, saying “Well, again, Gigi with the
sippy cup and grandma having six of them spread out all over and (ha-ha). God, that
whole tableau, that scene, was funny, the way it was described and just her reaction
again.” Blanca reveals that her laughter connects to her ideational framework as she
actually imagined the scene in her mind. Calling the laughable aspect a “tableau” or
“scene,” one which she did not see in real life, indicates that she conjured an image in her
mind that acted as the tableau or scene.

71

Finally, laughter does something in the action framework, as well, as Jefferson
(“Inviting Laughter”) and Glenn have worked to show. Their claim that laughter by a
speaker functions as an invitation to the hearer to engage in laughter places laughter in an
action framework. Additionally, laughter’s placement in backchannel also gives it the
function of indicating assent or agreement.
Schiffrin’s last criterion, that there must be “a lack of meaning or a vagueness of
meaning or a reflexiveness of meaning to either the language or the speaker” (328), arises
directly out of the requirement that a marker function on multiple planes. If there is no
inherent ambiguity, a marker would function on only one plane. The fact that laughter is
frequently called a response to a joke, the fact that it can indicate agreement, and the fact
that there is such a thing as nervous laughter all indicate that laughter has multiple
meanings, and, therefore, that its meaning is vague, although I prefer to call it ambiguous
rather than vague.
While Schiffrin exhaustively details the definition of discourse markers, she does
not claim to identify all of the possible markers that speakers use. What her work
provides for this study, then, is terminology to refer to laughter when it is produced by a
speaker and contextualizes an utterance. Such laughter can be described as a discourse
marker and can be understood as a speaker equivalent of hearer backchannel. That is,
hearer backchannel and speaker discourse markers together form an undercurrent to the
main current of turn-taking in the flow of conversational communication.
Others who have studied conversational laughter likewise distinguish between
hearer laughter and speaker laughter. Provine claims that previous to himself, others
neglected speaker laughter, “Audience laughter has been the almost exclusive concern of
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previous researchers, while speaker laughter has gone largely unrecognized” (26).
Provine’s claim must be taken in terms of raw numbers of researchers, since Jefferson
wrote four different articles on laughter, including the discussion of speaker laughter,
previous to Provine’s work. However, one researcher who performed a great deal of
work can be taken as few researchers, and Provine’s claim can stand. Provine’s results
showed that “speakers laugh more than their audiences” (3), although Provine did not
attend to all speaker laughter, purposely ignoring “laughspeak, a form of blended,
laughing speech that communicates emotional tone” as “qualitatively different from the
classical ha-ha-type laughter” (37). I disagree with Provine’s claim that “laughspeak” is
“qualitatively different” from speaker laughter with other placement positions in
relationship to the linguistic utterances. Unless speaker laughter is echoic, it serves as a
discourse marker, contextualizing the linguistic utterance in one of the five planes that
Schiffrin mentions. Provine’s statement that laughspeak expresses emotion suggests that
one of the planes may be the participant framework, the social relationship between the
speaker and hearer.
One aspect of speaker laughter that has been noted by all researchers of
conversational laughter is that it frequently occurs at the completion of a phrase or
utterance. Provine calls this the “punctuation effect” (37). Jefferson earlier, too, noted
the high occurrence of speaker laughter at the conclusion of turns, what Jefferson calls a
“post-utterance completion laugh particle” (“Inviting Laughter”), a finding that Glenn
reiterates (48, 50). My data and participants confirm the high frequency of speaker
laughter occurring at the close of an utterance. Out of 224 cases of speaker laughter, 104,
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or 46 percent, were placed at the conclusion of an utterance. Those 104 cases comprise
18 percent of all laughter in all conversations I observed.
Two self-aware participants revealed that their own laughter was often placed at
the conclusions of utterances. Both Ann and Amy identified themselves as people who
tend to laugh at the ends of their own sentences. Amy was unable to comment much
further on the phenomenon, however, stating merely, “I know I do it [laugh] often and I
know I do it at the end o f- I’ll say something and laugh. I don’t really know. . . . If I’m
making a statement, I would say that a lot of the times I do. Laugh.” She did,
nevertheless, go so far as to claim that it seems to occur primarily after statements, and
not after questions. “I would guess at the end of most statements, and of questions,
maybe not, if inquiring about something.”
Ann provides deeper insights for the study, noting that she “giggles” at the ends
of her utterances, but “laughs” in response to comments by others. Ann implies, then,
that not only does speaker laughter occur, but it is also a different sort of laughter than
hearer response laughter. She says, “I think that giggling is something that, ah, it is
almost like my, it just kind of happens at the end of my sentences. Laughing is like a
response to like a joke or a situation.”
We can see the phenomenon occurring twice in sequence (14). The first occasion
of post-utterance speaker laughter occurs in 14a and the second occurs in 14d. Although
Amy thought she laughed more at the ends of statements than questions, 14a shows that
she, indeed, at times, laughs at the ends of questions. It is clearly at the end of Amy’s
utterance because her conversation partner, Allie, takes the next turn as the selected
speaker to respond to the question, and Allie takes the question as a query for
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information, providing a direct negative response, and then asking a question on her own
part. Later, in 14d, Allie shows us an example of laughter occurring at the end of an
utterance, after a statement. Again it is clearly at the end of an utterance because Amy
takes the next turn as speaker.
(14)

a
b
c

Amy:
Allie:
Amy:

Didja look on line at all about appendi- appendix-ees, a-ha-ha-ha.
No. Why would I?
So you would know about it.

[
d
e

Allie:
Amy:

I know about your appendix. Hee-hee-hee.
I know. But if you were to find out about--cause it’s fairly
common, there’s—

In some cases, the post-utterance laughter seems to initiate while the speaker is
still completing the linguistic portion of the utterance. In this situation, we can say that
there is both mid-utterance and post-utterance laughter, and we can also see that
Provine’s idea of “laughspeak” as different from “punctuation effect” laughter is
unwarranted. Sequence (15) shows several examples of mid-word laughter, or
“laughspeak.” 15c shows an example of a mid-word laugh followed by a post-utterance
laugh. Other examples of mid-word laughter occur in 15a, 15d, and 15i.
(15)

a

Meg:

b
c
d
e

Ann:
Britney:
Meg:
Britney:

f

Meg:
Britney:
Ann:
Britney:

g
h
i

You don’t want that horrid middle child or anyth-h-ing that gets
upset that it’s not the oldest or the youngest?
What’s the middle child thing? I’m not—
I’ve got the middle chi-h-ld syndrome. Ha-ha=
You have themiddle ch-h-h-ild syndrome?
=Ha-ha-ha-ha I did when I was growing up. I don’t think I do
now.
ha-ha.
I did.
Ha-ha.
Let’s not ta-h-alk about it. This is an emotional moment that
we’re talking about.
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In this sequence, Meg, Ann, and Britney have been discussing whether they want to have
children later in life. Ann has claimed that she’d like to have two children, prompting
Meg to ask in 15a whether the motivation to have only two kids is due to a desire to
avoid the “middle child syndrome.” Arm indicates that she’s not familiar with the term in
15b, but Britney speaks up next, saying that she has the syndrome. It is Britney’s
admission of having “middle child syndrome” that includes the mid-word and post
utterance placements of laughter. Her laughter continues through Meg’s question asking
her to confirm that she suffers from middle child syndrome. In effect, Britney’s laughter
surrounds the word “syndrome,” suggesting that we need to interpret her laughter as
marking that word in particular. If mid-word laughter marks the laughable, then the other
mid-word laughs should be interpreted as marking other particular words laughable, too.
Meg marks “anything” in 15a as laughable with a mid-word laugh, and she marks “child”
in 15d as laughable by inserting a mid-word particle into it, although she may simply be
repeating Britney’s mid-word laugh because she is repeating Britney’s proposition in its
entirety. Finally, Britney inserts another mid-word laugh in 15i, marking “talk” as
laughable. Britney also confirms Provine’s suspicion that laughspeak relates to emotion
in 15i, even using the term “emotional.” But there seems to be no reason to take her post
utterance laugh in 15c any differently from the mid-word laugh in 15c. In short, laughter
seems to be used by a speaker to mark his or her own utterances as laughable and
attached to some emotion.
The questions of what makes those particular utterances laughable and what
emotion is attached to the accompanying laughter remain. The discussion of the nature
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of the laughable is located in chapter 3, but my participant, Ann, offers a suggestion of
what emotion is attached. She says,
I think that giggling is something that, ah, it is almost like my, it just kind
of happens at the end of my sentences and I think sometimes I add it in
when I am feeling like I am being watched (ha-ha) or recorded (ha-ha).
Ah, maybe for approval? From the other people, the people I’m talking to.
I think sometimes I add it when I’m nervous, too, or it’s also maybe like
even to negate like the strong opinions I have. It’s kind of like saying, “or
something.”
Ann reveals that speaker laughter is the form of laughter that is typically termed nervous
laughter. It encompasses feelings of uncertainty in the speaker, causing him or her to
request feedback from the hearers. Thus, speaker laughter functions as other discourse
markers do, serving as an ancillary remark that requests one’s hearers to come forth with
some acknowledgement of their understanding, agreement, approval, or acceptance of the
speaker. It functions on all five planes. It works in the action framework since its
function is to request acknowledgement from the hearer, and it works in the participation
framework since its request deals with the way the hearer perceives and receives the
speaker. It works on the information state plane, since it can request whether the hearer
shares the same information, or it can work on the ideational plane, since it can ask
whether a hearer understands the information in the same way as the speaker. Finally, it
functions in the exchange structure since a request anticipates a response.
But does all speaker laughter have to be nervous laughter? No. Jefferson has
shown that some speaker laughter serves as an invitation for others to laugh rather than
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serve as a request that others display acceptance or approval, and my data, too, provide
some confirmation that speaker laughter serves this purpose. Certainly my participants
mentioned it in their interviews. When reviewing one of her stories in her conversation,
Gigi mentioned that she probably laughed while telling the story and that her laughter
should have served to mark the story as a funny story. In other words, she was cueing her
listeners to laugh as she was telling a funny story. In Jefferson’s words, she was inviting
her hearers to laugh. More specifically when I asked her, “How did you feel when you
were telling that story?” Gigi said, “Like I was telling a funny story. . . . [M]y tone of
voice probably said, you know, I probably laughed myself.” Rhoda, too, sees that
speaker laughter can function as a way for a speaker to mark an utterance as laughable
and to invite others to laugh when she says that Kathy told a story “about- oh, it was a
funny story. I mean she was trying to put something funny out there and it w as- had
connections to what the other people were saying. She was using it to participate and—
she was laughing.”
If this interpretation is accurate, we should be able to locate an instance of a
speaker telling a story or making an utterance accompanied by speaker laughter and of
hearers subsequently laughing in return. In fact, the sippy cup story that Gigi told in
sequence (13) follows this pattern of laughter. In 13a Gigi launches the story with “for
example” and provides the background of the story, closing the background information
with the discourse marker “you know.” Then she continues to the body of the story,
launching it with “and.” She closes the story with the tableau statement “six sippy cups all over the ta-h-h-able, you know.” In the tableau statement, Gigi laughs mid-word on
the word table, and uses the discourse marker “you know” in the post-utterance position.
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In Jefferson’s interpretation, the mid-word laugh would be taken as an invitation to laugh,
and the hearers, Blanca and Linda, would be seen as accepting that invitation in 13b
because they laugh in response to the request.
There now appears to be ambiguity in the interpretation of speaker laughter. Ann
indicates speaker laughter may be a request for approval, and Gigi and Rhoda indicate
that it marks a speaker’s utterance as laughable and invites others to laugh. Is such
ambiguity acceptable, or is there a central element that explains how two such different
interpretations might arise from the same element? I suggest that both questions be
answered in the affirmative. First, ambiguity must be accepted if it, in fact, exists. While
we may like laughter to have one and only one meaning, as Morreall (Taking Laughter-)
sought to achieve, the fact remains that it may not function as we would like, and the
existence of ambiguity may be an aspect we’d like not to deal with. Furthermore, if we
recall that laughter at a joke represents prototypical laughter, then we can accept
nonprototypical laughter as poorer, but nonetheless true, cases of laughter. We needn’t,
in fact, mustn’t, dismiss them as “qualitatively different” (Provine 37) and ignore them
altogether.
Finally, there is a relationship between nervous laughter and laughter that invites
others to laugh. It is the same relationship that exists between a statement and a question.
We can use language to make a proposition stating, “This is funny,” or we can alter the
language to ask the question, “Is this funny?” The difference between laughter that
marks an utterance as laughable and laughter that marks an utterance, and consequently
the speaker, as uncertain is part of the difference that Ann sought to capture when she
separated laughter from giggling: her term “laughter” is my “statement,” and her
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“giggling” is my “question.” To wit, when a hearer “laughs” in response to a laughable
first pair part, the meaning is, in essence, “that was funny.” When a speaker “laughs” at
the end of an utterance or in the midst of an utterance, he or she is stating, “I’m telling
you something funny.” When a speaker “giggles” at the end or in the midst of an
utterance, however, he or she is asking, “Do you think this is funny? And what do you
think about me as a result of my saying this?”
In the end, then, we can see that laughter by participants can occur on the two
different levels of communication: the main current and the undercurrent. The
undercurrent includes speaker laughter used as a discourse marker, whether that laughter
is metaphorically phrased as a statement or as a question. The undercurrent also includes
backchannel laughter by hearers and indicates that a hearer is listening, understanding,
and in agreement with the speaker. The main current includes rare cases of echoic
laughter by speakers and hearers. The main current also includes very common
occurrences of prototypical laughter by a hearer in response to a laughable utterance by a
previous speaker; it forms the second pair part of a laughable-laugh adjacency pair. A
study of the nature of the first pair part, the laughable, comes next.
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CHAPTER 3
WHAT’S SO FUNNY? THE NATURE OF THE LAUGHABLE
The traditional theories of laughter attempt to answer the question of why people
laugh, but this question is, in fact, more vague than it appears initially. The question of
“why” may be broken into smaller segments: What is the stimulus of laughter? What
characteristics does a stimulus contain? What functions does laughter perform? These
questions lead to the possibility that laughter may be describable in terms similar to those
used to describe a language. We may seek the form of laughter, referring to its phonetics,
its morphology, and its syntax. We may seek the function of laughter, referring to its
syntactic function or its pragmatic function. Finally, we may seek the meaning of
laughter by looking for which thoughts or feelings it carries. We may also seek the
meaning of laughter by looking for the ways it carries thoughts, feelings or reference, a
semiotic approach to meaning.
A review of the traditional theories reveals that disparate ways of posing the
“why” question may be what has led to the different theories. The Superiority Theory
identifies a social function for laughter, the Relief Theory identifies a psychophysiological function for laughter, and the Incongruity Theory describes the
characteristics of the stimulus. All of the theories, then, may be involved in the answer to
why people laugh, for each may be the answer to a more specific question that is
contained within the vague “why” question.
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If we view the last chapter on the structure of laughter in conversation as the
beginnings of a description of the syntax of laughter, then this chapter may be viewed as
the morphology of the laughable. Like some earlier works, I seek to discover what it is
that acts as a stimulus to laughter and to describe its form. Like word morphology, I am
most interested in discovering the root that the laughable is built on. To do this, I have
analyzed the eight conversations in my data, and I have identified the laughable by first
locating the laughter and then by seeking what the laughable might be. To help ensure
that I correctly identify the laughable, I interviewed the participants with particular
interest in those sequences where I noticed laughter. The insights that such questioning
gave into the thoughts and feelings of the participants helped me in identifying and
describing the laughable. What I discovered is that the traditional description of the
Incongruity Theory most closely describes the characteristic of the laughable in
conversation. Whether a participant felt superior or not was inconsistent in my results, as
was the relief feature. These two theories are best looked at as attempts to describe the
function of the humorous and not as descriptive of the form of laughable utterances in
conversation.
This chapter serves as the most important contribution of this project to the study
of laughter. While the concept of incongruity as the root of the laughable has existed for
centuries, even millennia, the arguments of the oldest theorists (Kant, Hutcheson) are
based merely on introspection and lack empirical data. Those who have sought to use
empirical data (Jefferson, Glenn, Provine) have not attempted a description of the
laughable, and yet others who have sought to analyze concrete instances of the laughable
(Freud, Gruner) have analyzed formulaic jokes, not real, unmanipulated conversational
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data. While formulaic jokes are intended to be laughables, they may not, in fact, elicit
laughter, and thus must be described as nonlaughables instead. My study is the first
where a researcher has collected real, unmanipulated conversations, identified the
laughter and the laughables therein, and has sought to describe the form of both the
laughable and the laughter.
Robert Provine collected conversational instances of laughter and even went so
far as to define the laugh episode as “the comment immediately preceding laughter, and
all laughter occurring within one second after the onset of the first laughter” (26).
Provine, therefore, recognized that a laughable existed, but he described it only in terms
of what it was not: “most laughter did not follow anything resembling a joke, story
telling, or other formal attempt at humor” (40). When describing what the nature of the
“prelaugh comments” was, Provine merely states “people laugh more often after . . .
innocuous lines” (40). Provine provides a list of many of the utterances that were
followed by laughter, but he did not analyze them in depth, going only so far as to
separate the lists into four groupings: “Typical Statements,” “Typical Questions,”
“Humorous Statements,” and “Humorous Questions” (40-42). The data collectors
created the divisions, using the word “typical” to designate utterances that they thought
were ordinary sorts of conversational content and “humorous” to describe utterances that
they thought went beyond the ordinary for some reason. We are left to wonder what is
laughable about the ordinary sorts of conversational content. Provine’s response seems
to be that we need to drop the consideration altogether and focus only on the laugh itself
to understand what is happening, for he writes that “the discovery” of an absence of
“formal attempts at humor” in conversations “forces a reevaluation of what laughter
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signals, when we do it, and how we should study it” (42). Yet if by his own definition a
laugh episode consists of both a “prelaugh comment” and the laughter itself, to neglect
the prelaugh comment is to settle for half a description of the phenomenon of laughter.
Provine has left a gap that needs to be filled, and filled by someone using empirical data.
The linguists, too, seem to leave the same gap. Jefferson never seeks to describe
the laughable in any of her articles on laughter, but merely coins the term “laughable”
when talking about utterances followed by laughter. In only one article does she provide
any hint as to the nature of such an utterance, and it is limited in scope to “troublestelling” (“Talk about Troubles”). In this one brief comment, Jefferson remarks that the
troubles that get laughed at seem to be “manipulated” as “excuses, bids for sympathy,
sentimentalizing, and dramatizing” (366).
In his follow-up to Jefferson’s work, Glenn picks up the term “laughable” but
does not take it much further, saying, “Virtually any utterance or action could draw
laughter, under the right (or wrong) circumstances. This fact dooms any theory that
attempts to account coherently for why people laugh” (49). He adds, “Analytical
specification of what makes something laughable does not seem a necessary precondition
to understanding how people start laughing or laughing together in talk” (49). In short,
Glenn does not think it is possible to describe the laughable, nor does he deem it
necessary if we are aiming to describe the function of laughter in conversation. Note,
however, that he words the lack of necessity a “precondition,” which hardly precludes the
possibility that “what makes something laughable” may be describable after all. What is
missing perhaps from his approach is the interviewing of the conversation participants for
assistance in identifying the “right circumstances” by which any utterance can become a
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laughable. Yet Glenn does provide the method by which we can begin to locate and,
therefore, describe the laughable: “I use the term laughable retroactively to describe any
referent that draws laughter or for which I can reasonably argue that it is designed to
draw laughter. . . . I begin with a first laugh and its sequential location, which often
produces a relatively clear means for identifying the laughable” (49). So while the
“specification of what makes something laughable” is not a “precondition,” such a
specification may be possible through the retroactive identification of the laughable in a
conversation and its subsequent analysis.
In my study of laughter in conversations, then, that is exactly how I approached a
description of the laughable. I began as Glenn did: locating the laughter and retroactively
identifying the utterance or other referent that drew the laughter. However, I define the
laughable more narrowly than Glenn. For this study, only those utterances or other
referents that actually were marked by laughter are considered laughables. Other
utterances may have been potential laughables or may have been intended or designed as
laughables, but if laughter did not actually occur, I did not consider the utterance a
laughable. My analysis would no longer have been data driven had I done so: I would
have brought bias into the analytical process. In short, the laughable must be connected
to laughter. An unintended laughable that results in laughter is still a laughable, and an
intended laughable that elicits no laughter must be considered nonlaughable. To get at
the nature of the laughable, we must disregard intent altogether and simply study what
occurs.
By using Glenn’s method of first locating the laughter, I was able to describe the
structure of laughter in discourse analysis terms. Next I used the location of the laughter
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to identify the laughable. When laughter occurred as a hearer’s response, the second pair
part of an adjacency pair, I looked to the immediately preceding utterance for the
laughable because it could be expected to be adjacent to the laughter. When a laugh
response was accompanied by repetition or specification of material, I took that material
as the center of the laughable utterance. When laughter took the form of backchannel, I
looked to the last utterance by the speaker holding the floor as the laughable. That is, in
multi-party conversations, it is possible that more than one hearer will produce a
backchannel response. In such a case, the second hearer’s backchannel might follow the
first hearer’s backchannel. In this case, a second hearer’s backchannel laughter should be
taken as tied to the speaker’s utterance, not to the first hearer’s backchannel. Finally,
when laughter appeared as a speaker discourse marker, I sought to follow Glenn’s
method of locating the first laugh particle. The first particle can be expected to be the
most precise in identifying the laughable.
After identifying the laughable comment, I next sought to describe the
information contained within it, its propositional content. I also sought to describe its
presentation or delivery. Finally I interviewed the conversation participants regarding
certain points in the conversation when I observed laughter. I sought to discover the
thoughts and feelings of the participants at the points where they laughed and where they
produced a laughable. I then coded the interview comments in the same terms as I used
for the propositional and presentation of the laughable. With 570 instances of laughter, I
was unable to notice and question participants on each and every instance of laughter.
Those instances that I noticed most as a participant observer of the conversation itself
were the occasions I focused my questions on.
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Incongruity is fairly comprehensive in its ability to describe the propositions and
presentation effects that speakers use in conversations when they produce a laughable.
Some laughables arise from the external environment in which the conversation takes
place, but this occurred only rarely, and incongruity can cover the nature of those
occasions, too. Therefore, laughables arise out of two sources: what is said in the
conversation itself, or the text, and the larger environment in which the conversation
takes place, or the context.
I located 504 laughables in the data. The discrepancy between the 570 instances
of laughter discussed in the last chapter and the 504 laughables discussed here results
from the fact that some laughables elicited more than one instance of laughter (e.g.
sequence (2) 46; sequence (4) 48). Of the 504 laughables, 23 were unidentifiable due to
the difficulties of working with empirical data. There were instances when two speakers
overlapped and the talk was indecipherable at transcription; this resulted in lost
laughables. Additionally, sometimes speakers did not speak loudly enough for the
recorder to pick up their voices, and again such an occasion resulted in a lost laughable.
However, 481 of the 504 laughables were identifiable and analyzable into three broad
categories: contextual laughables, presentation techniques, and content laughables.
Contextual Laughables
Of the 481 identifiable laughables, only four arose out of the context: the
remaining 477 arose from the text of the conversation itself. The laughables that arose
from the context were ultimately incorporated into the text as well, but the laughter they
produced was in response to either the auditory or visual stimulus of an environmental
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object itself. Three of the contextual laughables were stimulated by physical objects, and
one was auditory in nature.
Sequence (16) provides the example of an external object that creates a laugh
response when heard by one of the conversation participants. Three participants have
been discussing a poetry class. In 16a Jack is discussing the differences between the
lessons of the class and the information in a book he is reading on his own outside of
class. As he is speaking, a janitor begins running a vacuum cleaner in the same room,
overlapping some of Jack’s words. Wade laughs in 16c at the interruption, and Jack is
forced to repeat his words in a louder tone in 16d in order to be heard over the vacuum.
(16)

a

Jack:

Well, its-a h , it’s a little confusing. I don’t - i t ’s a little confusing.
I—I’m reading a book at the same time as I’m taking the course,
and—the information I get in my book is=
[

b
c
d

Wade:
Jack:

((vacuum cleaner begins running))
Ha-ha-ha-ha.
((speaking more loudly)) =the information I get-

In yet another interruption of a conversation, a train in sequence (17) forces the
principal investigator to turn off the recorder until the locomotive passes. The signals of
the gates at a crossing sound in 17a, and Allie ends the previous discussion with “so” in
17b while Amy announces the imminent arrival of the train in 17c. It is at Amy’s
announcement that the recorder is turned off and, after the train passes, is turned on
again. In 17d, Linda, the principal investigator, announces the resumption of the recorder
and ends the utterance with a laugh.
(17)

a
b
c
d

Allie:
Amy:
Linda:

((Ding-ding-ding-ding: Train signal sounds))
So.
Here comes a train!
Okay. We’re back on. mheh-heh-heh
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While one might suspect that Linda’s laughter is in response to the train, this is not the
case, for her laughter does not occur when the train signal sounds, and during the time the
train passed, no recording occurred. Additionally, Linda’s laughter takes the structure of
a post-utterance discourse marker, suggesting that there is something laughable about the
announcement that the recorder is on again. Indeed, Linda’s thoughts on the matter are
that the focus on the recorder is the laughable object here. The conversation must stop
not because the train is passing, but because the recorder must be stopped and restarted.
That is, if the recording equipment weren’t necessary, the conversation could still be
heard over the train by all the participants. The recorder, however, would be unable to
pick up the conversation over the noise of the train. Therefore, it is the physical
engagement with the recording device that acts as the direct interruption to the
conversation, and the train is only an indirect interruption. As principal investigator,
Linda knows that she desires the conversation be as naturally occurring as possible and
that the presence of research paraphernalia as well as her own presence compromises the
goal. The train’s arrival indirectly disrupts the conversation but directly disrupts the
research goal by forcing focus on the research paraphernalia, by forcing focus on objects
that should be external to the conversation. The focus on the contextual object forces it
to become a textual object as well, to become the topic of the conversation.
Contextual laughables may be visual in nature, as the remaining two examples
demonstrate. In sequence (18) Laura and Rick, roommates of Nina, inform Nina of a
friend who dropped by their apartment while Nina was out. The visitor had recently
angered Nina, at which point she painted an abstract picture in hues of red, orange, and
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black. After dropping by the apartment, the visitor dropped in on Nina at her workplace.
Nina opens the sequence by telling the others that the visitor didn’t mention the painting
when he came to her workplace. As the conversation unfolds, a couple of laughables and
laughs appear in 18i and 18j-18k. In 18m, Rick turns to an individual in the conversation
who is unfamiliar with the situation and the painting and points out the painting under
discussion, which is hanging on the wall of the apartment. As he points out the painting,
he concludes his utterance with a laugh. His words indicate that the laughable in this
case is not anything he says, but the painting itself, an item that belongs to the context as
well as to the text.
(18)

a
b
c

Nina:
Laura:
Rick:

Butcha know what? He never said anything about the pi’ture.
I don’t know if he ever—
He probably didn’t see it.

d
e
f

Nina:
Laura:
Nina:

Oh, he prob’ly didn’t notice it.
I had asked Rick cause I was upset talking to him.
Well, if he does come by and he says it, tell him that Nina painted
it. And if he asks why, tell him—

g

Laura:

Go talk to her.

h
i

Rick:
Nina:
Rick:
Laura:
Nina:
Rick:
Nina:
Laura:
Nina:
Rick:

[

[

j
k
1
m
n
0
P
q

She’s—
Ha-ha. Yeah, go ask her.
She was abducted by aliens and that’s what they look like
Ha-ha-ha-ha-ha.
She’ll tell you that it was to—
It’s that picture up there. The red one ha-ha-ha-ha.
Yeah to relieve the stress cause he lied to me. It was like a—=
A get my anger out!
= Artistic therapy kinda thing. So.
Yeah.
(pause)
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Finally, even a person can be a contextual stimulus of laughter. Sequence (11), presented
in the last chapter but re-presented here with only the relevant lines included, shows how
an individual who is not a participant in the conversation and, in fact, is not in the same
room can give rise to laughter. Charlie and Roger have been talking about credit and
finances, and Charlie has asked Roger what job he plans to take when he grows up, and
Roger reveals he wants to work in finance, and then brings up the political point of view
that is typically aligned with such a profession. The sequence (11) re-presentation opens
with Roger stating that he’s become a Republican, the political party that is most aligned
with work in finance. Charlie provides a backchannel repetition of the information to
indicate his understanding, and Roger likewise makes a backchannel response in 1li. In
1lj, Charlie produces a laugh, and at first glance it might seem that his laughter is in
response to Roger’s backchannel affirmation of his new political affiliation, but Charlie’s
words reveal otherwise. He uses the imperative and refers to Roger as “this guy.”
Clearly, he is no longer speaking to Roger. What has happened is that relatives of
Charlie’s, his father and uncle, have been eavesdropping from the next room, and Charlie
has caught sight of the facial expression on his uncle, well-known to Charlie as a
Democrat, and he seems actually to be alerting his father, another Democrat, to the scene.
In effect, Charlie laughs at his uncle’s expression and tells his father to look at his uncle
and Roger. Roger seems to pick up the joke-making and produces a laughable utterance
in Ilk.
(11)

g
h
i
j

Roger:
Charlie:
Roger:
Charlie:

I’m a Republican. I changed.
Die hard Republican.
Hey dude, yeah.
Ha-ha-ha-ha-ha-ha Look at this guy. He’s getting the looks over
here. Ha-ha. Yeah. Die hard Republican over here ha-ha.
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k Roger:
1 Charlie:

I’m never changing.
Ah-ha-ha-ha-ha-ha

Four occasions of contextual laughables hardly present us with enough data to
describe them, but notice how in almost every case, the vacuum cleaner being the
exception, the contextual object somehow becomes part of the text as well. It either
becomes part of the text as an account of the laughter, as Charlie does in sequence (11),
or it is under discussion and then is laughed at as happens with the recording equipment
and the painting in sequences (17) and (18). Such few occasions of contextual laughables
and the fact that almost all that do occur become tied to the text as well strongly suggests
that laughables in conversation are textbound. This connection, in turn, suggests that
they are bound up in the meaning of the conversation. To find out what is laughable, it is
best to study the text itself rather than the external context. And here we bump up into
the Sociality Theory: if laughables rarely occur in the external environment but
frequently occur within the conversational text, the laughable and laughter are socially
bounded. Indeed, for those who might be tempted to say that the vacuum cleaner’s role
as a laughable disconfirms this aspect of the nature of the laughable, I can reply with a
more in-depth study of the conversation from which sequence (16) was taken. It turns
out that the vacuum cleaner was actually part of the text of the conversation at an earlier
point. Sequence (20) provides a fuller view of the vacuum cleaner as both textual object
and contextual object.
(20)

a

Wade:

But is it like, modem poetry? Or is it 20th century, early 20th
century poetry? That’s what I was wondering.

b

Jack:

c

Wade:

Yeah it’s ear-— it’s the—it’s not modem in the term modem of the
modem— in the term of the—the modernism involved.
Ah.
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d
e
f
g
h
i

Jack:
Wade:
Jack:
Wade:
Jack:
Wade:

j

Jack:

That would be generally 1915 to 1921 is the—
I see.
=The main time? And it includes like-like T.S. Eliot, Yeats=
Yeah.
=Auden, ????? How did that get—
Someone’s gonna be back for it ha-ha. Okay, I was gonna take
that course, butWell, its—ah, it’s a little confusing. I don’t - it’s a little
confusing. I—I’m reading a book at the same time as I’m taking
the course, and-the information I get in my book is=
[

k
1
m

Wade:
Jack:

((vacuum cleaner begins running))
Ha-ha-ha-ha.
((speaking more loudly)) =the information 1 get-

20j-m correspond to sequence (16), and 20a-i provide the fuller text. As noted earlier, the
conversation participants are discussing a class on poetry, and Wade begins by asking
what is studied in the class, focusing on the time period of the poets in the curriculum of
the course. Jack provides not only the years but also a listing of some of the individual
poets in 20f-h. Suddenly he catches sight of the vacuum cleaner in 20h, prompting him
to ask “How did that g e t-” where the word “that” refers to the vacuum cleaner. Thus the
vacuum becomes part of the text in 20h. Wade responds with “Someone’s gonna be back
for it” in 20i, and provides a laugh token at the end of that move. Only one utterance
later, Wade’s prediction is proven accurate when a janitor, the “someone,” does come
into the room and begin to run the machine. It is at that point that the vacuum and its
operator, both external to the conversation, become laughable. As a result, we can see
that at no time does a laughable exist entirely outside the text of the conversation. In all
four cases, the contextual laughable is taken into and becomes part of the conversational
text itself.
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Indeed, interviewing the participants helps solidify this conclusion. None of the
participants mentioned things in the environment as being laughables. Some of the
individuals recalled the painting as a topic in that particular conversation, but did not
mention laughing at it. Almost everyone mentioned the recording equipment, but they
referred to it as “when you turned the recorder on,” and they referred to a “moment of
silence” when it was turned on, and they mentioned their nervousness at the initial start
up of the recording equipment. In short, participants were far more concerned with the
internal context: their own thoughts and feelings as well as those of their conversational
partners, rather than the external contextual objects themselves. The external objects
only became a concern when they became part of the conversation itself or when they
impacted the internal context.
Although the low number of contextual laughables indicates that the laughable is
typically socially bounded, even the presence of a few indicates that sociality alone is not
enough to explain the laughable. In other words, simply being with others and talking to
them isn’t enough to incite laughter. A contextual laughable works its way into the text,
either prior to the laughter or after the laughter, but the fact that it can give rise to
laughter that must then be explained to the other participants indicates that there is
something laughable in the object itself. If sociality is not enough to explain the nature of
contextual laughables, then the Superiority Theory fails as well, for it, too, places the
laughable within a social framework, albeit much more narrowly circumscribed to those
social relationships where the superior one laughs at the inferior one. On the one hand,
we may well see sociality and superiority in some of the scenes. For example, we may
see that there is a striking contrast between the eavesdroppers and Roger, for example,
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one being Democrat and one being Republican, but the laugher is Charlie. Perhaps
Charlie does feel superior to all the others for not caring about political party affiliations.
On the other hand, when Linda talks about the tape recorder, she is unlikely to feel
particularly superior. In fact, she is closer to failing in her research goal of collecting
naturally occurring conversations than in succeeding. One wonders if laughter might
indicate inferiority, and here we must recall Ann’s comments on post-utterance speaker
laughter as marking a request for approval from the other participants. If one is superior
to others, why would one need to seek their approval? The view of the nature of the
laughable as broad sociality or narrow superiority is seriously questionable, and it must
also be pointed out that these interpretations do not describe the contextual objects
themselves, but the contextual subjects and the internal feelings of the participants.
These theories describe something about the context, but not the nature of the laughable.
The nature of all the laughables can be better explained by incongruity.
If one description of the incongruous is the “inappropriate,” then we may see why
Linda laughed at the focus on the tape recorder: it is an inappropriate object of focus in a
study where naturally occurring conversations are desired, for it is unnatural, and the
selection of it as a topic of conversation is viewed by Linda as inappropriate, but she
nevertheless talks about it.
When the vacuum cleaner is laughed at, it is first as a topic of discussion, as
propositional content, not as a contextual laughable. Jack does not laugh at it when he
first catches sight of it, but Wade laughs when he takes a turn responding to Jack’s
surprise at its presence. The placement of the laughter indicates that it is his own
comment that is laughable, not Jack’s. It is only later when the vacuum begins running
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that it acts as a contextual laughable. Although Wade has predicted before this point that
“someone’s gonna be back for it,” the exact moment when the person will come back and
the fact that the vacuum will be turned on rather than taken away are both unexpected. It
might be that Wade is surprised at how quickly his prediction came true.
Like the vacuum cleaner, the painting in sequence (18) is a topic of conversation
before it is pointed to and laughed at as a contextual object. Why is this painting
laughable? It is an unusual painting; the anger it expresses is obvious. Yet this painting
is hung in a living room as part of the ddcor. The incongruity lies in its purpose of
expressing anger with its function as the interior decoration of a room to accept visitors.
Its origin as a means to vent anger is also unusual: most people opt to vent verbally, not
pictorially.
Finally, the expression on Charlie’s uncle’s face prompts Charlie to recognize the
incongruity that Charlie mentions later in sequence 1In when he says “don’t say that too
loud in this house,” revealing the incongruity that there is a Republican visitor to a family
that is predominantly Democrat.
While the contextual laughables may be explained as incongruous, and only
questionably as superior or social, a closer examination of the majority of the laughables
is necessary in order to see if incongruity is pervasive. That is, both the presentation
techniques that seem laughable and the propositional content that seem laughable must be
examined.
Presentation Techniques
Far more common than external objects in the ability to elicit laughter is the
presentation of an utterance by a speaker. The presentation technique refers to how a
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speaker modifies the information he or she is presenting rather than to the content of the
information itself. Such presentation techniques include the familiar poetic devices of
hyperbole, understatement, metaphor, simile, personification, and so on, as well as
various role-playing techniques such as voice changes to represent another person and
direct speech as a way to represent another person. Additionally, speaker laughter is
counted as a presentation technique, especially when it seems tied to echoic laughter.
Typically, however, speaker laughter is not taken as merely a presentation technique, that
is, not as the laughable itself but as a marker of a laughable. It is only when an utterance
accompanied by speaker laughter failed to yield a description of the utterance as
laughable was the laughter itself taken as the laughable. Finally, some utterances were
laughable because they contained verbal mistakes: slips of the tongue or stumbling for
words, and the like.
Of the 481 identifiable laughables, I found 124 to be laughable due to their
presentation. Of these 124 laughables, 60 were due to poetic devices, 40 were due to
role-playing, 14 were due to laughter itself acting as a laughable (giving rise to echoic
laughter), and ten were due to verbal mistakes. Participants, too, identified certain
presentation techniques to be laughable in nature. At this point, we may recall
Jefferson’s comment on the laughable in talk about troubles as being “manipulated,” and
we may particularly notice her choice of the word “dramatized” in her expansion of that
manipulation (366). Clearly, dramatizing is similar to role-playing, and manipulation in
general resembles my idea of presentation techniques. Multiple sources, then, point to
presentation as laughable.

97

Poetic Devices

Hyperbole
By far the most commonly occurring poetic device was hyperbole. Thirty-four of
the 60 laughables from poetic devices were hyperbolic in nature. Additionally, seven
participants made 12 different comments that identified the nature of the laughable to be
due to “exaggeration,” “embellishment,” “elaboration,” or other similar term. Helen, for
example, directly stated that “the humor of the talk is based on melodrama, on
overstatement” when 1 asked her about one particular point in the conversation.
Sequence (21) provides the snippet from the conversation itself. The four women talking
in the conversation have been discussing the meetings of a group they all belong to, a
group that meets in a location with a central stage area for a speaker. The group members
themselves take turns speaking at the meetings, so all the women are familiar with
presenting on this particular stage. Helen opens the sequence with a complaint about the
stage area for the speakers, saying that the curtain or folding door behind the speaker’s
podium is not usually closed all the way, a somewhat unnerving situation for the speaker.
Both Rhoda and Gabriela speak up, indicating they understand her complaint and have
noticed the unnerving feeling, too. Gabriela says in 21 f that the opening is rather small,
and the implication is that a wide open backstage would actually feel more comfortable.
Helen’s comment in 21 g-i picks up on the size of the opening as just large enough for a
person, but she specifies which kind of person would come through such an opening, “a
serial killer.” The other participants respond to this comment with laughter, and Gabriela
builds the scenario by saying that all the attendees of the meeting would be able to see the
serial killer coming at the meeting speaker.
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a

Helen:

Well, You know, I wish that they would close that back area=

b
c
d
e
f

Rhoda:
Helen:
Rhoda:
Helen:
Gabriela:
Helen:
Gabriela:
Helen:
All:
Gabriela:

I know.
=all the way now.
It’s weird, it’s like someone’s behind you.
Oh, I know. And it’s all dark back there and kinda creepy.
Well they leave it open like just a tiny little bit.
Just enough foi=
Yeah.
=some serial killer.
Ha-ha-ha-ha-ha.
And everybody can see him cornin’ atcha.

g
h
i
j
k

Subsequently, Helen designated the serial killer talk “melodrama,” and the humor of the
melodrama “an overstatement.” As joke-maker, Helen was providing me with what she
thought she was doing to make this particular utterance laughable.
In yet another case, Nina called a laughable from her conversation “extreme.”
During the conversation, Nina and co-participant Rick got into a heated discussion on
voting. The other two participants, Laura and Duane, had left the room at the time the
two began their discussion, but Duane returned in the midst of it and initially joined in on
Nina’s side. As a result, both Nina and Duane were instructing Rick that he ought to vote
in elections, something he had yet to do, even though he was a young adult and had been
eligible to vote for four years. Eventually Duane determined that the dueling had gone on
long enough and decided to try to bring it to an end: “Yeah, Yeah, I just got in there, said
a couple of things and kept saying it and just pretty much giving an unserious argument
as opposed to a serious argument and just kept playing around with it.” At the point
when Duane decided to give “an unserious argument,” Nina had just instructed Rick
simply to vote Republican if he didn’t know who to vote for, which is her own political
affiliation, and Duane decided to instruct him to vote Democratic, which was Duane’s
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affiliation. However, Duane didn’t simply say, “You should vote Democratic.” Instead,
he said, “Join us Devil-worshipping Democrats.” With this utterance, both Rick and
Nina began to laugh. When I asked Nina what she thought when she heard Duane say
this, she replied, “I think that’s funny. . . . I kind of made a comparison that a lot of
Democrats aren’t necessarily the most religious people . . . . It was funny because I don’t
think that the Democratic party is devil-worshiping, but since I think they are less
religious . . . . It’s funny that it’s the extreme. That I don’t think they’re devil
worshiping.” In short, Duane presented the instruction “Vote Democratic” in a
hyperbolic manner, picking up Nina’s previously stated perceptions of the “less
religious” nature of the Democratic party platform and pushing the Democrats all the way
into “devil-worshippers.” According to Nina, who laughed at this comment, it was the
hyperbole that was funny.
Understatement
The second most frequent poetic device speakers employed in creating laughables
was understatement. Seventeen of the 60 poetic devices were understatements.
Interestingly, however, none of the participants identified any poetic devices other than
exaggeration as the nature of the laughable in their interview comments. In identifying
understatement, I used a definition of a speaker making something seem smaller or less
important than it really is. Sequence (22) shows a dual use of understatement to create
two laughables. Charlie and Roger have been talking about making a trip to Las Vegas
from their hometown, and they discuss the possibility of traveling by bus. Roger points
out that charter buses are available, and 22a begins with him stating that the bus itself is
free but that the people who typically take the free promotional transportation are senior
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citizens. Charlie indicates that this is unimportant or irrelevant to him and that the
important thing is to experience a road trip. At 22f, the father of one of the young men,
who has been eavesdropping from another room, speaks up with a question on what
Roger’s comment of “old” means and suggests that he might be referring to 45-year-olds.
The father’s comment receives a laugh in response from Charlie, and Roger picks up the
understatement of the comment and repackages it, providing a greater age—by five years.
Again Charlie laughs at the comment, and then we discover the reality of the ages of the
senior citizens in 22j; 70 years old is typical. No one laughs at the actual age, a point that
suggests that the laughable element in the original statements on age lies in the
understatement.
a

Roger:

b
c
d
e
f

Charlie:
Roger:
Charlie:
Roger:
Dad:
Charlie:
Roger:
Charlie:
Roger:
Charlie:
Roger:

g
h
i
j
k
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No, it’s-- the tour is completely free. It’s promotional. They
want to try to bring, but most people on the bus are o-h-old. Just
to let ya know.
So what dude? ha-ha
Yeah.
It’s a road trip anyways.
It’s fun though.
Do you mean like 45 or something?
ha-ha.
No, I’m talking like 50 or 60.
ha-ha. Yeah.
70 maybe. No really.
Yeah, those 50 year olds.
Full of wheel chairs and stuff like that.

Other Poetic Devices
The remaining instances of poetic devices providing the laughable nature include
two metaphors, one simile, one personification, two oxymorons, one rhyme, one pun, and
one use of profanity. While profanity is hardly considered a typical “poetic device,” its
use relates to the presentation of the information rather than the information itself. It
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must thus be included in the presentation-techniques category, and the subcategory it has
most in common with is the poetic device rather than the role-playing techniques. That
is, when the speaker of the one comment uses the profane word, it provides no content to
the information but adds emphasis, nor does the speaker seem to take on the role of
narrator or character within a story. For these reasons, I have coded the one occasion
when profanity occurred as a poetic device: a speaker’s optional choice of presenting the
content.
The situation in question occurs in a conversation where the four participants are
discussing horror films, and the sequence is provided in (23).
a
b
c

Rhoda:
Gabriela:
Helen:

d
e
f

Rhoda:
Gabriela:
Rhoda:
Others:

g

I know someone who had nightmares for years over Freddy, so
Oh, really?
Yeah, but he was creepy. He was the creepiest of all the serial
killers.
[
Have vou ever seen the first Nightmare on Elm Street? It is=
No.
=fucking scary.
Ha-ha.

In 23f, Rhoda provides her view of the horror film, Nightmare on Elm Street, judging it
“fucking scary.” It is unnecessary of her to use the profane participial adjective, but she
does. Although it seems to provide emphasis, she also uses vocal tone for emphasis, and
I have judged that the laughable in the statement is the profanity more than the vocal
tone, which would place the statement in the role-playing category.
Role-Playing
Role-playing occurs when a speaker takes on the characterization of someone that
the speaker is discussing. Role-playing usually occurs in story-telling or the relation of a
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previous event to the current hearers. When taking on the role of someone involved in an
event that is packaged as a story, the speaker may use vocal inflections to represent
another individual, or the speaker may relate what another has said using direct speech.
The speaker may even represent him- or herself as a character in a previous incident and
may adopt a different vocal tone even when role-playing the self. Additionally, speakers
may alter their vocal tone even when simply playing “narrator” of a story. Since vocal
alteration and direct speech are options and not requirements of speakers, they are part of
the ways that speakers present their utterances rather than being the content of the
utterance itself.
Role-playing characterization seemed to be the nature of the laughable 40 times
out of the 124 presentation techniques, and it was also one of the frequently cited sources
of the laughable by participants. Ten comments from eight different participants were
made identifying vocal tone and role-playing as laughable. Gigi took a broad view,
saying that the laughable can be “funny in their delivery or the way they say it,” and so
did Duane with “different tones of voice” and Helen with “the tone tells whether it is a
joke or not.” Duane became more specific when he identified a “sarcastic tone” as
marking a laughable, a judgment echoed by Nina in her interview. Laura directly stated
that role-playing is laughable: “They change their voices . .. they change the voice to
impersonate someone.” Roger, likewise, cited impersonation as a laughable, saying, “He
[his friend Phil] tries to act like Jerry [Seinfeld], and we all laugh about it and try to
impersonate some of those lines.” Britney claimed that she found Meg’s story-telling
funny because “I really enjoy getting glimpses of the moments where she is like a little
kid, like, telling a story and using voices,” revealing that the narrator role itself is a role

103

that a speaker takes on. In this case Meg’s narrator role struck Britney as similar to that
of a child who is telling a story, and Meg presented other roles within the story with other
voices, creating further laughables. Rhoda, too, hints that the narrator role itself can be
laughable when she claims that Helen can relate the same story “over and over” without
losing the hearer’s interest because “she’s just got that animation.”
Since transcriptions are poor tools for capturing voice changes, the following
examples of role-playing may include notations to assist readers in locating the voice
changes that influence the laughable nature of the utterances. Sequence (24) gives an
example of a speaker playing the role of someone else. Jack, Wade, and Joey are talking
about performance poetry, and Wade brings up his past experience with hearing famous
poets read their own work and says he doesn’t want to listen again in segments 24a-c. In
24d Joey takes a turn by providing not a poem, but simply noises spoken with the same
rhythm and intonation of one of the famous poets. Wade first repeats the noises and then
laughs in 24e. By repeating some of Joey’s material, Wade selects the laughable material
and then laughs at it. What Wade seems to think is laughable is the imitation, a fact that
becomes clearer as the discussion continues and Wade and Joey reveal that the noises
reflect their perception of Robert Frost’s poetry performance. The same laughable is
repeated in 24j, but this time there is no need for Wade to identify the laughable: it
remains the same as the earlier segment.
(24)

a

Wade:

b
c

Joey:
Wade:

Cause, whenever we read poetry in Intro to Poetry, or whenever I
hear, I should say, one of my classmates, I dunno, Duncan
McLaine, ah, h e - he’s in Spain right now or Argentina actually,
but any way he has like recordings of like Robert Frost. Like
people like that reading their poetry?
Oh.
And it’s like, I don’t even wanna hear those ever again
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d

Joey:

e
f
g
h
i

Wade:
Joey:
Wade:
Joey:
Jack:

((imitating intonation and rhythm of a poetry reading))
Ahh, ahh ahh, ahh buff-buff-buff
[
((also imitating)) Ahh-ahh-ahh. Ha-ha-ha-ha
Who would sound like that?
I think- I think that is Frost.
That’s - That is Frost.
I don’t know. I have it at home.
I just got it. I just picked it up from the Riverton Public Library.
[

j
k

Joey:
Wade:

Braa-braa-braa-faa-ooh-eeh braa-braa-braa
Ha-ha. Anyway, yeah, that’s-- so.

While sequence (24) shows a speaker role-playing another person, sequence (25) shows
how a speaker can role-play themselves as characters in a story or event. Meg, whom
Britney described as one to use voices in story-telling, does just that in segments 25e,
25g, and 25i. The conversation for the three women, Meg, Ann, and Britney, has turned
to the topic of children, and Meg has claimed that she is irritated by children. She
illustrates what irritates her with a story of a young three-year-old relative. Segments 25a
and c simply provide background information on the child, while segment 25e provides
the exact incident in question.
(25)

a

Meg:

=but we had- my cousin had a birthday party for her son this
weekend?

b
c

Ann:
Meg:

d
e

Britney:
Meg:

f

Britney:
Meg:

Mm-hm.
And I babysat him when he was young, and s o - and then they
moved back to Whistle Stop and now they just moved back
recently and so now I am trying to hang out with him again, but
God! he’s three,—
Ha-ha-ha-ha.
=so he’s at a stage where he just like ahhhh. You know, in your
face all the time, “Play with me, do this, how does this work,
why?” “I don’t know why,” I’m like, Gha-gha ((makes choking
noise))
ha-ha.
“I don’t know either,” you know=

g
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h

Britney:
Meg:

j

Britney:

k

Ann:

Ha-ha=
—‘Go talk to your mom.”
[
Ha-ha-ha-ha.
[
Yeah, Ha-ha.

Meg takes on the role of the three-year-old first in segment 25e, using direct speech to
show what he says. In her final move in segment 25e, Meg uses direct speech to tell her
response to the three-year-old’s questions but then acts out a further aspect of her
response by making a choking noise. Segments 25g and 25i provide expansions of
Meg’s response to the child as further cases of direct speech. Segments 25e, g, and i all
receive laughter from the hearers. Part of the laughable in these segments is that Meg is
playing out the scene between herself and her three-year-old relative.
Finally, it was noted that even the narrator role is a sort of role playing, and Meg
in sequence (26) gives us the opportunity to see this in action. In fact, it was Britney’s
comments about Meg telling this story that gave rise to the idea of narrator as character.
Sequence (26) begins with Meg initiating a story about an encounter she had with an
insect of some sort, possibly a centipede, in her bathtub early one morning. In segment
26h, Meg reveals that she screamed at the centipede, but she does not actually take on the
role of herself by screaming in the telling of the story. Instead, she lengthens the normal
vowel of the word “scream,” thus maintaining the role of narrator, but altering vocal
intonation even as narrator. In segments 26j and 1, Meg actually plays the roles in the
story by using direct speech, and then in 26n, she steps out of even the narrator role and
assumes her current status as a participant in the current conversation, analyzing the
events in the story she has just told.
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(26)

a

Meg:

b
c
d

Britney:
Ann:
Meg:

e
f

Ann:
Meg:
Britney:
Meg:

g
h
i
j
k
1
m
n
0
P
q
r
s
t
u
V

Ann:
Meg:
Ann:
Meg:
Britney:
Meg:
Britney:
Meg:
Ann:
Meg:
Ann:
Meg:
Britney:
Meg:

Then one morning I got up and got into the shower, turn--1 always
turn the shower on first because it takes forever for it to warm up?
Well it, you know, it—the spout flows right into this one spot and so
th e- the walls of the tub really don’t get wet while it’s going? and so I
pushed the curtain aside and we’ve got this big clawfoot tub so our
curtain goes all the way around it, and I pulled the curtain aside and
stepped in and I felt this fuzzy thing against my leg, and I was like, I
looked down, and I was, “Wooohhhhhh,” I was all...
Ooohh!
It was fuzzy?
Well, they have, it wasn’t fuzzy, but they have these really long
antennas and long legs and so like when he lifted up his legs =
[
Ohhhhh!
=like I got like ten legs th at- that went by my leg.
Uuughh!
And so it was like 5:30 in the morning, Ryan’s sleeping, and I’m
screa::ming from the bathroom and=
Hee-hee-hee-hee.
=he comes in there and he’s like, “What? What? What?”
???????? all like
Yeah, ha-ha, I’m sure, yeah. “What? What? What?” I’m like,
“There’s a centipede! Look out!” He’s like “Okay, okay.”
Ha-ha-ha-ha-ha-ha.
You know, like the overreaction=
Right.
=to the brain, you’re not ready for anything^
Oh, no~
=especially not a gross stinky centipede. It’s likeWhy do they like the bathrooms?
I don’t know.
O-ho
They seem to like every room in my house.

In segment 26h, Meg does not try to represent herself as a character in the story, neither
as herself during the time of the event, nor as another individual involved in the story, yet
Ann laughs in 26i. What is laughable in 26h?-The fact that Meg is camping up the
narrative by lengthening the vowel of the word scream, a technique that draws attention
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to that action in the story. Segment 26h contrasts with 26j and 261 where Meg does
present the events in the story by presenting the words of the individuals involved in the
story. She presents her own words and those of Ryan, the other person involved in the
event. Segment 261 also receives a laugh, but the laughable is Meg’s taking on the roles
of the characters, while in 26h the laughable is Meg playing the role of narrator.
Beginning with segment 26n and continuing until the end of the sequence, Meg no longer
plays any role, but returns to her actual current role as a participant in a conversation with
her friends, Ann and Britney. There is no laughter from 26n until the end.
Verbal Mistakes
A small number of presentation Iaughables are laugh tokens themselves, and an
even smaller number are verbal mistakes. The verbal mistakes include such things as
stumbling for words, or stumbling for expression, and the mispronunciation of words.
Sequence 27 gives an example of mispronunciation, and sequence 28 gives an example of
stumbling.
(27)

a

Amy:

b
c

Allie:
Amy:

Didja look on line at all about appendi- appendix-ees, a-ha-haha.
No. Why would I?
So you would know about it.

In 27a Amy initiates a new topic in their conversation by asking Allie whether she did
research about medical procedures on the appendix, a question that was prompted by the
fact that, already known to Amy, Allie’s sister had undergone an emergency
appendectomy a few days before. Yet Amy has trouble coming up with the proper
pronunciation o f the plural of appendix: her first attempt at the word simply leaves the
plural ending off, and the second uses the ending pronounced as if the word is the full
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Latinate word appendices. In the root of the word, however, she has actually used the
sound represented by the letter x, creating the singular form not the plural form, which
would be the sound represented by the letter c. The sound in the root represented by x
suggests she has Anglicized the word and should complete it with an English
pronunciation [oz], not the Latin [iz]. In fact, Amy’s laughter marks her groping for the
proper form of the word. There is no confusion about the meaning of what she wishes to
say in spite of her mispronunciation, nor is there any other presentation technique at work
here. The mispronunciation itself must be the laughable.
Similar to a mispronunciation is the act of groping for words in general. In
sequence (28), four women have been talking about a friend of theirs who has a medical
condition that prevents her from speaking normally or for normal lengths of time. In
segment 28a, Rhoda reveals that she spoke with the friend on the phone that day and was
the one who reminded the friend not to talk. In 28c, Gabriela adds that she had an
experience with the friend who was unable to make comments, comments about what we
don’t know because Gabriela seems unable to complete her thoughts for the others.
Instead Gabriela laughs, throws in the discourse marker “well,” attempts again to make
another sentence beginning with “she,” and this attempt, too is marked by laughter.
Finally Gabriela concludes her stumbled presentation with the fairly coherent “not that
there could have been a lot really.”
(28)

a

Rhoda;

Like, You know when I was talking to her at some points it was
like “Okay, just say yes or no.”

b
c

Helen:
Gabriela:

Yeah, uh-huh.
Yeah, she didn’t have a whole lot of comments on my, ha-ha
well—she-hee-hee- Not that there could have been a lot really.
So.

d

Rhoda:

Yah, but we can certainly invite her.
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What is laughable about “comments on my,” “well,” and “she”? Nothing that is obvious
to the listeners, who don’t laugh, but something is laughable to the speaker, who simply
stumbles around at this point in her utterance. Her stumbling itself seems laughable.
Sometimes a speaker notices his or her own mispronunciation or stumbling, but at
other times it is the hearer who catches it. In that case, the hearers, not the speaker,
laugh. Such is the case in sequence (29). In this sequence, a group of women have been
discussing movies, and Helen begins to talk about the actor Anthony Michael Hall, citing
when he was a young actor early in his career and comparing him to his older appearance
at the time of the conversation. The sequence opens with Helen’s comparison of the
older actor to his younger self, stating that someone watching a contemporary show in
which the actor stars would be unlikely to identify the two as the same without reading
the information in the show’s credits. She continues in 29c, intending to state that once
someone has the knowledge of the identity, it is possible to recognize the actor by the
way he speaks. Helen, however, misspeaks in 29c, saying “once you start talking”
instead of “once he starts talking,” and even though she catches her error, in her attempt
to correct it she repeats the error, and first Rhoda and then the other hearers laugh at
Helen’s misspeech.
(29)

a

Helen:

b Gabriela:
c Helen:
d Rhoda:
e All:

It’s like- Uh, he’s like not even the same person. You would not
know unless you saw the credits that it is Anthony Michael Hall,
Yeah, cause I don’t think I’ve seen him, but I must’ve,
Yeah and once you start talking to him, or—once you start
talking—
Ha-ha.
ha-ha-ha-ha-ha — ha-ha-ha-ha - ha-ha-ha
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Laughter

Finally, if we recall from the last chapter that echoic laughter is defined as a laugh
produced in response to someone else’s laughter, then we must consider the first laugh
token as a laughable in and of itself. Sequence (7), reproduced here for ease of reference,
provided an example of echoic laughter. In segment 7c Roger tells Charlie that the
response Charlie provides to Roger’s statement in 7a is correct, and then Roger produces
a laugh token. In 7d, Charlie responds with laughter and then asks what Roger’s point is.
Charlie’s initial laughter in 7d is an echoic response to Roger’s laughter in 7c, and,
therefore, we must consider Roger’s laughter in 7c a laughable of its own accord. Thus,
the nature of the laughable must include laughter itself.
(7)

a

Roger:

b
c
d
e

Charlie:
Roger:
Charlie:
Roger:

Yeah, but do you know how many people are in the United
States.
That’s true. Actually 260 million.
Exactly. Ha-ha-ha-ha-ha
Ha-ha-ha-ha-ha. Whatcha tryin to say? Ha-ha-ha
If it’s 100,000 people- I have a better chance of winning the
lottery.

Yet even here at 7c, the laughter does not stand entirely alone; it occurs with a linguistic
utterance. This fact suggests that even cases of echoic laughter in conversation do not
work on a purely neurological contagious effect but are attached to other aspects of the
conversation. Therefore, the laughable nature of laughter itself lies in its role as a
presentation technique. In essence, Roger makes two moves in 7c. First, he tells Charlie
that Charlie’s information is accurate. Then he laughs in a second move. Charlie doesn’t
follow what is happening in Roger’s second move, the laughter; it doesn’t contain any
content, only a presentation technique. Charlie laughs in response to Roger’s laughter,
but he doesn’t know what Roger’s laughter says. He laughs because Roger’s laughter is
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incongruous. It is laughter that appears to accompany a nonlaughable, and Charlie must
ask for the laughable content which is absent.
Conversation participants, therefore, take laughter as meaningful; they take it as
marking something else as laughable, something that can be directly stated or implied by
the one who utters the laughter. Therefore, the laughable aspect of presentation
techniques does not simply lie in just “the way it was said.” The content must be
accessible to the hearers through overt linguistic statements or through obvious
implication. As a result, for a full understanding of the laughable, we must go beyond
how something is said to what is said. Then we must find what is the same about how
something is said and the content of what is said, for a complete description of the
laughable must take all into account. I have already claimed the similarity lies in the
incongruous aspect, and I will follow up this theme after looking at laughable content.
Laughable Content
Out of 504 laughables, only 124 were attributable to the way a speaker said
something. Twenty-three were unidentifiable, and four were contextual in nature. That
leaves the majority yet unaccounted for. What were conversational participants laughing
at in the remaining 353 instances? The content of what was said must be the source. The
content can be divided into the topic of the conversation and its acceptability in a social
conversation, the logical proposition of the utterance, and the accuracy of the information
in the proposition. I located 146 instances out of the 353 that were based on logical
propositions, 122 that dealt with the accuracy of the information, and 85 that related to
the topic and its acceptability. Of the 85 topic-related laughables, 39 dealt with talk
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about social relationships, and 46 dealt with topic acceptability in the particular
conversation.
Topic-Related Laughables
Social Differences
When participants talked about people in their conversations, whether themselves
and their own relationships or others, the laughter that accompanied this talk seemed to
accompany utterances that highlighted the differences between people. The difference
between people becomes quite pronounced when another person is actually the topic of
the conversation and is deemed a person who is different from the participants. In
sequence (30), Amy tells her plans for the upcoming weekend, a topic which includes
friends of hers since she plans to visit them in another town.
(30)

a
b
c
d
e
f

Allie
Amy
Allie
Amy
Allie
Amy

g
h
i

Allie:
Amy:
Allie:
Amy:

j

So what are you doing this weekend?
We’re going to Bret’s lake cabin?
Bret?
Bret Hart, the o-h-nes that are expecting?
Oh, yeah, right, mkay.
Um, a good friend from my husband’s from college lives near
Centerville. So we’re going down there and they’re just hilarious.
They just live a very different 1-h-hi-festyle than we do. They’re
just out boating, and you know, take their yacht from here to there
and travel to France—
They have a yacht on a lake?
They have a yacht that goes from Mississippi to Florida=
Oh. Okay.
=each fall? so they’re like, “Come on over to France with us.” I’m
like “S-h-ure I’ll just take a month off and go to France,” you know,
to go skiing, and. It’s funny, so it’s generally a fun time. I haven’t
been there for a while. They do this every year. It’s been a while
since we’ve gone.

The sequence begins with Allie asking Amy what her plans are. After some turns to
establish exactly who these friends are for Allie’s benefit, Amy realizes she needs to fill
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Linda in with greater detail, and in 30f, she does just that. She stipulates in 30f that the
friends are “hilarious” and then goes on to describe what makes them so: their different
lifestyle. She embeds a laugh particle in the word “lifestyle,” and the content of the
laughable statement is that her friends lead a different lifestyle compared to her and her
husband. The only thing laughable is the difference. When asked about this sequence
later, Amy reiterated several times that the laughable lay in the contrast.
Sequence (31) presents one instance of a laughable that encompasses differences
between the participants themselves. In a conversation, four female roommates have
been discussing movies and the topic morphs into a discussion of famous people that the
women had crushes on when they were younger.
(31)

a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
j
k
1
m
n
0
P

Gabriela:
Helen:
Rhoda:
Helen:
Rhoda:
Rhoda:
Gabriela:
Helen:
Rhoda:
Helen:
Rhoda:
Kathy:
Rhoda:
Helen:
Gabriela:
Helen:

Mel Gibson was a hottie.
Sean Connery.
I never had the Sean Connery thing.
I— I well,
ha-ha.
Shawn Cassidy on the other hand
Who’s that?
Oh, but have you seen the “Behind the Music” of him?
No.
He’s just—
Don’t tell me.
The only one I had when I was young was Kirk Cameron.
Oh, yeah, that’s one I had.
Ha-ha-ha-ha.
Oh yes! That’s right!
Kirk Cameron. Ha-ha.

Sequence (31) picks up with Gabriela’s judgment of Mel Gibson as one of the famous
actors she had a crush on, and Helen adds Sean Connery to the list in 31b. Rhoda,
however, takes a turn saying that she didn’t have a crush on Sean Connery. This
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information places her in contrast with Helen, who seems to feel an account for her
judgment of Connery as a “hottie” is necessary, an account she is unable to provide,
stranding her in contrast to Rhoda. Rhoda then laughs in 3 le. The discussion continues
in the same vein, and Kathy adds another name to the list in 311. Rhoda readily agrees
with this in 31m, as does Gabriela in 31o. Helen, however, does not speak up as having
had a crush on Kirk Cameron. Instead she laughs twice, once after Rhoda admits her
crush, and again after Gabriela admits her crush. Apparently, Helen did not have a crush
on this actor, and again, she stands in contrast to the others in the conversation. Her
laughter seems to signify her difference of opinion with her conversational partners.
In another conversation Amy deals with the difference between herself and a
conversational partner even more directly. In sequence (32), Amy states her concern that
the topic of the conversation, the plans she and her husband have for building a house,
will not be of interest to her partners.
(32)

a

Amy:

b
c
d
e
f
g

Linda:
Amy:
Linda:
Amy:
Linda:
Amy:

h
i

Linda:
Amy:

j

Linda:

Yeah. Crazy. So, yeah, I just did that and hm-hm Hank and I just
looked at our house plans and dreamed. We-hee-hee bought
property so=
0:h
=w e’re dreamin’ about our- whenever we build our house.
Yeah? So what kinds of things are you thinkin’ about?
In regards to -?
Well, w hat- what you want in your house.
Oh. Urn—well, it’s on the river and so we want a view. We wanna
make sure the windows- like our bedroom faces the water.
Um-hm.
Things like that so (3.1 sec.) I could go on for hours abo-hout i-hihit— I don’t wa-ha-nna bo-hore you-hoo-hoo=
[
No, no, no. Ha-ha-ha.
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Amy has been relating her activities of the evening before to her partners, and included in
those activities was some time spent reviewing the house plans. In 32a, Amy laughs
twice as she brings up the topic of the house. After the topic continues for several turns,
Amy becomes overt in 32i about her concern over the difference between herself and the
partners’ interest. She first states that she could talk about this topic for hours, inserting
laugh particles into the utterance. Then in the next move she further clarifies her concern
by saying that she doesn’t want to bore the other participants, again inserting laugh
particles mid-utterance and post utterance. What is laughable about talking about plans
for a house? It is a topic of acute interest to one person, but of little interest to others. It
is this difference between the participants in the conversation that seems to prompt the
laughter.
Topic Acceptability
Indeed, the acceptability of the topic is something laughable, as well, as sequence
(32) suggests. One basis for acceptability is whether a topic interests the conversation
participants, as Amy’s concern over boredom shows. Ultimately, the acceptability of the
topic rests on the differences between the participants: a topic of interest to one alone sets
that individual up as different from the others and makes the topic unacceptable for a
group discussion. Other topic traits that render a topic unacceptable, and therefore
laughable, are those that are taboo for one or all of the participants, those that are private
or personal to one of the participants, and those that other participants cannot relate to.
Taboo subjects are those which shouldn’t be talked about, and while societies
often select issues surrounding sex and waste elimination as taboo topics, the taboo can
be defined in terms of the individual as well as the society. What is taboo for one
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individual may arise as a topic of conversation, and that individual may respond to that
topic in ways similar to the ways others respond to societal taboos. Such is the case for
the principal investigator when the recording equipment becomes the focus of attention
and discussion. We have already seen how the recorder as a contextual element can be
seen as a source of laughter, but now we see its role more circumscribed. It is not so
much that the recorder itself is laughable, but the focus on it and its inclusion as a topic of
conversation is where the real laughable aspect lies. Since the principal investigator
wants naturally occurring conversation, the choice of the recorder as topic leads to an
unnatural situation: the recorder serves as a reminder that the conversation is under study,
and once reminded of this, the participants are likely to exhibit the Hawthorne effect, to
allow the fact that they are under study to influence their thoughts and behaviors. Once
their thoughts and behaviors are influenced by the researcher or the methods of research,
the situation is no longer natural, and the goal of the researcher has been thwarted. Thus,
the recorder or other aspects of the study are taboo for the principal investigator. Indeed,
it is the principal investigator who laughs when the study arises as a topic. This happens
multiple times in one of the earliest conversations. Sequence (17) provided one example,
and another comes in sequence (33).
(33)

a
b

Amy:
Linda:

c
d
e

Amy:
Allie:
Linda:

f

Amy:
Allie:
Linda:

g
h

So did you like or do you like your university?
Yeah, they’ve been very very good, to me. Um, they’ve been
very, ah, accommodating for commuting, as I’ve mentioned
before=
Yeah.
Mm-hm.
=and um, you know, I’ve gotten a tuition waiver with the
assistantship=
Oh, nice.
mm-hm.
=and I even have a - a fellowship for the dissertation now.
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i
j
k
1

Amy:
Linda:
Amy:
Linda:

Oh, good.
So I have funds for this summer to=
Mm-hm.
=this is what I do, work on my dissertation.
[

m
n
0
P
q
r

Allie:
Linda:
Amy:
Linda:
Allie:
Linda:

Buy people coffee.
Buy people coffee.
Yeah-ha-ha.
Paying the transcriptionists=
Oh, you have to pay them.
=Buying the recording equipment. Ha-ha-ha.

Sequence (33) begins with Amy’s question to the principal investigator about the
university where she is pursuing her degree, and the principal investigator responds in
segments 33b, e, h, j, and 1, a response that is interrupted throughout with backchannel
from both conversational partners. In 33m, Allie takes a turn finishing Linda’s turn by
overtalking with an understatement. Linda acknowledges the spontaneous joke by
repeating it, and Amy provides a backchannel utterance of understanding that includes a
laugh token. Linda then continues with a full description of what she does with the funds
in 33p and r. Once she mentions the recording equipment, she includes a laugh token.
She has again brought attention to the equipment, for her a taboo topic.
Societal taboos may be accompanied by laughter, too, as happens in sequence
(34), where the topic of wetting the bed arises.
(34)

a
b
c
d
e

Bonnie:
Betsy:
Bonnie:
Betsy:
Bonnie:

You didn’t have to bunk with your brother didja?
I had to bunk with my brother.
hee-hee-hee.
Not that I mind, you know, but it’s like=
No, it’s not—it’s more fun when you’re eight. You’re both little.
Ha-ha.
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f

Betsy:

g

Bonnie:

Yeah. I was teasing him too, and he didn’t like this. I said well
last time—when we were little and the house was cold, we would
always sleep together, I mean, we were—Benjamin and I are very,
very close. But, he would still pee in the bed once in a while.
Ah-Ha-ha-ha.

[
h
i

Betsy:
Bonnie:

I would always wake up wet and cold.
Ha-ha.

Betsy reveals to her conversational partner that on a recent family vacation, she had to
share quarters with her brother, a situation that recalls her younger years when the same
would happen. In 34f, she tells Bonnie that she mentioned this recollection to her
brother, a recollection that included the brother’s childhood bedwetting. Bonnie responds
by laughing.
Yet another example of the taboo occurred when one group of participants
discussed profanity, almost stating directly that it is considered taboo. The sequence on
profanity occurs in (35). Previous to the sequence, the participants have been discussing
the movie Stand by Me, a movie rated R for its profanity. Some of the participants
express the opinion that there was no swearing, but others aver that there is, indeed,
swearing. Duane opens sequence (35) with the latter point. Rick offers his opinion as to
why some of the group didn’t notice the swearing in 35b, but Nina offers a different take
on the issue, stating why she thinks some people use profanity. In 35g Duane responds
with a contrasting point of view to Nina’s, a point of view which knits together the reason
why people swear with the reason why they didn’t notice the swearing in the movie. In
35h, Rick actually provides one of the swear words that Duane has just generally claimed
are “in your language.” It is only when Rick says a swear word out loud that Nina
laughs. Apparently profanity can be a topic of conversation, but can’t be the language of
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conversation. The societal taboo here is language bound, not topic bound. Nevertheless,
once the taboo is breached, laughter occurs.
(35)

a

Duane:

I nunno. I mean, considering the argument, I mean, they pretty
much swear all the time. That’s what I did. I was—

b

Rick:

They’re words—we swear so much, we’re so used to hearing it we
don’t even think about it any more.

c
d
e
f

??:
Duane:
Rick:
Nina:
Duane:

Yeah.
Pretty much.
That’s true.
That’s a lack of ah finding great adjectives
I don’t think it’s a lack of finding great adjectives. It’s just pretty
much that’s what you’re used to saying cause you know, at a
younger age we’d like—ah, you’re a rebel for saying it and now
it’s kinda like it’s just in your language, you know.
Shit?
Ha-ha
Exactly. I mean right there-ha. You just say it.

g

h
i
j

Rick:
Nina:
Duane:

What is it that makes a topic taboo? Certainly societal values play a role, and we
know that the typically taboo surrounds bodily functions, but there may be more at play
than simply its taboo status. We must ask why bodily functions are taboo. In response,
we may discover that these functions are taboo because they are personal. Every
individual has these needs and functions and must deal with them as they arise on an
individual basis. If the taboo is laughable, then the personal or private must be laughable,
too, and, indeed, it is. Sequence (15), originally discussed in Chapter 2 but reproduced
here for ease of reference, gives us an example of the personal as laughable. We noted
earlier that this sequence shows mid-utterance speaker laughter and that we could
interpret such speaker laughter as marking particular points in the utterance as laughable.
Now it is our task to study those laughable items and determine what their nature is.
Laughter marks Meg’s first utterance in 15a laughable at the phrase “anything that gets
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upset.” In 15c, Britney’s laughter marks the utterance “I’ve got the middle child
syndrome” or perhaps simply the phrase “middle child syndrome,” a marking that Meg
maintains when she repeats Britney’s utterance with a questioning intonation in 15d.
Britney laughs pre-utterance to her statement “I did when I was growing up.” Meg
responds to Britney’s claim of “middle child syndrome” as one of her own childhood
traits with laughter, and Britney seems to take Meg’s laughter as further questioning or
disbelief, as she reiterates the veracity of the proposition, a proposition that Ann responds
to with laughter. Finally, in 15i, Britney urges the others not to talk about the topic
anymore, and she inserts a laugh particle into the word “talk.”
(15)

a

Meg:

You don’t want that horrid middle child or anyth-h-ing that gets
upset that it’s not the oldest or the youngest?

b
c
d
e

Ann:
Britney:
Meg:
Britney:

f

Meg:
Britney:
Ann:
Britney:

What’s the middle child thing? I’m not-I’ve got the middle chi-h-ld syndrome. Ha-ha=
You have themiddle ch-h-h-ild syndrome?
=Ha-ha-ha-ha I did when I was growing up. I don’t think I do
now.
ha-ha.
I did.
Ha-ha.
Let’s not ta-h-alk about it. This is an emotional moment that
we’re talking about.

g
h
i

What comes of this analysis is that there is something laughable about the middle child
syndrome, about Britney’s having it, and about talking about it here. Putting all of these
points together, we can say that talking about the middle child syndrome is laughable
because it is personal to Britney, is not shared by the others, and talking about such a
personal topic recalls highly emotional feelings of upset. Embedded herein is also the
fact that there is a social difference between the participants: Britney has the syndrome,
but the others don’t. We can begin to see a thread of continuity among the instances of
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laughable content: the personal is off-limits (taboo) because it sets people up as different
from each other. When people talk about the personal or the taboo, it highlights social
differences, which are laughable. If this line of reasoning is on track, then other topics
that reveal social differences should also be marked by laughter. Glenn’s comment that
“Virtually any utterance or action could draw laughter, under the right (or wrong)
circumstances” (49) is accurate because it is possible for any topic to reveal differences
between people; what matters is which people are involved with which topics. However,
Glenn’s additional comments that “This fact dooms any theory that attempts to account
coherently for why people laugh . . .” (49) may not stand very well. Indeed, we can see
other examples of topics where the speaker doesn’t relate well to something in the
situation and that thing is laughed at.
Sequence (36) shows the unrelatable as laughable. Here Meg talks about her dog,
Cleveland, and tells of an experience she had with a neighbor who suggested that she
make a teddy bear out of the dog’s fur. Meg laughs when she tells her response to the
suggestion, “I don’t think so.” She clarifies why she wouldn’t take that action, saying
that it “creeps me out” and marking that utterance with post-utterance laughter. Ann
responds with backchannel, and Britney responds with first laughter and then states,
“That would be kind of weird.”
(36)

a

Meg:

b
c

Ann:
Britney:

Oh gross. I had one neighbor when I used to live on 5th Avenue
South and she- you know she met Cleveland when we first got
him and then he grew up there for a year and so she was—she was
like, “Oh, you know, if you’re brushing him, you should save the
hair and I’ll make you a teddy bear,” and I was like, “No, I don’t
th-h-ink so.” I don’t think I can handle having— having a stuffed
animal made out of the hair of my dog. That just kind of creeps
me out. Ha-ha.
Ooh.
Ha-ha—ha. That would be kind of weird.
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Meg’s reaction to the suggestion shows that she is different from the neighbor, and she is
different in that she can’t relate to the desire to have a teddy bear made out of a pet’s fur.
Britney, likewise, shows that she sees the social difference, too, and her laughter
indicates such, but she needs to clarify who it is that she can’t relate to: her laughter
might be taken to show that she is different from Meg or that she is different from the
neighbor, and therefore, like Meg. Hence, after laughing, Britney adds an account for the
laughter which shows she considers the neighbor’s idea weird.
Now we are squarely in the center of the Incongruity Theory: people laugh at that
which is unexpected, unusual, or inappropriate in some way. They laugh when the taboo
is talked about, when social differences are talked about, or when someone is shown to
have a point of view that can’t be related to. However, we still haven’t accounted for all
the laughables in all of the conversations yet. The greatest number of laughables deal
with another facet of incongruity: the improbable.
Improbable Content
The improbable occurs when one notices that the unlikely event is the one that
occurs. In this way, the improbable encompasses the event wherein two opposites or
differences exist side by side. The improbable, however, works on a cognitive level
rather than a social level. The greatest number of laughables, 146, fall within the
cognitive realm.
Contrasting Elements
In sequence (37) we see an example where the simple pairing of contrasting
elements seems to be the nature of the laughable. The four female participants in the
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conversation have been discussing the prices of homes and the hot housing market when
Gigi describes the experience she recently had when selling a home a few months
previous to the conversation.
(37)

a

Gigi:

Our house in Ryder we sold, somebody at Sean’s work heard we
were planning on selling our house =

b
c
d
e
f

Bianca:
Gigi:
Blanca:
Gigi:
Linda:
Lily:
Multiple:
Gigi:
Linda:

Mm-hm.
=She called her aunt that came over that night and bought it.
Oh!
Yeah!
I mean, that’s the kind of thing that’s been going on.
Not happening often in Big River.
Ha-ha.
It’s a different area.
Yeah.

g
h
i
j

Gigi begins the sequence with an utterance telling how her home sold within one day, and
the utterance is interrupted by backchannel from Blanca, and Blanca then expresses her
new information state at the completion of the utterance with the backchannel particle
“oh!” Gigi confirms that the information is accurate in 37e, and Linda takes a turn in 37f
with a comment whose proposition avers at a general level the accuracy of Gigi’s story.
Lily then takes a turn with a comment whose proposition is the opposite of Linda’s and
Gigi’s. The direct juxtaposition of the contrasting “going on” and “not happening” is
taken as laughable, as can be seen by Gigi’s assessment that both statements can be true
at the same time because there is something “different” about Big River. Gigi’s comment
on the difference reveals that she does not take Lily’s utterance as an exaggeration, but
rather takes it at its face as stating that the housing market in Big River is not hot the way
it is in the places Gigi and Linda have been referring to. Therefore, the laughable aspect
cannot be that Lily has exaggerated. Since they are talking about houses and not people,
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the content of the proposition does not deal with social differences. Instead, the
participants see that there is a contrast between two real housing markets, a contrast that
shows up as each participant describes her own experience in housing sales and
purchases. In order for Gigi, Linda, and Lily all to be correct in the truth of their
propositions, the participants must be able to conceive a world that allows for differences
and contrasts, an achievement that occurs as Gigi says that differences can occur
according to different areas, but before that cognitive achievement is made, the contrasts
stand side by side.
New Information
In yet another example of cognitive improbability, sequence (38) allows us to see
a scene where new information proves difficult to assimilate for one of the speakers.
Previous to this sequence, Meg, the owner of a Newfoundland retriever, has just
described her dog’s daily routine at its walk time. One of the other participants, Ann,
offers the information in 38c that she has seen a dog that is taller than Meg’s dog, a
proposition that seems unlikely to the third participant in the group. Britney laughs in
38d as she repeats the new fact that there is a dog larger than her friend’s Newfoundland
in the same town.
(38)

a
b
c
d

Ann:
Meg:
Ann:
Britney:

Did I tell you that big dog that I saw him with ?????.
What? Hunh-uh.
????? It was taller than Cleveland,
It was taller than Cl-h-eveland! ha-ha

The distinction between contrast, improbability, and exaggeration blurs easily,
and now we begin to see the thread that runs through the content laughables and the
presentation laughables: both types of laughables rest on incongruity. The exaggerated
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elements are logically improbable or impossible due to the very fact that they are
exaggerated, as are the understated propositions, the oxymorons, similes, and
personifications. Here is where we gain our strongest clue that the laughable is that
which is incongruous with reality. Exaggeration is laughable because the proposition is
stated in such a way that makes it larger than the real situation under discussion.
Likewise, understatements are incongruous with reality by making a proposition smaller
than the reality it refers to. Role-playing becomes incongruous with reality because a
speaker pretends to be someone other than who he or she really is. Verbal mistakes are
incongruous because the words come out in ways different from the ways they really
should or are really intended to come out. Thus, we can say that laughable presentation
techniques are laughable because they build incongruity into the presentation of the
proposition. Cognitive incongruities exist within the very propositions themselves.
Accuracy o f Knowledge
What then are we to make of the remaining instances of laughable content,
instances that involve the accuracy of knowledge? If incongruity is the key to the
laughable, how can we explain the fact that 94 cases of laughter seem connected to
occasions where speakers and hearers have knowledge that is true and accurate? If verbal
mistakes are indicative of an incongruity, then shouldn’t inaccurate knowledge act as the
incongruous when working at the cognitive level? Indeed, inaccurate knowledge acts in
this role a few times, 18 out of 121 knowledge-based laughables seem to occur as
inaccuracies of knowledge, but many more, 94 out of 122 knowledge-based laughables,
involve accurate knowledge. Many of the instances occur as backchannel laughter,
instances where the laughter is produced by a hearer and indicates that the hearer is
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listening, understands, and agrees with the speaker’s proposition. If the nature of the
laughable is incongruity, what is incongruous about these cases? One of the participants
in the study provides the explanation.
While discussing her experience as a participant in a conversation, Gigi noted that
when I turned off the recorder, another participant said, “I was just getting started.” I
asked Gigi what she thought the remark indicated, and Gigi said she thought it was a
joke. When I next asked how Gigi responded to that joke, she claimed that she laughed,
or that perhaps she both laughed and said “yeah”: “I maybe said something like ‘ye-haha-ah’ ((laughing while speaking vowel)) you know, something like a little gurgle.” She
later added, “I suppose if it was just a laugh it would be ‘Ha-ha, Lily, you’re funny.’ Or
if it was a ‘Yeah’ and the laugh, then ‘Yeah, I agree, ha-ha, we’re almost done.’ Joke,
you know. It would be a slight difference? Does that make sense?” When pressed for a
clearer description of the difference, Gigi stated that “just a laugh,” without any
accompanying linguistic utterance,
would be me responding to Lily’s being funny only like from this—a
different distance ((holds hands up and apart)). If I said “yeah,” it
would’ve been more- it would’ve been a closer distance, probably. Like
“yes, I’m in agreement with you. I think the same, ha-ha, it’s funny.”
Maybe I would’ve said the same thing, too. If I said- you know, if- if I
were- had said “yeah” it might be like “yeah, it’s just on the tip of my
tongue. Yeah, I would have said the same thing, ha-ha.” Or- but if I had
just laughed, it would have been like, “That’s funny. Why didn’t I think
of that?”
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Gigi’s words here reveal that laughter as backchannel and the word “yeah” as
backchannel have essentially the same meaning. They differ in one respect only: the
closeness of thought between the two conversational partners. To speak the word “yeah”
indicates that the hearer agrees with the speaker and even is thinking the same thing at the
same moment. To emit laughter, however, indicates that the hearer agrees with the
speaker’s proposition even though the hearer was not thinking along the same lines at that
moment. The incongruity for Gigi, then, occurs at the cognitive level as an issue of how
closely aligned thoughts patterns are: thought patterns that are very closely aligned will
occasion a linguistic utterance, while those that are some distance apart will occasion
laughter, and the combination of laughter and linguistic utterances indicates a middle
distance.
In transferring the concept of cognitive closeness to the hearer response adjacency
pair structure, Gigi sought to further elucidate her understanding of laughter:
but think about when you’re sitting in a theater or a kind of like a comedy
club or something and somebody says something funny and you laugh
because it’s funny in their delivery or the way they say it? Ahm, but if
they say something you can relate to? And you nudge them and go “yeha-ha-ah!” You know, it’s that kind of thing.
Here again, the laughter indicates greater distance from the hearer to the speaker than a
linguistic response does. The speaker’s presentation may be the laughable aspect, and the
hearer responds simply with laughter alone. But when a verbal utterance of “yeah”
accompanies the laughter, that indicates the presence of greater relatability for the hearer.
Notice that even when there is a spoken term of agreement, the presence of laughter
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indicates some distance between the thoughts of the hearer and the speaker. When there
is only laughter produced as a response, then the hearer is simply presenting recognition
of incongruity. If a hearer responds with a linguistic utterance of agreement, the hearer
shows agreement with the content, with the proposition.
In short, then, what we begin to see is a combination of difference between
speaker and hearer and knowledge base. There is agreement in the knowledge that is
shared, but there is incongruity in what each holds in mind at the moment of speaking. In
fact, it is essential that two conversants share some level of knowledge or experience or a
conversation cannot take place. When one conversant references some of that shared
knowledge at a point when the other conversant is not thinking about it, it becomes a
point of incongruity for the second conversant and becomes laughable. The second
conversant laughs not because the first has made a mistake in an utterance but has said
something surprising for that moment, something the hearer has not been thinking of
even though he or she has been discussing the same topic.
We have already seen one example of this in Sequence (12), provided again here.
The female participants in the conversation have been discussing a group they belong to
that holds meetings and selects speakers from among the members of the group as the
focus of their meetings. One group member has moved from elsewhere, where she was
also a member of a chapter of the same organization. The participants are discussing the
new arrival’s timeline and whether she has spoken at the local chapter’s meetings. As it
becomes obvious that Helen, the new arrival, has not spoken at the local chapter, Rhoda
reveals in 12h that she has mentioned Helen’s name to the group leader as a possible
speaker for a future meeting. Gabriela laughs in 12i at Rhoda’s confession, and in 12j,
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Helen shows that the revelation is news to her, including the discourse marker “ooh,” a
variation of “oh,” which typically signals a change in information state (Schifffin 100).
In 12k, Rhoda reiterates the accuracy of her confession with “yeah, I” and then laughs in
place of providing the full response, “Yeah, I did.” The laughter acknowledges the truth
of her words at the same time it registers the difference in knowledge level between her
and Helen. This is a case where the center of the laughable is the difference between the
knowledge base of the two participants, Helen and Rhoda, and therefore mirrors a case of
social difference. Adding to the surprising nature of Rhoda’s confession, however, is the
fact that the women have not been trying to work out who might have come up with the
idea to have Helen speak but rather the timeline of where and when she has spoken.
Rhoda’s confession surprises for two reasons: the presence of new information, and the
addition of the information that is unrelated to the current topic.
(12)

a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
j
k
1
m

Rhoda:
Gabriela:
Helen:
Gabriela:
Kathy:
Gabriela:
Helen:
Rhoda:
Gabriela:
Helen:
Rhoda:
Others:
Gabriela:

I thought you were main one night at the old church?
She never was at the old church.
I never was at the old church.
She, ah, she just came when we were at the new church.
Yeah, last September.
Yeah, a year after.
I know, I’ve been here forever.
Then I’m glad I did say you
Ha-ha-ha-ha.
You told it—ooh.
Yeah, I ha-ha-ha-ha-ha
Ha-ha-ha-ha.
I knew it! Rhoda does that! Rhoda always does that!

In another way, an accurate piece of information may be surprising to a hearer
because the hearer has held inaccurate information or perhaps lacked information
altogether and is now being corrected. Even in this scenario, the accurate is laughable
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because it is surprising to a hearer. Sequence (12) above provides us with an example of
the surprise that comes when one was right all along. Once the information has been
confessed by Rhoda, however, all participants in the conversation now share the same
information, and all laugh in 121. The sequence closes with Gabriela claiming that she
knew the information all along, or more precisely, she guessed it and her guess was
accurate. Her closing statement provides an account for her laughter several turns earlier:
she laughed first in 12i because just after Rhoda confesses for the first time, Gabriela’s
suspicion that Rhoda nominated Helen turned out to be accurate. In short, her
information state was accurate, although she had held it as uncertain until Rhoda’s
confession. The sudden confession created an unexpected reason for her to reorient her
information state from uncertain to accurate.
Sequence (39) gives us an example of both the accurate and inaccurate as
laughable. The four conversational partners in this example revisit a topic that they had
discussed earlier in the evening, a topic that Nina raises here in 39a, movies which
feature the actor Corey Feldman. Duane mentions that the group, all of whom are
roommates, own ten of Feldman’s movies. Laura begins by mentioning one of them in
39c, and Duane adds to her list in 39d. Laura adds another in 39e, and Duane again
expands the list for her in 39f. In 39g, Laura takes a turn by laughing in response to
Duane’s listings. The laughable aspect of Duane’s lists cannot be said to be in its
presentation for there is no poetic device or role-playing in his delivery. Additionally, it
is not logically improbable for an actor to play in the movies listed, for that is exactly
what actors do, nor is talking about the body of work of an actor a taboo or highly
personal topic. No comparison is being made between Feldman and another actor, so the

131

discussion doesn’t revolve around a social difference. There is, however, a difference
that occurs without being overtly stated: there is a difference in the knowledge of Laura
and that of Duane. For every one movie Laura can name, Duane can add two more. At
this point Laura’s knowledge is not so much inaccurate as it is incomplete. When Rick
and Duane bring up the Ninja Turtle movies in 39i and j, however, it becomes clear that
Laura’s knowledge base is not only incomplete, but also inaccurate. She first repeats
their proposition with an intonation that displays incredulity, to which all the other
participants reply that Feldman voices the character Donatello. To this Laura first replies
“oh,” signaling the shift in her information state, and then she utters the proposition that
she didn’t know this piece of information. It is the utterance of lack of knowledge that is
surrounded by laugh particles; her lack of knowledge, or rather her inaccurate knowledge
that Feldman was not involved in the Ninja Turtle movies, is the laughable. Discovering
the inaccuracy is unexpected to her.
a

Nina:

b
c
d
e
f

j
k
1

Duane:
Laura:
Duane:
Laura:
Duane:
Laura:
Duane:
Rick:
Duane:
Laura:
Nina:

m

Duane:

g
h
i

Okay what are the other Corey Feldman movies we were talking
about earlier?
Well, pretty much the same. We have ten of ‘em on tape or DVD,
Gremlins.
Gremlins. Goonies, Stand Bv Me.
The Lost Bovs.
Lost Bovs. Dream a Little Dream. Dream a Little Dream 2.
Ha-ha-ha.
Um.
Ninia Turtles.
Um, Ninia Turtles. Ninia Turtles 3.
He’s in The Ninia Turtles?!
He’s the voice of Donatello
[
He’s Donatello.
[

n
0

Rick:
Laura:

He’s the voice of Donatello.
Oh. Ha-I didn’t know tha-ha-ha-ha-at.
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p

Rick:

Get with the times, Dear.

Incongruity
By now the evidence that the laughable involves incongruity of some sort has
become overwhelming. Further evidence inoludes comments by the participants in their
interviews that connect to issues of surprise or unexpectedness and the like. Six
comments were made that mentioned contrast in some way. Fourteen dealt with logical
improbability, twelve mentioned the uncommon, five mentioned inappropriateness, eight
comments mentioned newness and nine mentioned that something had been forgotten,
fourteen dealt with unexpectedness or surprise, ten mentioned social differences, five
dealt with accurate knowledge, two with inaccurate knowledge, and three with shared
knowledge, and finally thirty-two dealt with relatability. In total, then, 120 comments by
participants identified or referenced terms that fit with the Incongruity Theory.
Let us look at some of the comments the participants made, remembering that
during the entire conversation and interview process the participants were ignorant that
laughter was the object of the study. Remembering that Britney found Meg’s stories
extremely funny, an opinion attested to by a very high frequency of laughter by Britney
during the conversation itself, we now find what Britney was considering as she listened
to Meg: “I just remember it being so strikingly different than what I see at the office. It
was really fun to hear Meg like, ‘cause generally in the office she doesn’t like, she
doesn’t like laugh a lot, she’s not funny a lot, she’s not—she wouldn’t scream and tell a
story about screaming in the bathtub, you know what I mean?” In short, Meg was funny
because the content and presentation of her talk was incongruous with Britney’s past
experience with Meg.
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Gabriela, too, volunteered the incongruous as funny when she commented, “The
story behind the speaker at the meeting is that he is a friend of ours. We made fun of him
because we knew him. His dress was off-the-wall; it is not the expected way to dress.
We joke around about him because he's been inappropriate with other girls.” Here
Gabriela cites unexpectedness and inappropriateness as part of the explanation of the
laughable.
Roger and Charlie both identify why they thought that remembering a stunt they
and their teammates pulled on a bus trip to an away baseball game was funny. Charlie
directly states the stunt was “unexpected” as he tries to explain what he meant when he
said it was “out there”: “And it was out there just because, you know, something that, you
know, you wouldn’t expect, you know. I don’t know. It was just outra- -- an outrageous
thing to do. It was unique, very unique. And we just thought of i t . . . ” Roger separately
concurs when he says, “It’s just something that happened.” In other words, the stunt was
invented spontaneously and, therefore, unexpectedly. It was a unique idea in Charlie’s
mind, meaning it was uncommon, unusual. And for Charlie, the uniqueness is what
ultimately made the event memorable and funny.
Regarding a taboo topic that arose in a conversation, Joey commented that the
reason someone’s saying the taboo is funny is “you never—never like, okay, expect them
to say it or anything, or you never like put much thought into [the idea].” Here Joey
states that an utterance that includes something taboo is unexpected, and additionally, it is
something that is unthought of, or is rarely thought of, until it is mentioned. Again, we
find ourselves in the center of the Incongruity Theory.
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In contrast with the 120 comments that connect to incongruity, only three
comments from two different participants suggested superiority directly in any way.
While it is tempting to consider that all social difference must be superiority, the ways
that the participants talked about their views of others lean more toward incongruity, as
difference more than as superiority. Although superiority may be related to laughter, it is
not a component of something said that is responded to with laughter. Because it is not
the nature of the laughable itself, I suggest that superiority be conceptualized as a
possible function of laughter. Additionally, while more comments mentioned tension
than superiority, there were some comments that described a high level of tension and
others that mentioned a feeling of comfort and fun: laughter happened under both
conditions. The implication is that the Relief Theory is not upheld by the data here. The
next chapter will deal more fully with the implications of this data for the other theories
of laughter and will seek to address the criticisms of incongruity as an explanation of why
we laugh.
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CHAPTER 4
I’M NOT LAUGHING AT YOU, I’M LAUGHING WITH YOU: SOCIAL SOURCES
OF INCONGRUITY
After identifying and analyzing the laughables that occurred in eight twentyminute conversations, I have suggested that incongruity is the best way to explain the
nature of the laughable. By using the term the nature of the laughable. I mean the
common characteristic of utterances or other sources that stimulate laughter in one or
more individuals. However, criticism has already been raised against the Incongruity
Theory, and one of the strongest points of the criticism is that not all incongruities are
received with laughter (Morreall Taking Laughter 19, Santayana 91). Critics, therefore,
claim that incongruity alone is not enough to stimulate laughter or that the attribution of
incongruity as the nature of the laughable is erroneous. This chapter addresses this
criticism by first reviewing John Morreall’s analysis of reactions to incongruity and then
by redefining what is meant by the term incongruity. Finally, it will show how
incongruity is bound up with sociality, superiority, and semiotics.
Funny Ha-ha, Funny Strange, and Spooky Strange:
Reactions to Incongruity a la Morreall
In his essay, “Funny Ha-ha, Funny Strange, and Other Reactions to Incongruity,”
John Morreall outlines three different reactions that humans have when faced with
incongruity. First, they may react with a “negative emotion,” such as fear or anger.
Second, they may react with “puzzlement” or an attempt to assimilate the incongruity
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into reality. Finally, humans may react with “humorous amusement.” When a human
reacts with a negative emotion, the incongruity that caused the reaction has created “a
loss of control” in a “practical” way for that person, and the negative emotion rouses him
or her to act “to bring it [the situation] back into control” (191-92). When a human
responds to an incongruity with puzzlement, the incongruity does not rouse one to
practical action but rather to “cognitive” processing in order to bring the incongruity into
a state of understanding. When humans react to an incongruity with amusement, they are
not roused to any further action at all: neither cognitive nor practical action. Figure 2
presents a graphic representation of Morreall’s view.

Fig. 2: Morreall’s View of Human Reaction to Incongruity

The participants in my study validated Morreall’s three-part division, using the
same cliches of “funny ha-ha” for amusement, “funny strange” for puzzlement, and
adding the term “spooky strange” for the negative emotion.
Three different participants use the “funny ha-ha” cliche. One was Wade, who
said that he initially thought the response by a co-participant to a question of his during
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the conversation was a joke, but when he discovered it wasn’t entirely so, he
characterized the response as “kind of funny, just not ha-ha funny.” When pressed for
greater detail, Wade declared, “It’s funny, but it’s not ha-ha funny, like I wouldn’t laugh
out loud. It’s weird, but it’s not I’m-gonna-laugh-out-loud, so to speak. .. If he would
have just made it that joke, I would have been ha-ha-ing about it, but then I realized [he
was being] serious about talking and he knew the history of it. It became a non-ha-ha.”
What we see in Wade’s words is that the “ha-ha funny” is something that is intentionally
a joke on the part of the speaker. When a speaker says something that is not intentionally
laughable but is serious and informative, the utterance is not considered ha-ha funny, but
if that utterance still contains within it some incongruity, then it is “weird” or funny
strange in its nature.
The second participant who used the “funny ha-ha” cliche, turning it around to
“ha-ha funny,” was Bonnie, who said that a story told by her conversation partner was
“not funny, ha-ha funny.” When pressed for her meaning on “ha-ha funny,” Bonnie said
“funny ha-ha” means funny “as a joke is funny,” and went on to say that the story wasn’t
“ha-ha funny” because “it wasn’t intentionally funny.” Like Wade, Bonnie considers
“ha-ha funny” to refer to utterances that the speaker intends as laughable. Betsy, too, the
third to use the “funny ha-ha” cliche, said that “funny ha-ha” refers to the type of laughter
that comes after a joke, again suggesting that the speaker’s intention is important.
Finally, Helen referred to the “spooky strange” and contrasted it with the
“amusing strange.” She defined the difference as being one of threat: the “amusing
strange” is “not threatening,” but the “spooky strange” is “threatening.” Helen went even
further than Wade and Bonnie on the issue of intentionality by identifying how a hearer
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knows a speaker’s intent: “The humor of the talk is based on melodrama, on
overstatement. We all do it. The difference between melodrama and non-melodrama is
in the tone of the voice. The tone tells whether it is a joke or not. Also the content, the
use of certain terms.” And here we see the importance of both a speaker’s presentation
techniques and the content of the utterance: the speaker’s presentation and content are
what show the speaker’s intention in creating a laughable or not. When bringing up
content that is incongruous, perhaps especially when the content describes social
differences, the presentation and choice of terms will reveal whether the content should
be interpreted by the hearers as threatening or nonthreatening. The threatening “spooky
strange” should be reacted to with negative emotion, but the nonthreatening “amusing
strange” should be reacted to in a different way, with laughter.
Kathy provides a more comprehensive view than any of the other participants.
Kathy recounted the impact of Alzheimer’s disease on her grandmother and her family’s
reactions to the grandmother, saying, “She would do just bizarre things that you either get
really angry about or really sad about or you just kinda laugh ‘em off and that’s what our
family chose to do is laugh ‘em off. She would like just do bizarre things hh-hh-hh-.”
Kathy’s words show clearly that the nature of the laughable is the incongruous, the
“bizarre,” that the reaction to the incongruous is possibly a negative emotion, such as
anger or sadness, and that laughter is also a reaction to the incongruous. Kathy even
specified some of the grandmother’s activities that were considered bizarre, including the
hiding of her teeth and glasses: “She’d hide her teeth and her glasses and hh-h I don’t
know why she hid her teeth hh-h. That one’s still kind of baffling.” Here Kathy’s final
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comment identifies yet another reaction to the incongruous, “baffling,” which illustrates
the “puzzlement” reaction that Morreall identified.
A closer look at Kathy’s statements reveals a flaw in Morreall’s view and the
diagram based on it as well as in the similar views voiced by her fellow participants.
There is no laughter in Morreall’s description. The implication in Morreall’s description
and in the similar views of Wade, Betsy, and Bonnie is that we only laugh when there is
amusement, at the “funny ha-ha,” and not the “funny strange” or the “spooky strange.”
In truth, this is not the case. Although Wade claimed that he didn’t laugh out loud at the
point where his conversational partner gave a history lesson in response to Wade’s
question about poetry slams, the conversation recording reveals that he did, indeed, laugh
out loud. Bonnie, too, didn’t think that her conversational partner’s story was
intentionally funny, but even though it was not “funny ha-ha,” she, too, laughed out loud
at that point in the story. The conclusion is that what we think we laugh at and what we,
in fact, do laugh at do not always coincide. Morreall, Wade, Helen, Betsy, Kathy, and
Bonnie all delineate our emotional reactions to incongruity but mistake laughter’s
relationship to those emotions, essentially equating it with the one emotion of
amusement. This approach to laughter is akin to describing laughter as an emotion, as
synonymous with amusement just as angry is synonymous with mad. But laughter is not
a feeling; it is a behavior, a physical reaction, and cannot be equated with an emotional
reaction. This point is one that Provine makes, too, when he says, “Laughter and
associated facial behavior are unreliable mood meters” (45), a conclusion he reaches after
conducting a very different study than mine, a study where 72 college students kept a log
of their own laughter and the circumstances when it occurred.
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In practice, then, or rather in our behavior, we may laugh when an utterance is not
intentionally laughable, as may be surmised from the verbal mistakes that draw laughter.
We may also laugh at the “funny strange,” at points when we are puzzled, as Charlie did
in response to Roger’s laughter when Charlie accurately provided the exact number of
people in the United States (see sequence (7) 53, 111). We even laugh when negative
emotions are aroused, as when Ann feels anxiety over whether her co-participants will
approve of her (76-77). Therefore, we must amend our conceptual image of reactions to
incongruity to include laughter, not just emotional reaction.
What seems to happen is that we hold a prototypical view of laughter in our heads
as indicating the emotion of amusement. The error occurs when we take laughter as
exclusively indicating amusement rather than as prototypically indicating amusement.
The distinction is important. To review, Rosch’s work on prototypes shows that humans
create an ideal picture of a word’s meaning in their heads, and they subject an actual
experience to that view in order to determine what word to call it. Some items in the
physical world correspond very closely to the prototype, while others are “poor
examples” although they ultimately are accepted as cases of the same phenomenon.
Rosch found that sparrows and robins correspond closely to the prototype of “bird,”
while penguins do not correspond closely. Nevertheless, penguins are still ultimately
accepted as birds. Rosch’s work focuses on word meaning, but we may extend its
explanatory power to the meaning of laughter, as well.
Our view of laughter, as outlined by Morreall, Helen, Wade, Betsy, and Bonnie,
sees laughter as contained within situations which rouse amusement, but my study has
shown that laughter may occur in other situations as well. This does not dispel the notion
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that laughter co-occurs with amusement, simply that it does not co-occur exclusively with
amusement. Its co-occurrence with amusement exists in fact and in our minds as the
prototypical situation for laughter. Laughter’s co-occurrence with negative emotions and
with puzzlement also exists in fact and should exist in our minds; such co-occurrences
can, however, perhaps take a place in our minds as atypical even as they are accepted.
Indeed, a consideration of our casual ways of talking about laughter reveals that we do
hold at least two different laughter situations as accepted. People regularly mention
“nervous laughter” as a type of laughter standing in contrast with regular laughter.
Nervous laughter refers to laughter that co-occurs with the negative emotion of anxiety or
the cognitive state of uncertainty.
A new diagram to capture the full range of our reactions to incongruity might
allow amusement to impinge on the other two reactions as a way to hold laughter as the
prototypical reaction to “funny ha-ha” situations and also as a way to account for those
times when laughter is part of our reaction to the “funny strange” and the “spooky
strange.” Morreall provides a clue in how we might do this as he attempts to explain how
humans can display amusement at the grotesque or the macabre. He says “the amusing
often overlaps” (“Funny Ha-Ha” 205), and the inclusion of overlapping areas in our
conception of human reactions to incongruity shows that laughter can occur at the same
time as negative emotion or as puzzlement. An amended diagram (Fig. 3) both separates
and overlaps, with the areas of overlap representing the occurrence of laughter:
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Fig. 3: Houts-Smith’s View of Human Reaction to Incongruity
To reprise what has been shown so far: the structure of laughter in conversation
reveals it is stimulated by an utterance that contains an incongruity in content or
presentation technique, but that laughter cannot be taken as pointing to any one particular
emotion within the laughing person. One of three different emotions may arise in an
individual in response to incongruity, but the behavioral reaction of laughter may also
arise no matter which of the three emotions arises. Therefore, the laughter points more
strongly toward the incongruity in the situation than to the internal emotion of the
laugher. This fact is even reflected in our common ways of talking about laughter and
calling some laughter “nervous laughter” and distinguishing it from regular laughter.
Nervous laughter is that which comes when we feel a negative emotion, and regular
laughter comes from when we feel a positive emotion such as amusement or curiosity,
The norm is laughing when in a pleasant mood, but even our casual speech reveals what
we know: that we can laugh even when we feel anxiety, a negative emotion. And this
shows that we know that laughter doesn’t refer to an emotion.
That Is Just Unreal: The Nature of Incongruity
If laughter points to incongruity more than to an emotion, however, we still face
the conundrum of why we do not laugh at all incongruities. The answer to this issue must
address the very definition of incongruity itself. Morreall gives us the following
definition: “a relation of conflict between something we perceive, remember, or imagine,
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on the one hand, and our conceptual patterns with their attendant expectations, on the
other” (“Funny Ha-Ha” 189). Taking this definition, we can see that an utterance one
makes in a conversation can be something “we perceive,” and if there is a conflict
between what we perceive or hear and our conceptual patterns, there exists an
incongruity. This explanation seems to hold for incongruities such as verbal mistakes
and inaccurate knowledge and also for the cases of unusual or uncommon social
differences. But how does it explain all of those presentation techniques that were
identified in Chapter 3 as stimuli to laughter? When someone tells a story or relates
previous events, don’t we expect the speaker to tell about others involved and to make it
clear who says what? So now we have two conundrums: we don’t laugh at all
incongruity, and we laugh at some expected things, too. What is missing is the
explanation of “our conceptual patterns.” If we work on this part of the definition, more
will become clear.
The term conceptual pattern would seem to mean the ways our ideas are
organized, or the way that our ideas relate to each other. This moves our concerns about
incongruity into the mental realm and also adds to the conundrum: what happened to the
sociality aspect? Doesn’t talk about the mind and ideas and mental patterns move our
discussion into issues of the individual? Indeed, it does, and so we have to push the issue
further: How can incongruity be both social and mental at the same time? I believe the
explanation lies in the definition of reality, an explanation that is enhanced if we first find
a suitable description of reality. In the last chapter of his text Client-Centered Therapy,
Carl Rogers sets out 19 propositions in his “Theory of Personality and Behavior.” Within
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the 19 propositions of this theory of personality, Rogers describes reality in ways that are
useful for our consideration of laughter and incongruity.
Rogerian Reality
For most people, the word reality refers to what Rogers calls the “world of
experience” (483), which might be roughly described as the physical world. For Rogers,
however, the description of an objective reality is insufficient to explain individual
behavior, and the same problem follows us in the study of laughter. The mere presence
of contrast is insufficient to explain laughter because we don’t laugh at all incongruities.
The answer to why we laugh, therefore, does not lie in objective reality, but in a
subjective view of experiences, and here is where Rogers’ alternative definition of reality
as a subjective perception to experience proves useful. It gives us a new framework for
describing laughter: we can describe laughter from a phenomenological standpoint. The
shorthand usage of the term reality in the remainder of this discussion will refer to
Rogers’ definition of reality as subjective perception. A closer look at Rogers’
description, then, is in order.
In fact, Rogers’ theory begins with the very issue of reality that we are currently
interested in. The first two propositions state, “Every individual exists in a continually
changing world of experience of which he is the center” (483), and “The organism reacts
to the field as it is experienced and perceived. This perceptual field is, for the individual,
‘reality’” (484). Rogers further describes the “changing world of experience” as a
“private world” because it is comprised of “all that is experienced by the organism”
(483). In other words, within the physical world, experiences (what happens to and
around every individual organism) are unique to each individual organism, and those
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experiences are in a constant state of flux even for that particular individual. This means
that, for any two individuals, there are actually two sets of experiences at any given
moment. Additionally, as an individual experiences the changing world, he or she
perceives those experiences and reacts. The act of perception serves to make the
experience even more unique to the individual. The combination of first an experience
and then a perception of that experience serves to create a “private world” for an
individual within the larger physical world and serves to create a reality unique to that
individual alone.
Rogers clarifies with an example from other researchers (484), an example I will
include and expand upon here. Two people are riding in a car at night; this is an
experience. An object appears on the road just ahead of the car, exemplifying the
changing nature of the world of experiences. To one of the two individuals the object
seems to be a rock, that individual’s perception of that experience. To the other
individual the object seems to be a tumbleweed, the perception of the second individual
to the experience. The first individual reacts by screaming in fright. The second reacts
with silent indifference.
The emotional reactions of fright and indifference, clearly, are geared not to the
experience or even the changing nature of the world, but to the perceptions of the
individuals to those experiences. Therefore, Rogers defines reality narrowly as the
perceptual field of an individual since the perceptual field is what an individual bases
reactions on. This view of reality is what we are interested in since laughter has been
shown to be a reaction. In the example just cited, then, two perceptual fields, or two
realities, exist. One reality consists of the appearance of a rock in the road ahead: a
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reality based on the perceptions of one individual, and the second reality consists of the
appearance of a tumbleweed in the road ahead: a reality based on the perceptions of the
second individual.
As we read through the example above, we may respond by pushing for the next
change to the world: what happened as the car drew closer to the object? Did two
different perceptual fields and two realities continue to exist? The answer for Rogers
would be yes, two different perceptual fields continued to exist and two realities also
continued to exist, but the perceptual field and the reality of one of the individuals
changed from what it had been earlier. As the car approached the object in the road,
causing a change in the experience of the two individuals, the perception of the
experience could also change, and the first individual no longer perceived the object as a
rock, but began to perceive it as a tumbleweed, a perception that equaled that of the
companion in the car. In this way, the two realities did not become one reality, but
became two realities “with a high degree of commonality” (485). According to Rogers,
“for psychological purposes, reality is basically the private world of individual
perceptions, though for social purposes reality consists of those perceptions which have a
high degree of commonality among various individuals” (485). There is, therefore, yet a
third reality: a reality of perceptions common to various individuals. Taking up after
Rogers, we can describe the perceptual field of an individual as individual reality and the
perceptual field of commonality among various individuals as social reality.
There remains one more possible definition of reality, however, and if we extend
our example further, we can see it clearly. If the car draws even closer to the object and
hits it, what does this new experience do for the individuals in the car? Don’t they find
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out for certain whether it is in fact a tumbleweed, a rock, or even something altogether
different, say a downed tree? And doesn’t this new change in experience trump all of
their perceptions? And doesn’t this eliminate all potential realities and set up one actual
reality, a reality based on the physical world? Rogers would call such a view of reality an
“absolute concept of reality” (485), a reality that exists outside of any individual and
doesn’t even need to be shared among various individuals. He does not pursue even the
minimal definition I have attempted here, however, since it is “not necessary” for him in
his pursuit of a theory of personality and behavior (485).
For this study, too, a definition of an “absolute concept of reality,” or a
description of the physical world, is not necessary, for even such seemingly physical
experiences as hitting an object in the road to confirm or disconfirm a perception is
merely a new experience, and the “fact” of the object’s identity is merely a new
perception that each individual creates based on the experience of hitting the object. If
the car hits the object and it provides little resistance to the car, breaking apart into
smaller stick-shaped sections, both individuals may create the common perception that
the object was indeed a tumbleweed, but that perception may turn out to be “wrong” if
they should stop the car after hitting the object and inspect it even more closely with a
flashlight. They may with this new experience revise their perception yet again to
identify the object as some man-made contraption. This is why Rogers states that
“perception is essentially a hypothesis - a hypothesis related to the individual’s need and many of these perceptions are tested and retested by experience” (486). Through the
testing and retesting of perceptions, the world “acquires a certain predictability upon
which we depend. Yet mingled with these perceptions, which have been confirmed by a
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variety of experiences, are perceptions that remain completely unchecked [untested].
These unchecked perceptions are also part of our personal reality, and may have as much
authority as those which have been checked” (486). In short, an absolute concept of
reality is an illusion. It is merely the final perception that an individual holds after a
series of testings and retestings, and as such it is always a hypothesis of sorts, not a
“fact.” This final conclusion may exist as a perception that is held in common among
various individuals, but it remains part of the perceptual field and not outside the
individual. Figure 4 represents one possible scenario to illustrate the features of Rogerian
reality.

with two sorts of reality: individual reality, or the perceptual field of an individual, and
social reality, the perceptions held in common among various individuals. This means
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that the number of individual realities present at any time depends upon how many
individuals are present; for every person in a group there is a unique individual reality.
Verification o f Rogerian Reality
The participants in my study also note the difference in individual realities and
underscore Rogers’ definitions. Britney provides nearly the same point-by-point
description of the experiences and perceptions of two different individuals as Rogers does
when she talks about Meg’s story of the centipedes in the bathroom (see sequence (26)
107). In that story, Meg got up early to take a shower and discovered a centipede in the
bathtub that brushed up against her and prompted her to scream, waking the other
member of the household.
When asked what kinds of things get her started laughing, Britney replied that the
centipede story was one example, and the reason it got her laughing was “with just this
story in mind, just like awkward situations, you know. Like extreme situations, like
screaming your head off in the bathtub, like it’s a—it’s a silly awkward situation.” When
pressed further as to what was silly about it, Britney continued, “Screaming. I mean it’s a
little, little thing, you know, I mean, it’s like—seems out of proportion, you know, like
[an] extreme thing to do in respect to the situation, but—” And when asked why
screaming was out of proportion, Britney said, “Well, like you think of screaming- well,
I think of screaming as something like, urn, I’m going to be injured o r- You know, it just
seems like a big indicator of—you know, which would also be reflected in Ryan’s
reaction, as well, ‘you screamed and got me out of bed. I thought someone was jumping
in the window and murdering you. No!”’ When I wondered if I understood her idea
appropriately and restated what I understood, saying, “her screaming was out of
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proportion because she was not going to be injured by this thing.” Britney averred my
interpretation and added, “Except, I mean, she thought she was. So the scream was still
appropriate for her, but for me on my side it wasn’t.”
Here we see Britney first describe the laughable as exaggeration, as something
extreme, and as incongruous, or out of proportion. Then we see Britney identify three
different perceptions: Meg’s perception of herself as a person who was being attacked by
a centipede and on her way to injury, Ryan’s perception that because she screamed Meg
was a person who was being attacked and injured, and Britney’s perception of Meg as a
person who responded entirely out of proportion because the centipede was much too
small to injure her. Meg’s screaming fit Meg’s perception of impending injury, and
Britney’s laughing fit her perception of an incongruous response to a centipede.
After the fact, we see Meg admit that the story included exaggeration, some of it
intentional:
I’m sure it was discussed in horror and the idea of having really gross bugs
in the close vicinity of where you sleep and shower, um, I’m sure it was
again somewhat—I’m sure—I mean I think that they, ah, ah, Ann in
particular knows that I exaggerate a lot of what I say, so I’m sure she
laughed, but laughed knowing some of it was exaggeration, so. Well, I
think that, you know, like, I usually make a bigger—I sh—I guess it’s—it
might not be exaggeration, but it’s more that I make a bigger deal out of
smaller things, ah, and sometimes that’s just for dramatic effect for the
story. You know, it’s like, I brushed th e- the mill—the centipede when in
reality I just kinda looked back and saw it or something an d - and so I

151

think some of it she s—she kind of understands that well maybe this is just
her, you know, adding, adding dramatic effect or whatever.
Meg even informs us that it is the passage of time, the constantly changing nature of
experience, that allows her to reassess the experience:
Well, um I would say that finding millipedes w as- er, centipedes, er
whatever the heck they are, um, isn’t—wasn’t that it was a small deal, but
the actual getting into the bathtub, um maybe I just thought it wasn’t a big
deal after the fact, you know, that it sometimes feels like a big deal
when—when you’re going through it, when you feel the millipede, but um
afterwards it’s like oh it was just a millipede in the shower, you know, you
just wash him down and it’s not that big of a deal.
Meg informs us here that her initial perception of the centipede was that it was a big
issue, but that her later perception was that it was a small thing. We find out that in
telling the story, she relates not just her initial perception, a perception that is no longer
even part of her individual reality, but an exaggeration of that perception. In this way, we
find a double unreality in her story: the perception that she talks about has changed and is
no longer reality for her, and the perception that she talks about is exaggerated from what
her initial perception was. These two methods show how a speaker can create an
intentional incongruity in the content of a story and, therefore, tell a funny story.
Finally, to Meg’s hearer, Britney, there is yet a third unreality: the fact that the
perception Meg talks about is not part of Britney’s reality at all, nor is it even part of her
experience. She did not see or touch a centipede at all, and she can’t imagine screaming
even if she were to see or touch one. Screaming seems to her to be an unreal response to
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the experience. Importance must be placed on the hearer’s interpretation of an utterance
if it is the hearer who laughs. My participant, Wade, noted the same, “It’s just how you
interpret. It relies so much on the listener how funny it is.” In fact, the interpretation of
the hearer is what creates multiple social realities.
In addition to the multiple individual realities among different conversational
participants, there may be several different social realities, as well, according to how
many people are in a group and what is held in common by how many of them. A pair of
individuals will hold three realities at one and the same time: two individual realities and
one social reality. Three different individuals will hold at least four different realities:
three individual realities, and one social reality that is shared by all three individuals.
There may be more than these four realities, however, because there may be other social
realities, one social reality may consist of what is held in common by two of the three,
but not by the remaining third individual, and the grouping of dyads creates up to three
different social realities that leave out one of the individuals. Imagine a group of
individuals A, B, and C. Social realities can configure as A and B share common
perceptions, or as A and C share common perceptions, or as B and C share common
perceptions, or as A, B, and C all share common perceptions. So the possibility of seven
realities exists in a group of three individuals: three individual realities, and four social
realities.
In an example of a conversation where perceptions were held in common by some
participants but not by all, we can turn to Gigi’s story of her mother-in-law and the video
camera, a story we have encountered before (see sequence (6) 53). In the story, Gigi tells
of her son’s birthday when she gave him some musical instruments, and as the child plays
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with the toys, his grandmother exclaims that he is just like her. Gigi, in response, mouths
an obscenity to her husband, who happens to be holding a video camera, thus capturing
the obscenity for posterity. As the participants described their perceptions of the story,
Gigi indicated that she intended the story to be funny. Linda and Blanca took it so, but
Lily did not. Both the conversation itself and the subsequent interviews disclose the
different perceptions the individuals have towards the story.
During the conversation, Lily does not seem to catch Gigi’s intention nor to be
clear on certain details of the story. First she asks for clarification of the mother-in-law’s
claim, “Look, he’s musical just like Gramma,” when she asks, “When she said ‘just like
Gramma’ she meant - just like herself? Not like her grandmother.” When Gigi confirms
that the mother-in-law meant herself, Lily then asks, “Was she being facetious?” Later in
the interview, Lily said that her thoughts during the conversation were that she “hoped
that her [Gigi’s] mother-in-law would never read your paper” because she was “not really
sure how she [Gigi] meant it. I took it that her mother-in-law was maybe being
competitive or self-absorbed or something.. . . I think it was making me uncomfortable..
.. I think just the - you know the fact of talking about somebody and being recorded in
any instance. . . . Whatever. Just the danger of that.” When asked what the danger was,
Lily replied, “The danger would be that the mother-in-law would hear it or read it and be
offended or hurt or, you know, be upset and it would cause a big family riff, you know.”
Finally, when it was pointed out that Gigi herself during the conversation said that she
was trying to be funny, Lily said, “And I didn’t think it was funny.” Lily, therefore,
initially felt puzzled by Gigi’s choice of topic and by Gigi’s purpose in telling the story.
She sought clarification by asking if the mother-in-law was trying to be funny, but she
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missed that Gigi was the one trying to be funny. She saw incongruity in the story, but she
was puzzled rather than amused, and ultimately she felt a negative emotion (discomfort)
based on an element of danger that she perceived in the situation.
Lily’s reactions to Gigi’s mother-in-law story come from a conceptual pattern of
predictability built around Lily’s individual experiences with her own mother-in-law,
whom Lily characterizes as “not an interfering mother-in-law,” adding “I remember
saying that I had a good relationship with her.” Lily claimed that she felt the group had
some things in common, but “the mother-in-law stuff not so much because Blanca isn’t
married. So she can’t - you know, she wasn’t a part of that. And I don’t - you know, I
don’t see my mother-in-law that much. So it doesn’t seem to have much of a connection
for the three of us.” Lily’ perception of Gigi’s mother-in-law story reflected her own
experiences: since she has a good relationship with her mother-in-law, and her mother-inlaw doesn’t interfere, she was puzzled by Gigi’s mother-in-law’s words. She was also
puzzled by Gigi’s decision to tell the story to others, a decision which she took as
potentially dangerous to Gigi’s relationship with her mother-in-law.
Blanca, on the other hand, thought the story was funny. She was not puzzled at
all during the conversation, saying at the end of the story-telling, “I think I would have
done that.” Later in the interview, she acknowledged that she was neither puzzled nor
did she see anything negative in the situation. Her understanding was based on
experiences of her friends and her own mother, and she thought about one of the women:
I guess I was just thinking about my friend who had a similar mother-inlaw who was a little domineering, which to me is what it sounded like was
going on there. . . . I think I can relate to it somewhat just because my

155

friends have mothers-in-law, my sister has a mother-in-law, my mother is
a mother-in-law and I have just been able to see what they all have
experienced from both ends, as the daughter-in-law and the mother-in-law.
And it just seemed to be somewhat typical of their experiences.. . .
The lack of negativity lay in the fact that her final perception lacked danger:
At the same time, I-1 thought, ah, what’s the big deal. It’s just, you know,
the grandmother thing. . . . I don’t think it was really a big deal. Just one
of those things that you can get over, you just try to - it might be irritating
but you just try to let it go and—and just worry about the big issues. It just
seemed like a- a little thing. It’s like being caught with your pants down,
you know. That would have been embarrassing but it didn’t sound like it
turned out to be that way. I don’t think anybody noticed, if I remember
correctly.
Ultimately, Blanca felt amusement, even using the word “amusing,” and the amusement
was based on suspense, on an ending that she did not know: “I thought it was amusing. I
definitely did. . . . I mean I definitely listened because I wanted to know what happened
here, what was the outcome . . . ”
What the contrast between Blanca and Lily shows us is that two different
individuals can hear the same utterance and can perceive it in two different ways. Lily’s
perception was that the situation was puzzling and dangerous, and the story roused
negative emotion in her. Blanca perceived that, although the story held potential danger,
the end of the story displayed no actual danger, and the situation roused only amusement
in her. Since Blanca’s perception had amusement in common with Gigi, one social
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reality was created out of their two individual realities; they both interpreted the story as
“funny.” Lily’s individual reality, on the other hand, remained individual; no one else
held the perception that the story was confusing or dangerous in common with her.
With a definition of reality as the perceptual fields of individuals, we begin to
locate the mental aspects that relate to our interest in laughter, and with the definition of
social reality, we locate the social aspects that relate to our interest. Perceptions that
have been tested and retested lead to conceptual patterns of predictability based on a
number of experiences. Conceptual patterns are mentalistic in nature and do not belong
to the world external to the individual per se. As noted above, even “facts” that seem
external to any individual are merely perceptions that remain after testing and retesting
has ended. There is no absolute concept of reality. Some perceptions and consequently
some conceptual patterns are held by the individual alone, while others are held in
common with other individuals, creating a social reality that in turn creates the social
realm within which laughter occurs.
Equation o f Incongruity with Unreality
Now that we have arrived at a better understanding of incongruity and reality, we
can turn to the interrelationship of the two. One of my participants, Meg, provides the
initial clues to that relationship when she tries to explain why her conversational partners
laughed at her suggestion of throwing a Halloween party at her place. She claimed, “I
think they found it to be somewhat unrealistic and exaggerated because they— I think
they’re quite aware that there would never be a party in my place or very unlikely to be a
party at my place.” Meg’s words reference her party plans as an exaggeration. As we
have already seen, exaggerations and other poetic devices and presentation techniques are
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part of the nature of the laughable. Now we see that exaggerations are also defined as the
unreal. Very simply, then, the relationship that exists between incongruity and reality is
that incongruity is unreality. That is, incongruity, the equivalent of unreality, is what lies
outside of an individual’s perceptual field, which is a portion of the field of experiences
of an individual.
But we must pursue the logic of this statement more carefully. In particular, we
must ask whether exaggerations are exactly the same as unreality or merely a subcategory
of unreality. Meg brings more clarity when she says “I kind of told it as a joke. I mean it
meant—I knew that they would take it as a joke . . . and some of it ah, it was kind of
fiction, joke telling. . . ” Here Meg takes the definition of unreality a bit further, stating
that the unrealistic and exaggerated pieces of her story were intentional joke-making, and
were fiction. This suggests that unreality is not limited to the poetic device of
exaggeration alone but may be viewed as equivalent to the broader categories of joke
making and fiction writing. Therefore, we can push the correlations one step further and
say that the unreal and the incongruous are the same. Taking this step means that an
alternative description of the laughable is the unreal.
To test this new description, we need to review each category of the laughable
and see if we can locate unreality in each. The presentation techniques that speakers use
most obviously mark their utterances as statements of the unreal. Among the poetic
devices, exaggerations, understatements, metaphors, similes, and personifications are
obviously utterances of unreality: that is part of the definitions of these phenomena. A
pun has two meanings: one is the real meaning, the intended meaning that captures a
speaker’s perception, and the other is an unreal meaning, an unintended meaning that
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presents a perception that does not correspond to the speaker’s perception. While some
may think that a pun is intentional, it need not always be so, and our casual ways of
talking indicate that we may, indeed, state something with “no pun intended.”
An oxymoron is similar to a logical improbability and will be discussed with
other improbabilities, while a taboo resembles social difference and will be taken up
later, as well. Rhymes are unreal ways of rendering adult conversational speech in that
rhymes are uncommon outside of poetry and children’s games.
The presentation techniques used in story-telling present the unreal to hearers, as
well. Changing one’s voice and role-playing direct speech also clearly mark an utterance
as unreal to the speaker’s current perceptions of his or her own status. Verbal mistakes
are unreal renderings of intended sound sequences because what is said does not
effectively present the speaker’s perceptions to the hearers. Finally, laughter that spawns
more laughter acts as a discourse marker of the unreal nature of an utterance by the
speaker.
Incongruous content deals directly with the differences in perception of two
individuals. When the social difference between two people is stated directly and
obviously, the utterance shows that one individual’s experiences and perceptions are
different from another’s, and therefore unreal to the second individual. When an
utterance is made that describes the personal or the individual, again the difference in
experience and perception is obvious.
The taboo may reflect two types of unreality. First, as we have already seen, the
taboo is related to the personal, and the selection of the taboo as the topic of conversation
focuses attention on the individual. When conversants bring up a taboo topic, they talk
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about something that is highly personal to each individual since each individual engages
in the activities at idiosyncratic times and places. In a second way, the taboo presents
unreality to the social reality that is constructed by members of a society. In the social
reality that has been constructed, the presence of certain activities is denied existence as
experience. Therefore, when the taboo is raised in a conversation, it brings in an
experience that has been denied perception in the social perceptual field.
Logical contrasts and improbabilities reveal individual differences in experiences
and conceptual patterns, too, as do utterances whose accuracy of information is an issue.
As we experience multiple instances of similar phenomena, we build a conceptual pattern
that expects certain consequences when we again encounter a new instance of a similar
phenomenon. When a new consequence results, it is unexpected, but it is also deemed
improbable since the conceptual pattern has a strong foundation. Logical contrasts also
place the improbable alongside the expected and challenge us to fit the duality into our
conceptual pattern or to alter our conceptual pattern in a way that can hold both
simultaneously.
Contextual incongruities are rare, but the concern with individual versus social
realities also helps explain them. When an experience in the perceptual field is
unexpected, it presents an incongruity only if it is noticed by an individual. Contextual
incongruities that are noticed become the topic of conversation at some point as the
individual who perceived the item and perceived it as incongruous seeks to determine if
the item is part of the social reality or seeks to make it part of the social reality.
The identification of individual realities and the definition of the perceptual field
as reality partially answer our question of why some incongruities stimulate laughter and
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others do not. First, we had to determine what an incongruity is, and we have determined
that incongruity is the unreal, or what is “outside” of an individual’s perceptual field. But
this is only part of the description. Rogers describes two levels to the perceptual field: its
ground and its figure. He states,
. . . in this private world of experience of the individual, only a
portion of that experience, and probably a very small portion, is
consciously experienced. . . . [A] large portion of this world of experience
is available to consciousness, and may become conscious if the need of
the individual causes certain sensations to come into focus because they
are associated with the satisfaction of a need. In other words, most of the
individual’s experiences constitute the ground of the perceptual field, but
they can easily become figure, while other experiences slip back into
ground. (483)
The further identification of ground and figure creates two levels of unreality: 1)
experiences that are outside of an individual’s perceptual field, 2) experiences and
perceptions that are inside an individual’s perceptual field, but as the ground of that field,
not as the figure.
After merely defining incongruity, we must explain why some incongruities are
not laughed at. Incongruities that are outside and remain outside of an individual’s
perceptual field will go unnoticed and unlaughed at, but because of the constantly
changing nature of the world, anything that lies outside the experience and perception of
an individual can enter that individual’s perceptual field and be noticed as an incongruity.
Likewise, incongruities that are part of an individual’s perceptual field but lie in the
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ground of the field will go unnoticed, unless in the changing nature of the world they
move from ground to figure. Finally, we are faced with the question of what causes these
incongruities to move from one place to another? The naturally changing world is one
source, but another source is the current need or goal of an individual. For example, as
the individual feels thirst, he or she will focus on drinking as figure, but as the thirst is
slaked and hunger grows, the individual will shift focus from drinking to eating, making
eating figure and drinking ground. Yet another source that brings incongruities into the
perceptual field of an individual is another individual who brings a separate set of
experiences and perceptions into a conversation where a social reality is constructed. As
the second conversational participant shares an experience or perception, that experience
or perception may be incongruous with the perceptual field of the first individual or it
may be incongruous with the current figure of the first individual.
Placing the entire construct of reality and incongruity into a conversational
scenario, we can surmise the following. First, an incongruity must exist within an
individual’s experience and perception in order to be noticed. If an individual is unable
to perceive the incongruity, it will rouse no reaction. Second, an experience may be
perceived as incongruous or unreal to one individual but not to another. This suggests
that one person will laugh, but the other will not. Only the person who perceives the
incongruity will laugh. Third, the unreal depends entirely upon the current state of an
individual’s perceptual field, a state that is liable to change, so what may one day elicit
laughter from an individual may the very next day not elicit any laughter from the same
individual. Additionally, the key to whether an incongruity is noticed or perceived by the
individual depends on its relevance to the individual. An incongruity that is irrelevant to
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a particular individual may go unnoticed by that individual, and that individual will not
laugh.
If we apply Rogers’ concept of ground and figure to the issue of incongruity, we
can see that many incongruities may exist around an individual, but if those incongruities
are part of the ground of the perceptual field, they will go unnoticed. Only incongruities
that become figure will be perceived and they are the ones which will elicit laughter. The
question then becomes one of how something moves from ground to figure. Rogers
indicates that it is the need of the individual that drives the shift from ground to figure.
This claim means that an item’s relevance to the individual is important as well as an
item’s relevance to the individual’s current goal. This further suggests that the purpose
of the conversation itself plays a role in what incongruities will be noticed.
“The Shortest Distance between Two People”:
The Purpose of Laughter in Conversation
Now we have one answer as to why the environment or context provides few
laughables and why the conversation itself provides so many: the environment is usually
ground to the individuals involved in a conversation, and the conversation is figure. If
we go further and seek the function or purpose of conversation itself, we may discover
even more answers about which incongruities are noticed. One factor that we may note
at this point is that a conversation requires more than one person. If a conversation is
figure, then other individuals are also figure, and here we see the potential for the
Sociality Theory of laughter.
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The Functions o f Conversation

Closeness
To determine the function of conversation, I reviewed the comments of my
participants. I discovered that for a number of the participants, the goal in the
conversation was to get closer to their conversational partners. Six different participants
made comments directly identifying this purpose. Charlie said, “I think it’s a lot to get to
know them -- get more - this is someone you wanna get more closer to,” and Gigi, too,
referenced the need to “get to know people.” In a chain of statements, Britney said that
she often laughs when she is happy, when asked what situations make her happy and
react with laughter, she said, “I think a lot of them surround, like, closeness of people,
like, having a moment where I just feel really close with people.”
Further evidence that individuals in conversations are concerned with feeling
close to others comes in participant statements that described how a topic of conversation
was selected. These comments frequently referred to the selection of things in common
as the preferred topic. The implication is that if two people hold a perception in common,
they are closer to each other than two individuals who cannot find a common perception.
There were five comments that described the topic choice as something held in common.
Lily noted that not only was something in common selected, but also it was preferred,
“We started talking about school and that’s ju s t- for us, it’s easy to talk about because
it’s the one thing we have in common and then it just flows. And when we were trying to
talk about other things that we don’t have in common, then it’s very awkward, I think.”
Blanca concurred, strengthening the claim that commonality is commonality of
perception more than simply experience: “It just takes somebody to propose something

164

that’s halfway recognizable and normal sounding, kind of the, ah, test balloon to see, oh,
does anybody else have any recognition of feelings about this and if so, are they in
agreement with mine.”
Venting
People in conversations do not always select things in common as their topics of
conversation. A second frequent choice of topic is one’s current experience. When these
experiences are chosen as topics, they are often referred to as something that is on
someone’s mind. Seven comments described topic choice in this way. Gigi noted the
phenomenon in general and specifically within her conversation with Lily, Blanca, and
Linda, “If you’re really interested in something you bring it into the conversation. Lily
made a comment right when we started- um- talking about- um- ‘so I can’t talk about a
certain other graduate student.’ Because that is on her mind all the time. It’s always on
her mind because it’s such a point of irritation. And so I think if something’s in your
head, then you want to talk about it.” Meg more simply stated that one choice of topic
was, “a hot topic for me that week,” indicating that the topic was within her current
experience.
When we examine the statements of currency closely, however, we discover that
currency is not time-related, but rather self-related. Gigi’s comments about Lily’s
concern with another graduate student reveal the issue is on Lily’s mind not just at that
moment but always. The important thing is that the issue is on one’s mind, not that the
experience is recent in time. Roger, similarly, identified his preference of topic in
conversation as one of “what’s going on,” leading one to think the importance is timerelated, but he actually described “what’s going on” as “more important to me.” He even
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went further, saying “I told Charlie, like, when they’re out at a bar or something and
they’re talking, you know, with Phil and stuff, I’ll just kind of be totally- thinking about
some totally- not paying attention to anything they’re talking about. I’ll be thinking
about- my mind will be wandering off somewhere else, thinking about something else.”
Again, the issue of currency is not time-related but self-related, a stance implied in the
words of five of the participants. Wade even called himself “selfish” when he realized
the extent of his self-centered focus, “I feel very selfish now that I look back at the
conversation. I only remember what I brought up and what I wanted from it . . . . Jack
was not as informative or his information wasn’t as meaningful to me as it was from
Joey; it just seemed Joey knew more or could explain it better.”
Now it seems that the choice of topic creates a schism in the purpose of
conversation. If the purpose is to get closer to others, the choice of topics held in
common seems a clear way to feel close, a way for individuals to conclude “We have
both experienced an event, and therefore we are very similar.” When the selection of
topic is what is on one’s mind, and when the thing on one’s mind is clearly self-related,
we must ask how this serves the purpose of getting closer to others. The answer comes in
the words of some participants as “sharing” or “venting.”
Venting entails talking about experiences that are on one’s mind. In this case, the
speaker vents and the listener empathizes with the speaker. Bonnie describes both the
speaker’s venting role, “she’ll call me up on the phone randomly when she sees
something that’s driving her nuts and she’ll, she’s gotta have someone that will
understand,” and the listener’s empathizing role “picturing myself in that situation and
just thinking,. . . just thinking about how I would react in that situation or something.”
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Through empathizing, a listener is able share in the speaker’s experience and, therefore,
to hold it in common to an extent. In short, one talks about the seifs current experiences
in order to share it with a listener, which results in the listener’s empathizing and sharing
of that experience, creating a perception held in common with the speaker.
Entertainment
When a conversation results in a sharing of perceptions in common, the
conversation becomes fun and entertaining. Ann specifically claimed that her
conversation partner was “funny,” and when asked what she meant by that, answered, “I
just have a good time talking to her. We go out and we just discuss a lot of things about
like our day or things we’ve seen. .. . She can go out and have a good time and think
about things outside of school and think about things outside of her own life.” Ann’s
words reveal that funny is a good time, a time spent talking about one’s own experiences,
about one’s “day” or “things” one’s “seen.” Funny is also time spent talking about things
“outside” of one’s “own life,” perhaps things in another’s life. The implication is again
that sharing happens in a conversation: talking about one’s experiences as well as talking
about things other than one’s own life. What Ann further adds is the designation that this
type of conversation is “fun” or even “funny.”
One participant, Duane, cited entertainment as the purpose of conversation “most
of the time.” Yet even his comments on entertaining bring the purpose of conversation
full circle, for Duane explains what is involved in an entertaining conversation: “If it’s
more of an entertaining conversation, you’re taking it lightly, you’re associating that with
laughter, with happiness, with, you know, just kinda good old times kinda thoughts, and
it’s—it makes it a little bit more—memorable or easier to connect with.” When asked
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what a person in an entertaining conversation connects with, Duane replied, “Connect
with everyone else.”
Planning
The final purpose to conversation identified by participants was planning the
future. Charlie identifies this as one of the goals of his conversation with Roger, “We’ll
talk about our future goals with each other and kind of give each other guidance and
opinions on our future goals. We’ll plan activities.” Yet even within this purpose is
sharing: the giving of guidance and opinions is clearly sharing perceptions about possible
future events.
What the comments of the participants tell us in general is that the main purpose
of conversation is to get closer to our conversational partners, to connect with them by
sharing our experiences, especially those that are currently of great relevance to the self.
In short, the goal of conversation is the discovery or creation of a social reality. In
conversation, then, the issues that are part of the figure are the words that are spoken in
the conversation, the other participants in the conversation, the self, and whether or to
what extent an individual is able to connect with others through the sharing of individual
experiences that are most relevant to the self.
Laughter’s Functions in Conversation
Because the goal of conversation is the creation of a social reality, self and other
are figure in conversation. Laughter reflects sociality because sociality is figure in
conversation. Laughter centers on incongruities, and incongruities abound in social
situations because there is incongruity inherent in the self-other distinction. Since every
individual has a unique set of experiences and perceptions of that experience, there is a
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gap between any two individuals. When those two individuals attempt to connect with
each other in conversation, the gaps between their experiences and perceptions will
become part of the exchange, and those gaps will at times be perceived by the
participants in the conversation. At other times, when the gap is bridged and a
connection made, the bridging of the gap, not its elimination, is perceived. In both cases,
in the awareness of a gap and in the awareness of a bridge over the gap, the gap is
perceived and the one perceiving will laugh. Laughter has great sociality because
sociality has great incongruity; what is real to one is unreal to another. As we strive to
create a social reality by sharing our own experiences and perceptions of experiences
with another, we perceive the gap between more readily, and we laugh more readily.
Marking “Betweenness ”
Tom Delph-Janiurek, who looked at interview conversations between a researcher
and research participants, reached conclusions similar to mine. He claimed, “laughter,
including its presence or absence, is an example of listening behaviour through which
sameness or difference may be (re)constituted” (417). He thus characterizes laughter’s
role in conversation as one of “betweenness,” a concept that he defines as “the notion that
. . . researchers and researched mutually constitute each other” (414). In other words,
individuals engaged in speech interaction co-construct themselves as individuals in
relationship to each other, working in a space that lies between the two individuals. As
two individuals interact in conversation, they locate points of sameness and points of
difference. Laughter may mark both points, and Delph-Janiurek falls back upon our
casual ways of talking about laughter to clarify the two, saying, “A sense of sameness
and consensus amongst participants in a conversation is thus realized through shared
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‘humorous’ laughter. ‘Nervous’ laughter can mark sensitive points in conversations at
which a potential ‘danger’ has been recognized . .. such as behaviour that somehow
threatens the identity or role enacted by one or more interactants, disrupting the
interactional frame” (417). By describing humorous laughter as marking “consensus,”
and nervous laughter as marking a threat to “identity or role,” Delph-Janiurek talks about
laughter as marking points in conversation when one individual self holds reality in
common with an “other,” and points when an individual self holds a unique individual
reality: laughter marks the perception of a gap or the bridging of the gap.
Marking the Self-Nonself Distinction
Provine, too, has identified laughter’s role in the establishment of self and other
through his study of tickling. Provine first notes that “compared to comedy, tickle is a
more reliable and much more ancient stimulus for laughs” (99), intimating that the surest
way to get someone to laugh is to tickle him or her. He then notes “the critical social
dimensions of the stimulus” (100) when he points out “we can’t tickle ourselves” (116).
The fact that a person can’t tickle him- or herself demonstrates that tickling is an
inherently social activity, and the fact that this social activity is the only reliable way to
rouse laughter indicates to Provine that the roots of laughter lie in the self-nonself
distinction: “tickle requires the discrimination of self from nonself’ (113). Provine then
goes on to describe the neurological mechanisms of self-nonself identification, explaining
that there is “neurological cancellation of the sensory consequence of self-produced
movements” by a “neurological comparator that distinguishes self-stimulation of our
body (proprioception) from that produced by motile, external objects, or organisms
(exteroception)” (116). Provine says that stimuli produced by others is “less predictable”
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(116), and with the use of the words “less predictable” we see Provine’s work coincide
with my conclusions that incongruity is the unreal, that the unreal includes that which
originates outside of an individual’s perceptual field, and is, therefore, external or other.
In Provine’s words, “The less predictable the stimulus, the greater its nonselfness and
otherness. A nonself, animate stimulus meets the criterion for other, the lowest level of
‘social’ stimulus” (116-17).
Marking Play
Provine’s study of tickling brings the Semiotic Theory of laughter into focus as
well. Provine observed chimpanzees engaged in tickling behavior, a behavior which
induces a panting noise that resembles human laughter in some respects although not in
others. The conclusion Provine reaches is that “the vocalization of laughter . . .
originated in the ritualized panting of rough-and-tumble and sex play, whereby the sound
of labored breathing came to symbolize the playful state that produced it” (96-97). The
first level of the sign is the iconic sign, one that resembles its referent. Laughter
resembles the heavy breathing and panting of physical activity in play, and therefore the
iconic referent of laughter is breathing. The second level of signs is the indexical or
symptomatic sign. A sign at this level is one that points to something else that it coexists
with, and since heavy breathing coexists with playing, laughter is a symptom or index of
play. And here is where we need to ask the next question, “What is play?” Freud
provides an interesting answer to the question in “Creative Writers and Daydreaming,”
where he writes, “The opposite of play is not what is serious but what is real” (483). And
with Freud’s definition, we come back to my contention that the nature of the laughable
is the incongruous which can be redefined as the unreal, and laughter as a symptomatic
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sign points to play, which for Freud is simply another term for the unreal. As a symbolic
sign, then, or a sign that has an arbitrary relationship to its referent, laughter carries the
meaning of other, for that is what a child leams as he plays. He learns about himself and
others and his relationship to the other. As he plays, he comes to distinguish the serious
from the playful, the real from the unreal, and the self from the other. Laughter in
conversation means that a laughing individual sees the gap between the self and the other.
Once one sees a difference between the self and other, one can make judgments
about both. Here is how the Superiority Theory fits into the system of laughter in
conversation. The flaw in the Superiority Theory is its implication that one must feel
superior to another in order to laugh. In truth, the Superiority Theory is merely a
narrower interpretation of the Sociality Theory. Behind a sense of superiority must lie a
sense of difference. One cannot be exactly the same as another and hold a sense of
superiority. One can only perceive a difference first and then make a judgment about the
value of the two different individuals.
We have now accomplished the original goal of creating a deeper understanding
of laughter than we had at the beginning of this study. One of our goals was to study
naturally-occurring laughter to see which, if any, of the five different theories of laughter
was accurate or whether all were accurate in some way and could be combined together
in a more systematic whole. The discovery is that the structure of laughter in
conversation can be used to identify laughables. Analyzing laughables led to the
conclusion that the nature of the laughable was incongruity. By looking more closely at
incongruity, we were able to see its connection to individual perception and reality. By
looking at the goals that individuals have as they engage in conversation, we discovered
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that the function of laughter in conversation is to assist in the pursuit of the goal of
connecting with and becoming closer to others. Its ability to assist lies in the fact that it
arises from incongruities, and incongruity is inherent in the gap between the self and
other. The high amount of incongruity between people leads to the high sociality of
laughter. By symbolizing the gap between the self and other, it can increase the gap or it
can bridge the gap. If the gap is increased, there will be greater alienation between the
two interactants, possibly with one or both feeling superior to the other. If the gap is
bridged, the two interactants will affiliate and become closer to each other by creating a
social reality wherein perceptions are held in common. It is inaccurate to think that
laughter indicates only one emotional state, such as amusement. Even our casual ways of
talking about laughter don’t support this point of view.
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CHAPTER 5
THE LAST LAUGH: CONCLUSION
This study began with a desire to understand the role of laughter in conversation.
The results of the study lead to far deeper issues: the purpose of conversation, the nature
and perception of human experience, and the definition of reality. While such issues
would initially appear far afield from the issue of laughter, laughter’s apparent
universality in human behavior as a means of expression and communication should
indicate its essential tie to basic human nature.
Through the collection and analysis of real conversations, I have been able to
locate unmanipulated occasions of laughter, and the unmanipulated occurrence of the
laughter further suggests that the results would point to basic human nature, for there is
no intentional manipulation of laughter or conversation other than that which is basic to
ordinary human interactions. Nevertheless, the question arises whether my analysis here
is generalizable beyond the social groups to which my participants belong. Do people of
other cultures speaking other languages than English structure their laughter in the same
ways Americans do? Do people of other cultures laugh at the same sorts of stimuli that
Americans do? Do people of other cultures react to incongruity with the same three
emotions that Americans do? These are questions that deserve to have answers before we
can achieve a full understanding of laughter and human behavior. One approach to
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obtaining these answers might be a replication of my study with participants who are
members of other cultures having conversations in languages other than English.
A review of this study and its results might be in order if its replication is
appropriate. By studying laughter in real conversations, I analyzed its placement in
relation to other conversational elements. To determine ways to describe the structure, I
used the conversation analysis approach to discourse analysis. Other researchers using
this approach have identified structural features that are common in all conversations,
including turn-taking, backchannel, and discourse markers. Of these general features,
turn-taking has been analyzed in greater detail and micro-levels of structure have been
identified. Among these micro-features are adjacency pairs and moves. Laughter is
integrated into these regular structures of conversation, and it appears in adjacency pairs
as both a first pair part and as a second pair part. It also appears in backchannel and as a
speaker discourse marker. These results confirm the work of previous researchers in the
structure of laughter in conversation but also extend those earlier studies. I have labeled
laughter a paralinguistic discourse marker, a step neither Jefferson, Glenn, nor Schiffrin
has taken. I have also shown that when laughter serves as a speaker discourse marker, it
cannot be taken only as an invitation to laugh, as Jefferson claimed, but it can be taken
also as a request by the speaker for others to laugh. Also, since Jefferson claimed that the
role of laughter in conversation was to create affiliation but Glenn claimed that it could
disaffiliate, clarity was needed to determine what speaker laughter meant: an invitation or
request to affiliate or an invitation or request to disaffiliate?
The meaning of laughter was sought by interviewing the participants, a
methodological approach that conversational analysts do not typically employ. It was
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pursued in this study to see if the participants would be able to provide insights into what
they thought or felt at the time they laughed during the conversations. The participants
indicated that laughter often signaled agreement, especially when it took the structure of
backchannel, but also when it formed the second pair part of an adjacency pair. When it
acted as a discourse marker, it could declare that the speaker considered a statement
funny or that the speaker wants to know if the others in the conversation find the
utterance funny. This is how it can be seen as either an invitation, as Jefferson claimed,
or as a request, as I have additionally claimed.
The meaning of laughter as a signal of agreement or as a request or invitation for
agreement relates directly to the purpose of conversation in general, which my
participants generally claimed was to get closer to others. The location of points of
agreement or disagreement is important to the goal of closeness. If two individuals can
locate points of agreement or points “in common,” they will feel close to each other. If,
however, they locate points of disagreement, they will feel greater distance from each
other. Fundamental to the situation is the fact that each individual has unique
experiences and unique perceptions of those experiences. The uniqueness of experience
and perception creates individual realities, and only by discovering common experiences
and common perceptions of common experiences can individuals connect with others and
create a social reality.
Therefore, fundamental to laughter is the identification of agreements and
disagreements, points of congruity and incongruity. In my study I have attempted what
no other researcher has attempted: a description of the laughable in real, unmanipulated
conversations. After using the structure of laughter in conversations to point to the
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laughable elements, I analyzed the propositional content of the laughable utterances and
the laughable elements of the context, and I discovered that the nature of the stimulus to
laughter is incongruity. To understand why we don’t laugh at all incongruities, a new
definition or clarification of incongruity was sought and found Carl Rogers’ humanist
psychology. The definition of incongruity as something that is outside of one’s
individual experience, perception, and conceptual patterns opposes incongruity with
Roger’s definition of individual reality. Thus, incongruity is unreality, and the
incongruous or unreal serve as the laughable. This result validates the traditional
Incongruity Theory of humor, but does not invalidate other theories.
The Sociality Theory is accurate in that laughter is largely circumscribed by social
contexts: it occurs far more in interpersonal interactions than in any solo activity. This is
likely the case because there are far more incongruities between two individuals than
between an individual and the physical world, especially the inanimate physical world.
The Superiority Theory is merely a narrower interpretation of the Sociality Theory,
claiming that we laugh when we realize our own personal ascendancy over another. My
results do not suggest that a sense of gain over another is necessary, merely the sense of
difference and incongruity. The sense of difference is inherent in a sense of superiority,
and thus it shares the same base in its description of laughter as Sociality. The narrower
view, however, is unwarranted, although it is not entirely erroneous, for at times social
difference can be accompanied by a sense of superiority. Indeed, my results show that
laughter is not tied to any particular emotion, and superiority is a sense, a judgment, and
the claim that laughter indicates this particular feeling or judgment is proved as erroneous
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as the claim that laughter accompanies only the feeling of amusement and not a negative
emotion such as fear or anxiety, or the feeling of puzzlement or uncertainty.
Since laughter does, however, indicate incongruity with an individual’s
conceptual patterns built on individual experiences and perceptions, it relates directly to
the perception of an experience as real or unreal. Poetic devices, especially exaggeration
and understatement, and role-playing mark an utterance as unreal. Laughable content
that includes direct contrasts, social differences, and logical improbabilities all describe
situations that are unreal within the conceptual patterns that have been created by the
participants in the conversation. In this way, laughter coexists with an attitude of play,
for play is the opposite of real. The Semiotic Theory o f laughter draws on the conflation
of unreality and play, for the origin of laughter is seen in its imitation of heavy breathing
in rough-and-tumble play and tickling. As an indexical sign, it then points to incongruity,
and symbolically it represents the gap between self and other.
What my study fails to satisfy is a confirmation or disconfirmation of the Relief
Theory. Because my results show that laughter does not coexist with any one emotion,
there is some confirmation that we should view it as a physical or physiological
phenomenon, not an emotional one, and this seems to coincide with some interpretations
of the Relief Theory. Because my results locate sociality as a ready source of
incongruity, Freud’s contention that jokes are borne out of hostility and sexuality seems
logical because hostility and sexuality are socially bound, but this seems to place Freud in
the Sociality camp rather than in the Relief camp. There is tension in the goal of
conversation to get closer to others: the achievement of success or failure in that goal
may produce a feeling of tension, and the resolution of the goal, especially in success,
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would relieve that tension. Because these conclusions are so speculative and lack
conclusive data from my study, further work should be done, perhaps a study that places
strangers together in conversation would enlighten us more on the role of tension, its
sources, and its release.
While my study has found points of intersection that connect the five different
theories of laughter and humor together, much more work can be done to study the
phenomenon of laughter. I have already mentioned two different ways of selecting
participants. One approach to participant selection would be to choose participants from
different cultural groups using different languages to engage in conversations and
interviews. Another approach would be to select strangers to engage in conversations;
however, the caveat must be mentioned that such an endeavor may result in less than
natural occurrences of conversations. There will be a sense that such situations have
been set up.
Other alterations in methodology might address the question of which type of
laughable is deemed funniest, a question that might be answered if finer recording
instruments are used so that the exact number of individuals who laugh can be quantified.
Yet further alterations to the study could vary the type of social exchange from
conversations to meetings or classes. It is possible that laughter will be structured
differently or will function differently in these types of situations, and such discoveries
would greatly enhance our understanding of laughter. Continued work with empirical
data and the pursuit of more naturally-occurring data seems to be what is needed in our
ongoing attempts to understand laughter and ourselves. Even if the result simply
confirms the older traditional theories, we can feel surer of the understanding and seek
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ways to apply this deeper understanding of ourselves to our daily interactions with others,
interactions we have with strangers, with friends, at work, at school, and in families.
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APPENDIX A: CONSENT LETTER
Hello!
My name is Linda Houts-Smith. I am a graduate student at the University of North Dakota in the
English program working on my Ph.D. You are being asked to take part in a research study to
identify the structure and meaning of elements found in everyday conversational patterns. You
have been chosen because you share similar social and cultural traits with other participants in
the study.
If you agree to take part in this research study you will be asked to participate in a twenty-minute
conversation with two others at a place and time convenient for all participants and me. The
conversation will be recorded and I will take notes on paper as I observe the conversation. After
the conversation, you will be asked separately in two different interviews for your perspectives,
views, and feelings about the conversation. The interviews will also be recorded. Participation
in one conversation and two interviews will take approximately four hours of your time,
including an introductory meeting, the conversation time, and the two interviews. You may
participate in more than one conversation or limit yourself to one as you wish.
Since the conversations will be free-form, you may find yourself expressing thoughts and
feelings that you’d prefer to remain private, or you may find yourself discussing issues that
produce feelings of anger, sadness, or other emotional upset. Likewise, when asked your
perspectives on the conversation during the interviews, you may find yourself reliving these
feelings of emotional upset. To alleviate any concerns you might have should any of the above
occur, the following steps will be taken. First, you will be given a pseudonym in the
transcription process. Pseudonyms will also be supplied for any names you may mention during
the conversations or interviews. My final dissertation report and any subsequent publications or
presentations will only refer to these pseudonyms. The consent forms will be shredded three
years after the study has been completed, according to regulations. Second, although I may be
assisted in the transcription process, the transcriptionists will not know you personally; they will
be hired out of different communities than this one. Third, your decision to take part in this
research study is entirely voluntary. You may discontinue participation at any time.
Although you may not benefit from taking part in this study, findings may help explain how
Americans communicate and interact with each other on a daily basis. If you have any questions
about the research now or during the study contact: Linda Houts-Smith, by phone (218)2911435, or by email, linda_houts_smith@und.nodak.edu. If you have any questions regarding your
rights as a research subject, you may contact the Office of Research & Program Development at
the University of North Dakota at 777-2049.
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If you agree to participate in this study, please read, sign, and date the statement of consent on
the reverse side of this page.

Subject's Statement of Consent
I have read the above description of this research study. I have been informed of the risks and
benefits involved, and all my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. Furthermore, I
have been assured that any future questions I may have will also be answered by a member of the
research team. I voluntarily agree to take part in this study. I understand I will receive a copy of
this consent form.
Name (please print):____________________________
Signature:_____________________________________
Date:

____
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APPENDIX B: TRANSCRIPTION SYMBOLS
[

(square bracket)
indicates overlapping speech
The bracket connects two utterances that overlap at the point where the overlap begins.
Example: Laura begins speaking before Rick finishes, so her utterance overlaps his
beginning with Rick’s word “about”
Nina:
Rick:

You haven’t voted yet, let’s not even get into this.
I told you about that —

[
Laura:
=

(1.5)

You’ve already discussed this.

(equal sign) indicates latching
The equal sign indicates that no interval exists between the end of one utterance and the
beginning of another. Most typically used when an overlap occurs in the middle of an
utterance and the utterance must continue beyond one line in the transcript.
Example: Gabriela’s first utterance is somewhat interrupted by Helen’s, but she does not
give up the floor in spite of that, and to indicate that Gabriela has not
paused while Helen utters ‘kay, the latching symbol is included.
Gabriela:

Well, call, yeah, cause six, seven-fifteen’ll be the last one.
I don’t think I have anything as of right now. So if you
call right away in the morning at, like, nine=

Helen:
Gabriela:

‘kay.
=you’ll be good to go.

(number in parentheses)
pause length
The number indicates the approximate number of seconds that a pause lasts.
Example:
Linda:
Gigi:
Blanca:

Mm-hm.
Mm-hm.
(6.76 sec)
Seems like that area is so populated now.

(dash) Break in thought or structure by speaker who then continues
Example: As Allie attempts to describe an appendectomy procedure, she reformulates
the structure of her speech three different times.
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Allie:

?

Yeah, so I just know that it’s like two—they’re making two
little holes, one for like a scope and one for like a too—a
cutting tool and sort of like grab the appendix out and pull
it out, so two little holes is all. And that she— they’re
sending her home today. And that’s all it is.

(single question mark) rising intonation or question
Appearing at the end of a regularly structured question, simply indicates the questioning
nature of the utterance. Appearing at the end of some statements, indicates a rising
intonation which may or may not be making the utterance into a question.
Example of Question:
Allie:
Linda:

Did you build a house?
No. We just bought one that already existed=

Example of Rising Intonation:
Amy:

??:

We found a plan we liked. We wanna do like a wrap
around porch. To kind of make it look as if it’s more
traditional and not built in 2004? Or whenever.

(double question mark followed by colon) indicates unidentifiable speaker
At times a transcriptionist is unable to identify a speaker with certainty, usually due to
shortness of an utterance or overlapping speech.
Example: Ann makes a statement on how she would treat a spider, and one of the other
participants says no with a rising intonation, and Ann provides a fuller
explanation
Ann:
??:
Ann:

It’s not like I would kill it.
No?
No I just made it run away and hide and then it ?????.

????? (multiple question marks, usually five)
indicates indecipherable speech
At times a transcriptionist is unable to determine the words in an utterance. This is
usually due to overlapping talk, talk at a volume too low to be picked up by the
microphone, or talk that is not enunciated clearly.
Example: Meg and Britney overlap their talk, and neither utterance is clear enough for
transcription.
Meg:

I can understand why you have ?????

[
Britney:

?????
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(colon in an utterance)
prolongation of a particular sound
A colon after any particular letter indicates a prolonged pronunciation of that particular
sound. Multiple colons indicate greater lengthening
Example: As Betsy speaks the word and, she lengthens the initial sound represented by
the letter a.
Betsy:

(())

a::nd- so he couldn’t get in there, so he had to like go
around the block=

(double parentheses) transcriptionist characterization of vocal modulations
At times the transcriptionist feels the need to capture something of the scene or manner of
vocalizing that is not typical or frequent in the data. Rather than creating a device that
will be used only once or twice, the transcriptionist will provide a written description in
double parentheses.
Example: The conversation participants are discussing a role played by Leonardo
DiCaprio, and Joey imitates the voice DiCaprio used in his
characterization of the part.
Joey:
Wade:
Joey:
Wade:

ha-ha-ha.That’s Leonardo.
DiCaprio
((in an imitative voice))Yeah, yeah=
heh-heh

Me

(underlining) vocal emphasis by speaker
When a speaker adds emphasis to a word or syllable through greater volume and higher
pitch, the emphasis will be noted with underlining.
Example: Gigi adds emphasis to the final word in her utterance, so the word me is underlined.
Gigi:

= I’m sorry, musical like me.

Note on phonetic articulation in the transcriptions
Some attempts will be made to capture the sound quality of certain utterances, but since
pronunciation is not the focus of this particular study, the conventions of written English
will be primarily adhered to. Where the conventions are ignored, the alternatives will be
written with easily identified “literary” transcriptions, much as would be found in a novel
where attempts are made to capture a variety of speech of a particular character. These
alternatives will not be presented consistently.
Example of phonetic transcription:
Gigi:

=some people either back away from it or they feel
compelled to stick their face in it. /ae se ae/
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Example of literary transcription: Rhoda doesn’t articulate “I don’t know” clearly, but
uses the elision typical of fast speech. Rather than indicate the standard written format or
attempt to capture the speech phonetically, it is rendered with “literary” transcription.
Helen:
Rhoda:

Why didn’t he just wear what he wore last night?
I dunno.
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